Pol. Sc

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXIII, Number 4 July 1971

Price $9.00 per year

SERIAL DEPARTMENT
HOWARD UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

KLAUS KNORR, *Chairman*

GRAHAM T. ALLISON
CYRIL E. BLACK
ROBERT A. DAHL
WILLIAM T. R. FOX
TED ROBERT GURR
MORTON A. KAPLAN
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
RAYMOND TANTER

Editors: KLAUS KNORR, CYRIL E. BLACK, HENRY BIENEN (*review articles*)
Associate Editors: FRANCINE R. FRANKEL, ROBERT G. GILPIN,
EDWARD L. MORSE, ROBERT L. TIGNOR, EDWARD R. TUFTE
Executive Editor: ELSBETH G. LEWIN

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers. WORLD POLITICS does not usually accept manuscripts for which subsequent publication, even in somewhat different form, is planned.

Manuscripts should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Rates: $9.00 per year; $15.00 for two years; $20.50 for three years. Foreign postage, 50 cents additional per year. Single issue, $2.50.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *Social Sciences & Humanities Index* and the *Book Review Index*. Abstracts of its articles appear in *Historical Abstracts* and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Back issues: WORLD POLITICS is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Volumes I-XVII are available from Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003, at $20.00 per volume. Volumes XVIII on are available from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Reprint permission: Permission to reproduce or translate material from WORLD POLITICS should be sought from the Permission Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Copyright © 1971 by Princeton University Press
"Development under Two Systems" *Copyright © 1971 by Abram Bergson*

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. July 1971. Vol. XXIII, No. 4. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. XXIII · JULY 1971 · No. 4

CONTENTS

Development under Two Systems: Comparative Productivity Growth since 1950 — *Abram Bergson* — 579

The Social Costs of Modernization: Ecological Problems in the USSR — *David E. Powell* — 618

Strategic Interdependence and the Politics of Inertia: Paradoxes of European Defense Cooperation — *Michael J. Brenner* — 635

The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development — *Myron Weiner* — 665

REVIEW ARTICLES

Political Science in the USSR: "To Be Or Not To Be" — *Rolf H. W. Theen* — 684

Soviet Foreign Policy Studies and Foreign Policy Models — *William Welch and Jan F. Triska* — 704

Index to Volume XXIII — 735

The Contributors — ii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

ABRAM BERGSON is Frank W. Taussig Research Professor of Economics at Harvard University. Among his more recent books are *Essays in Normative Economics* (1966) and *Planning and Productivity under Soviet Socialism* (1968). He is at present working on a quantitative appraisal of socialist economic performance.

DAVID E. POWELL is Assistant Professor at the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia. He is currently engaged in a study of the social costs of modernization in the USSR.

MICHAEL J. BRENNER is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Cornell University. At present he is engaged in a study of the conceptual bases of United States foreign policy making.

MYRON WEINER is Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress* (1967), editor of *State Politics in India* (1968), and co-author of the forthcoming *Crises and Sequences of Political Development.*

ROLF H. W. THEEN, Associate Professor of Political Science at Iowa State University, is the editor and translator of *The Early Years of Lenin* (1969), by N. Valentinov. He is completing work on a book, *The Political Thought of P. N. Tkachev*, and is doing research on the Jacobin tradition in Russian social thought, and for an intellectual biography of V. I. Lenin.

WILLIAM WELCH, Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, is the author of *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy* (1970).

JAN F. TRISKA, Professor of Political Science at the Institute of Political Studies at Stanford University, is currently engaged in a study of comparative national risk-taking in international politics. He also cooperates in an inter-university, international research project on political participation in Eastern Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DEVELOPMENT UNDER TWO SYSTEMS: Comparative Productivity Growth since 1950

BY ABRAM BERGSON*

INTRODUCTION

A FAMILIAR and yet notable feature of socialism is the nature of the countries where that form of social organization prevails. With few exceptions, all are economically among the less advanced countries of the world. At least, they were so at the time socialism emerged in them.

In those countries, then, socialism rather than its great rival, capitalism, has been the instrument for further economic development. How have they fared in consequence? What in particular of the claim often made by proponents that socialism is a superior system for such development?

Both the nature of the countries concerned and the socialist claim are paradoxical, to say the least. Among composers of encomiums of capitalism as a vehicle for economic advance, few surpass Karl Marx. We must still be somewhat incredulous that, for example, the *Communist Manifesto* should contain such lines as these:

> The bourgeoisie . . . has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals. . . . The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together.[1]

For Marx, it is true, socialism was to be economically superior to, and indeed was on that account ultimately to supersede, capitalism. But in any particular country it could be expected to do so only at a late stage of capitalism, when that system had run its course; only, that is, after capitalism had finally ceased to be the great engine for material advance that, in Marx's view, it must prove to be in earlier phases.

* *Copyright 1971* by Abram Bergson.

This essay revises and expands upon a John and Dora Haynes Foundation lecture that I gave at the University of California, Santa Barbara, in May, 1970. In preparing the lecture for publication, I have benefited from advice of Professors Simon Kuznets and Zvi Griliches. The work was aided by a grant from the National Science Foundation.

[1] International Publishers (New York 1932), 11-14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These proverbial theories of Marx are rarely considered in socialist discussion of economic modernization. As every sophomore knows, Marx stood Hegel on his head. Those proponents of socialism who urge that it is relatively meritorious at earlier economic stages would now seem to be performing a similar stunt in respect to Marx himself. We may even wonder whether some latter-day Marxians may not soon be led to elaborate their doctrine further, and so come to hold that socialism will not so much succeed, as precede, capitalism. In effect, socialism would then represent not an alternative to capitalism but only a novel and allegedly efficacious path to it.

But the fact remains that socialism has tended to come into existence primarily in less advanced countries. And, whether Marxian or not, the view that socialism is especially meritorious in promoting economic development in such countries, has enjoyed wide currency even among non-Socialists.

It is also a view that could easily become the subject of a lengthy inquiry. But a summary appraisal, taking account of not always well-known results of continuing Western research, may be of value. The appraisal must also be very selective. Most importantly, I focus exclusively on socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe. I thus bypass that system as found in China and other Asiatic countries. Their omission is regrettable, for only in Asia do we find socialism at an especially early economic stage. Some would hold that it is particularly at such a stage that socialism is advantageous. Only there can we observe the contribution that that system might make in the critical phase where the process of development in any modern sense has its earliest beginnings.

The claim as to the comparative merit of socialism as an instrument of economic development, however, is by no means confined to such a very early phase. Moreover, the USSR and Eastern Europe have considerable appeal for an inquiry such as this because Western research on their experience with socialism is relatively extensive.

Among socialist countries of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia is a special case. All those countries alike, when they became socialist, proceeded faithfully to organize themselves economically in conformity with the famous system of "centralist planning" that had originated in the USSR, primarily under Stalin. Eastern European socialist countries have conducted their economic affairs under that system ever since, at least until recently. Rather, this has been so except in Yugoslavia, which long ago veered away from "centralist planning" toward the more decentralized system emphasizing markets that has come to be called

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"market socialism." Interesting as Yugoslavia's experience is, I must leave it for separate inquiry.

In sum, attention is directed to European members of COMECON,[2] all of which have applied centralist planning up to almost the present day. Now, of course, economic organization is in flux even among COMECON countries. The much-discussed planning reforms there, however, do not seem generally as sweeping as was once thought. Centralist planning has in any event an interest of its own. Along with socialism, it is a cardinal facet of the famous "Soviet model," one of the principal options considered wherever the mode of development is in question.

The model is also usually construed as embracing a particular development strategy. Such strategy almost inevitably has varied in emphasis from country to country and from time to time, but everywhere and always there manifestly has been a notable stress on economic advance, and along with it on economic self-sufficiency, especially in relations with the capitalist West.

In implementing such a strategy, moreover, public authorities in the USSR and Eastern Europe have had extraordinary power over economic affairs, and indeed over affairs generally. Perhaps, therefore, authoritarian rule by a Communist Party should also be considered an element of the Soviet model. We may wonder, however, whether such rule is not an integral feature of socialism generally; at least if socialism is understood, as it most often is, primarily as a system in which ownership of the "means of production" is predominantly public. Authoritarianism seems nowhere to have been avoided where there is socialism in that sense. Still, many socialists sincerely aspire to avoid authoritarianism. If that should be at all possible, economic development might turn out rather differently from that under the socialism we are to examine.

Inquiry into experience regarding economic development must start somewhere. Socialism has its beginnings in Eastern Europe at the end of and right after the second World War. For all these countries alike, I shall focus on the period since 1950. Earlier postwar years were notably turbulent, and hence can be of little interest for our purposes.

In the USSR, socialism dates from the first World War, but I shall focus there too on the years since 1950. Some of the East European countries examined were, in 1950, at a stage of economic development

[2] The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, founded in 1949. Yugosalvia too has been associated with this agency, but as an observer rather than a member. I shall also pass over Albania, however, even though it is a European member.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comparable to that of the USSR at the outset of the famous Five-Year Plans in 1928. Hence, we may gain some insight into socialism at a stage comparable to that of the USSR in 1928 without venturing into the early Soviet experience itself. That extraordinary experience, nevertheless, can hardly have been duplicated fully anywhere, but, if considered at all, it would have to be the subject of a study in itself.

Our inquiry must be comparative. With which capitalist countries should we juxtapose the socialist countries of COMECON? A comparison of socialist performance with that of any and all capitalist countries might be of interest, but it may suffice here to consider members of the Western counterpart of COMECON, that is, OECD.[3] As with contemporary capitalist economies generally, those of the OECD are usually decidedly mixed and rather remote from the pure laissez-faire, private-enterprise system of text books. A comparison of COMECON and OECD performance, however, surely should be illuminating.

Appraisal of Performance

How shall we gauge comparative performance regarding economic development? Among many diverse criteria that might be applied, only a few are at all comprehensive. Of these, one of the most outstanding by far is the growth of labor productivity, as represented by national income or output per worker. A summary account may properly apply primarily that yardstick.

As the primers teach, however, a social system must affect such growth mainly through its impact on three conditioning forces: (1) the share of the national income devoted to investment, and with that, the increase in the stock of reproducible capital (plant and machinery, transportation facilities, and so on) available to collaborate with labor; (2) improvement of the quality of labor, as reflected in worker attitudes and skills; (3) technological progress, including innovations in productive technologies and also gains in efficiency of the particular working arrangements (institutions, policies, and practices) through which economic affairs are conducted.

Depending on the comparative influence of these forces, then, one system may favor growth of labor productivity more than another. But

[3] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, established in 1960 as the successor to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Among OECD countries, I omit Luxembourg and Iceland because of their tiny size, Spain because of the lack of needed data, and Finland because of its somewhat special status. I must again bypass Yugoslavia, though it participates in some OECD activities as well as being an observer in COMECON.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

just which forces are responsible is not immaterial. Rather, allocation of national income to investment must entail a cost in the form of a sacrifice of other uses of that income, principally consumption. The larger the allocation, the larger the cost. As for the improvement of labor quality and technological progress, these too must often entail costs, the former in the form of "investments in human capital," the latter in the form of outlays for research and development. But, relative to the increment of productivity, such costs very often should not be at all comparable to those represented by an increase in investment in physical capital. That should be so especially in respect of technological progress. It is perhaps often so for the improvement of labor quality as well.

As not always considered, moreover, costs incurred may be more or less offset by intrinsic benefits generated quite apart from the effect on productivity. For well-known reasons, such benefits are usually regarded as especially weighty in the case of labor quality improvement, particularly where that reflects additional education. Intrinsic benefits are often claimed to be generated as well, however, when productivity grows on other counts: as where a modern investment project is held to enhance national prestige.

Different sources of productivity growth should differ in these ways under one system as well as under another, but they may do so in differing degrees. The reasons are diverse. Suffice it to recall the familiar contention that one system may be inherently more favorable than another to workers' attitudes. If that is so, the effect should be primarily of a once-for-all sort, but a continuing improvement in labor quality might also occur. If it does, the cost of the improvement of labor quality must be all the less. That is also apt to be so in the case of technological progress so far as systems differ in incentive arrangements. Although innovators might profit more in one case than another, the same technological progress might be achieved at less cost to the community generally. Gains in efficiency of economic working arrangements are also seen here as a factor in technological progress. Hence the costs of such progress should again be diminished if, as is possible, one system were to be inherently more favorable than another to the achievement of such gains. The difference in gains in efficiency would manifest, in effect, a corresponding difference between the two systems in capacity for economic self-improvement.

Even if productivity should grow at the same rate under one system as under another, then, the growth could be more costly in one case

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than in the other. In appraisal of performance that possibility must be considered. Of particular interest are the comparative roles of capital investment, on the one hand, and labor quality improvement and technological progress, on the other. Further possible causes for a difference in costs are also of concern, though often not easy to delineate.

Investment, labor quality improvement, and technological progress must usually be the most important forces in labor productivity growth on which the social system impinges, but the social system may also affect the growth of the labor force itself. Should it do so, that would affect labor productivity as well. The effect almost inevitably is of a perverse sort, for, other things being equal, increasing numbers of workers should yield diminishing returns in output. Even so, in an appraisal of performance, such an effect of the social system must be considered. The labor force, however, depends on the size of the population, its age-structure, and labor participation rates. The social system may affect the labor force through any of these factors, but in doing so it generates a host of further benefits and costs of familiar sorts much beyond those represented by productivity, and also often highly complex to evaluate.

The labor force, though affected by the social system, will usually be so only to a limited degree—at least in any short period. To that extent, therefore, labor productivity growth must vary quite apart from the social system rather than in dependence on it. That is also the case so far as the growth depends on physical endowment in the form of natural resources, for that too is beyond the reach of the social system. What can be achieved in respect of labor productivity in any period must also depend on labor quality at the outset of the period, and on the inherited reproducible capital stock and state of technology. Here too, therefore, growth of labor productivity must vary independently of the social system, at least as that system functions during the period in question. How it functioned previously, however, would still be material. Difficult as it is, appraisal of performance must seek to disentangle the role of the social system from all these extra-system factors, and still others like them that are easy to imagine.

An inquiry such as this requires much quantitative data. I have set forth the sources and methods I have used in compiling appropriate measures in a supplement at the end of this article; but I should explain here that for OECD countries I utilize well-known materials, principally publications of the OECD itself. For COMECON countries I draw heavily on Western research, as I have implied. I have also made selective use of official data released in the different countries, but at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important points such data are superseded by Western findings.[4] Western scholars have had many reasons to undertake independent calculations regarding socialist economic development, and, curiously, even socialist scholars do not always conceal their skepticism of the official figures. Although the Western calculations too have their limitations, they are properly favored here over the official data. But that is a familiar theme, and I need not expatiate on it.

Postwar Recovery

I focus, to repeat, on years since 1950, when the countries studied had already left behind them the immediate aftermath of the war. As it turned out, recovery from wartime destruction and dislocations proceeded rapidly almost everywhere, but different countries had suffered unequally, and, partly for that reason, had by 1950 regained prewar levels of economic activity in varying degrees. That that was so is indicated by per capita national income (Table I). Moreover, so far as the wartime and immediate postwar experience of different countries varied, the extent and sources of gains in labor productivity after 1950 may have varied as well.

How the one would have affected the other must have depended on the specific circumstances of each case, but, paradoxically, a lag in recovery could easily have been favorable to subsequent growth, for it is a familiar fact that it may often be easier to re-attain previous levels of activity than to surpass them. And, even after prewar per capita national output is re-attained, one country may be favored over another if it still has more devastation to make good than does the other. Previous turmoil, also, may leave different countries with varying opportunities for further growth in still other complex ways, for example, in respect of the resulting arrearage in technology that remains to be made up. Although growth usually should be favored, especially in respect of output, it would be surprising if the increase of productivity were not often also speeded or made less costly.

[4] The USSR apart, this means primarily the work of Dr. Thad P. Alton and his associates in the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe at Columbia University, as collated in Dr. Maurice Ernst in "Postwar Economic Growth in Eastern Europe," Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States [hereafter cited as JEC], *New Directions in the Soviet Economy* [hereafter cited as *New Directions*], Part IV (Washington 1966), and by Thad P. Alton, in "Economic Structure and Growth in Eastern Europe," JEC, *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe* [hereafter cited as *Eastern Europe*] (Washington 1970). From one standpoint, the present essay might be considered as, in good part, an attempt to round out and explore the import of the voluminous data on Eastern Europe compiled in these studies of Ernst and Alton, though almost inevitably that has sometimes required reworking the data as well.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA, 1950, COMPARED WITH PREWAR, COMECON AND OECD COUNTRIES[a]

(Prewar = 100)

	Prewar Year (1)	*1950* (2)
COMECON		
Bulgaria	1939	103
Rumania	1938	96
Poland	1937	141[b]
Hungary	1938	93
USSR	1940	134
East Germany	1936	75
Czechoslovakia	1937	121
OECD		
Turkey	1938	100
Greece	1938	73
Portugal		n.a.[c]
Japan	1939	72
Ireland	1938	119
Italy	1939	99
Austria	1938	102
Netherlands	1937	110
Belgium	"Prewar"	121
France	1937	108
Norway	1939	119
United Kingdom	1937	103
Denmark	1939	116
West Germany	1936	94
Switzerland	1938	114
Canada	1939	152
Sweden	1939	150
United States	1939	147

[a] For COMECON countries, reference is to GNP; for OECD countries, often to national income as such, but often also to some other concept of total output, including gross national product, net national product, and so on. For Denmark, reference is to "total available supply" and for Ireland, to consumers' expenditures.

For sources and methods, see the supplement.

[b] See p. 587, fn. 6.

[c] n.a. =not available.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Though I focus on a period five years removed from the war, then, in appraising comparative performance we must still reckon with differential manifestations of "catch-up" phenomena, which have become a well-known theme in analyses of postwar economic growth.[5] I am concerned particularly with COMECON and OECD countries. As my data on relative prewar and postwar per capita national income (Table I) underline, the wartime and immediate postwar experience varied widely even among countries on each side,[6] but it should be borne in mind that catch-up phenomena might still affect comparative performance.

Growth of Productivity

Data on the growth of national income per worker in COMECON and OECD countries could be compiled for the period 1950–67. For that interval, COMECON countries apparently tended neither to surpass nor lag behind OECD countries, but simply to match them. Output per worker during 1950–67 grew on the average by 4.1 per cent a year in COMECON countries, or at essentially the same tempo as in OECD countries: 4.0 per cent (Table II).

Together with rates of growth of output per worker for different countries, the table shows, for each country, a corresponding index of the level of its output per worker in 1960 compared to that of the United States. Just as the increase of labor productivity epitomizes a country's progress in economic development, the relative level of such productivity serves at once as an indicator of comparative stages of economic development in different countries. Reference to such an indicator is in order, for, as I have explained, many causes of labor productivity growth are more or less beyond the reach of the social system, at least during the period studied. Some of the causes that were discussed, clearly must be related to the stage of development: others of a similar sort readily come to mind. Such causes must be rather consequential.

Thus, among OECD countries, the rate of growth of output per worker varies widely, but, very broadly, tends to be higher the lower the level of output per worker, and conversely. The inverse relation is apparent from the data, particularly when represented graphically (Chart 1). Such a relation could not have been predicted with any confidence, but is not too difficult to understand in terms of the "advan-

[5] See Simon Kuznets, *Postwar Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass. 1964), 69ff, 99ff.

[6] The incongruously high figure for 1950, compared to that for the prewar period, for Poland apparently reflects in part the wholesale boundary changes occurring as a result of the war. Per capita national income in 1950 in the postwar territory is compared with per capita national income in 1937 within the prewar boundaries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II

COMPARATIVE REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER EMPLOYED WORKER, 1960, AND AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE, REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER EMPLOYED WORKER, 1950–67 AND 1955–67, COMECON AND OECD COUNTRIES[a]

	Real national income per employed worker[b] *(USA = 100)* (1)	*Rate of growth of real national income per employed worker (per cent)*[c] 1950–67 (2)	1955–67 (3)
COMECON			
Bulgaria	17	5.7	6.2
Rumania	17	4.9	4.9
Hungary	24	3.8	3.9
Poland	24	2.6	2.9
USSR	30	4.4	4.1
East Germany	36	n.a.[d]	3.7
Czechoslovakia	42	3.1	3.5
All	27 (26)[e]	4.1	4.2
OECD			
Turkey	8	4.4	4.1
Greece	15	5.4	5.3
Portugal	20	4.7	5.2
Japan	26	7.7	8.4
Ireland	34	3.4	3.2
Italy	34	5.6	5.7
Austria	40	4.8	4.4
United Kingdom	49	2.2	2.4
Denmark	50	3.0	3.6
West Germany	51	4.6[f]	4.1[f]
France	52	4.5	4.6
Switzerland	54	3.1	3.1
Belgium	56	2.9	3.0
Norway	56	3.6	3.6
Netherlands	56	3.7	3.4
Sweden	65	3.1	3.3
Canada	87	2.0	1.7
United States	100	2.4	2.2[g]
All	47	4.0	4.0
All lower productivity countries[h]	25	5.1	5.2

[a] For sources and methods, see the supplement.

[b] For each country, reference is either to the geometric mean of alternative indices of GNP per employed worker in national and U.S. prices, or to some alternative measure taken as a surrogate thereof.

[c] Real national income for COMECON countries is given by GNP in constant "adjusted" prices. For OECD countries, reference is to GNP, usually in constant factor cost, though sometimes in market prices. Output as so understood is related to average civilian employment during the year, together with the armed forces. For Turkey, however, reference is instead to the labor force.

[d] n.a. = not available.

[e] In parentheses, average excluding East Germany.

[f] Data adjusted for addition of Saar and West Berlin.

[g] Data *not* adjusted for addition of Hawaii and Alaska.

[h] Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Japan, Ireland, Italy, Austria.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tages of backwardness" that a less advanced country can exploit. The advantages can become weighty if the country has gained sufficient momentum to begin with. Perhaps most important, through wholesale borrowing of modern technologies from advanced countries, technological progress can be speeded with only a modest commitment of resources to research and development. It can often be speeded even more through transfer to industry of workers previously employed in agriculture with inordinately low productivity.

Among COMECON countries, too, the rate of growth seems, broadly, to vary inversely with the level of output per worker. The relation cannot be considered especially definite, however, in view of the small

CHART 1

RATE OF GROWTH OF GNP PER WORKER, 1950-67, AND REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER WORKER, 1960, COMECON AND OECD COUNTRIES



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number of countries in question and the fairly limited variation in productivity level represented.

In sum, the approximate equality of average tempos of productivity growth among COMECON and OECD countries is of interest, but we must consider that COMECON countries tend to be at distinctly lower productivity levels than OECD countries. May not an actual difference in performance between the two systems be obscured on that account?

Possibly so, according to this further comparison: whereas the average rate of growth of output per worker in COMECON is 4.1 per cent, the corresponding tempo achieved by seven OECD countries at more or less similar productivity levels is 5.1 per cent (Table II). The margin between OECD and COMECON seems less than decisive, though, when we consider that the data probably are rather inexact for both OECD and COMECON countries of lower productivity. Note also that, among OECD countries generally, the rate of growth of output per worker varies widely even for countries at fairly similar production levels. As statistical texts caution, in such circumstances limited differences in group summary measures must be of doubtful significance.[7]

Among causes of productivity growth that are more or less beyond the reach of the system, some must be of a cultural sort not necessarily very dependent even on the stage of development. Some of the complex forces shaping worker attitudes, for example, could easily be of that kind. Such cultural causes must also vary among countries, but the variation should be rather limited among three countries that were all

[7] I have focused on the level of output per worker as of a date, 1960, falling within the period 1950-67 to which the rate of growth of output per worker relates. For present purposes, would it not be more appropriate to refer instead to the level of output per worker at the beginning of the period, that is, in 1950? There certainly is much to say for doing so, but in that case the relationship between level and growth would become especially sensitive to statistical errors. An underestimate in output per worker in 1950, for example, might in itself mean that a low level was associated with rapid growth. I focus on 1960 in order to limit the effect of such errors.

In somewhat technical language, reference is, of course, to the "regression" of the rate of growth on the level of output per worker. It should be observed that here and elsewhere, where such a relation is considered, or where reference is to an issue such as that just posed concerning the significance of observed differences in tempo between COMECON and OECD countries, I take into account results of further calculations of a conventional statistical kind set forth in the appended technical note.

The relative inexactness in the data for lower productivity OECD and COMECON countries is due partly, if not chiefly, to the limitations in available employment statistics, particularly the incomplete and uneven coverage of "helping family members" in agriculture. I refer below, however, to comparative data on the rate of growth of national income per person of working age. It is reassuring that these figures seem plausibly related to those in Table II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

once constituents of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. If only for this reason, it is illuminating that Austria, a member of the OECD, appreciably outperforms its two former imperial partners, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, both of which are now members of COMECON. Note also that Austria's output per worker in 1960 was about the same as that of Czechoslovakia, and higher than that of Hungary.

Among all the countries studied, the one with the highest tempo of productivity growth is a member of OECD rather than of COMECON. That country is, of course, Japan. With output per employed worker increasing at an average rate of 7.7 per cent a year, Japan is clearly in a class by itself, at this point.

I have been considering growth of output per worker and therefore have taken no account of changes in hours worked. How do COMECON and OECD compare regarding the growth of labor productivity if allowance is made for such changes? For the USSR and a few OECD countries for which data are available, comparative rates of growth during 1950–62 are not very different from what they are before such allowance (Table III). How allowance for changes in hours might affect the results generally has to be judged in that light.

TABLE III

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH, REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER EMPLOYED WORKER, AND PER EMPLOYED WORKER, ADJUSTED FOR CHANGES IN HOURS, 1950–62[a] (PER CENT)

	Per employed worker (1)	*Per employed worker, adjusted for changes in hours* (2)
USSR	4.5	4.7
Italy	5.4	5.3
United Kingdom	1.7	1.9
West Germany	5.2	5.6
France	4.8	4.8
United States	2.2	2.4

[a] For real national income, reference is to net national product in constant prices. Additional working hours are discounted in accord with a scale used by E. F. Denison. For sources, see the supplement.

Reference, strictly speaking, has also been to output per employed worker. What if we consider instead output per worker in the labor force, including the unemployed? Comparative tempos again seem little affected, at least on the average, for different groups:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

	Average annual rate of growth, real national income per worker, 1950–67 (per cent)	
	For employed workers (Table II)	*For the labor force*
COMECON, all	4.1	4.4 (4.6)
OECD, all	4.0	4.0 (3.9)
OECD, lower productivity countries	5.1	5.2 (4.8)

Data on output per worker in the labor force are, if anything, apt to be less exact than those on output per employed worker. It should be observed, therefore, that the results are still much the same as before if reference is to output per person of working age (15 to 64 years), though the COMECON performance now appears in a distinctly more favorable light. (See above, the data shown parenthetically.) By implication, COMECON rates of labor participation have tended to rise somewhat relative to those of OECD countries. In view of well-known facts about COMECON labor policies, particularly regarding employment of women, that is not surprising.[8]

I have been discussing rates of growth of output per worker relating to the entire period 1950–67. As I have explained, tempos of growth of labor productivity in different countries during this period must often have been affected by the turbulent events of the war and of the immediate postwar years. Comparative rates of growth of output per worker in COMECON and OECD countries, however, do not change much if reference is to a period still further removed from the war, 1955–67 (Table II; Chart 2). That is true whether COMECON countries are compared with OECD countries generally or only with those at lower levels of productivity. As before, too, Austria outpaces both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, though now by a narrower margin. A similar comparison can now be made as well for East Germany and

[8] In comparing rates of growth set forth in the text, note that the one which relates to output per worker in the labor force for COMECON countries is unchanged if East Germany is excluded, as is done for the corresponding figure from Table II on output per employed worker. By comparing employment with the labor force in COMECON countries, may we answer, after all, the recurring question concerning the level of unemployment in those countries? Because of the peculiarities of the COMECON concept of, and data on, the "labor force," not really; at least not in any sense comparable to that in which unemployment is understood in the West. Compilation of meaningful comparative data on the growth of output per worker in the labor force does not seem precluded, although, to repeat, such data are no doubt fairly inexact.

Rates of growth of output per worker in the labor force, and per person of working age, are derived by use of essentially the same sources and methods as those used in deriving rates of growth of output per employed worker.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

West Germany. Rates of growth of output per worker in the two countries apparently are practically the same. Japan's tempo, now 8.4 per cent yearly, is again the highest by far among all the countries considered.

CHART 2

RATE OF GROWTH OF GNP PER WORKER, 1955–67, AND REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER WORKER, 1960, COMECON AND OECD COUNTRIES



I conclude that there is no evidence here of the superiority of socialism in the growth of labor productivity. Rather, if we may judge from the comparative performance of COMECON and OECD countries, that system does no more than hold its own with capitalism. Possibly capitalism is the superior system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Investment Rates

Turning to sources of productivity growth, we may best bring out essentials, I think, if we consider that COMECON countries have devoted to capital investment a notably large share of their national income (Table IV). COMECON investment rates, even so, are often matched by OECD countries, but often, too, OECD rates fall well short of those of COMECON. That is the case both during 1950–66 and during 1955–66, although data on OECD countries are more complete for the later than for the earlier interval. For 1955–66, we can see what could not be seen so easily for 1950–66: that OECD investment rates do not vary much one way or the other with the productivity level. Hence, COMECON rates compare favorably with those not only of OECD countries generally, but of OECD countries at lower productivity levels.

That is so also if, as before, we compare Czechoslovakia and Hungary, on the one hand, with Austria, on the other. The Hungarian margin over Austria, however, is small. Previously we also compared East and West Germany. Regarding the rate of investment, East Germany is at the bottom of the COMECON list, and West Germany nearly at the top of the OECD list. At this point, therefore, it is the OECD rather than the COMECON rate that is the higher.

Japan again is in a class by itself among OECD countries. Curiously, however, one COMECON country, Bulgaria, apparently surpasses it in respect of the rate of investment. Even among OECD countries, Japan now has a close rival in Norway, but the high investment rate recorded for that country probably is partly statistical rather than real.[9]

Reference has been particularly to investment in fixed capital (plant and equipment, transportation facilities, and so on). That is by far the most important component of investment in any but the most backward countries, but it is, of course, not the only element. It should be noted, therefore, that investment rates for COMECON countries, if

[9] Though, according to the usual OECD practice, repairs generally are treated as an expense, in the case of Norway I understand that appreciable outlays of that sort are capitalized, and so included in both investment and national income. It should also be noted, however, that in compiling data on fixed investment shares for COMECON countries, I rather arbitrarily take one-third of so-called "capital repairs" as representing investment and national income. Capital repairs are major renovations that are intended to restore an asset to full working power; for example, replacement of a defective heating system. Such a category of outlay has no counterpart in OECD national income accounts. In practice, the bulk of such repairs must be classified, along with repairs generally, as expense, but, most likely, appreciable amounts find their way into investment and national income instead. Among COMECON countries, the one-third of capital repairs that are here treated in that way come to an estimated 6.8 per cent of gross fixed investment exclusive of such repairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE IV

SHARES OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT AND OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1950–66 AND 1955–66, COMECON AND OECD COUNTRIES[a] (PER CENT)

	Gross fixed investment ÷ GNP		*Gross domestic investment ÷ GNP*	
	1950–66 (1)	*1955–66 (2)*	*1950–66 (3)*	*1955–66 (4)*
COMECON				
Bulgaria	31.3[b]	34.0[b]	n.a.[c]	n.a.
Rumania	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Hungary	23.8	23.9	n.a.	n.a.
Poland	24.2	25.5	n.a.	n.a.
USSR	25.2	26.6	28.8	30.3
East Germany	19.1	20.7	n.a.	n.a.
Czechoslovakia	24.4	25.2	n.a.	n.a.
All	24.7	26.0	n.a.	n.a.
OECD				
Turkey	n.a.	15.2[d]	n.a.	n.a.
Greece	21.4	22.8	23.4	24.8
Portugal	n.a.	17.8	n.a.	18.2
Japan	n.a.	32.3	n.a.	36.0
Ireland	16.6	16.9	17.5	17.9
Italy	20.2	20.8	21.2	21.9
Austria	21.3	22.0	n.a.	n.a.
United Kingdom	16.2	17.1	17.2	18.2
Denmark	19.7	20.7	21.2	22.3
West Germany	23.7	24.6	25.6	26.4
France	19.7	20.5	20.9	21.6
Switzerland	n.a.	24.6[d]	n.a.	26.1[d]
Belgium	n.a.	18.1	n.a.	18.6
Norway	29.4	30.0	30.4	30.8
Netherlands	23.2	24.0	25.3	26.1
Sweden	22.0	22.7	23.2	24.1
Canada	23.0	23.2	24.2	24.3
United States	17.3	17.3	18.5	18.3
All	21.1	21.7	22.4	23.5
All lower productivity countries[e]	n.a.	21.1	n.a.	n.a.

[a] As implied, reference is to domestic investment in fixed capital. For COMECON countries, investment and output are valued in constant adjusted prices, generally here of 1955 or 1956, though for East Germany reference is to 1936. For OECD countries, valuation is in market prices of 1955, except for Turkey, where valuation is at market prices of 1958. For sources and methods, see the supplement.

[b] The terminal year is 1965 rather than 1966.

[c] n.a. = not available.

[d] The initial year is 1958.

[e] Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Japan, Ireland, Italy, and Austria.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

anything, probably compare even more favorably with those of OECD countries when reference is to all investment.

That that is the case for the USSR may be seen from comparative data available on "domestic investment" (Table IV). Comprising investment in both fixed capital and inventories, domestic investment still falls short of all investment, which also includes net foreign lending. But relative to output, domestic investment has tended to approximate closely all investment among OECD countries. That must be so for the USSR as well, though highly publicized loan transactions might suggest the contrary. Investment in inventories, it is often supposed, varies with the rate of growth of output. Among OECD countries, if it does, it still does not seem to vary at all closely with the rate of growth of output per worker. Note, however, that when inventory additions are included, the Soviet investment rate rises relative even to that of Italy. While on a par with the USSR regarding the level of productivity, Italy surpasses that country regarding the corresponding tempo of growth.[10]

[10] To return to the relation between domestic and all investment among OECD countries studied, as implied, net foreign lending, the source of the difference between the two categories, has lately tended to be limited. That is not necessarily always so, but if my comparison of Soviet and OECD investment errs on that account, most often the error must be in the direction of overstating OECD investment. Where OECD net foreign lending is consequential, it almost always takes the form of net foreign borrowing. That holds true particularly for Greece, Portugal, and Norway, where net borrowing during 1952–66 amounted to 3.7, 2.9, and 2.3 per cent and during 1955–66 to 3.9, 2.8, and 2.1 per cent of the gross national product. Data on net foreign borrowing are lacking for Turkey and are incomplete for other countries. Canada too is probably a net borrower on some scale. Since the USSR was no doubt a net lender during the intervals in question, all investment for it must exceed domestic investment, while for Greece, Portugal, Norway, and Canada all investment must fall appreciably short of the domestic kind.

Inclusion of foreign lending in all investment is, of course, the conventional procedure. The procedure also has its logic, for net earnings on foreign assets are included in gross national product. The practice, however, is apt to be misleading. As we need not ponder long to realize, a country should usually gain more from borrowing than it remits abroad in the form of earnings on the borrowed assets. Hence, all investment, which excludes such borrowing altogether, should understate the increment of capital contributing to growth. By similar reasoning, for a net lender all investment should overstate the additions to capital contributing to growth. In short, even for Greece, Portugal, Norway, and Canada, my comparison of Soviet and OECD investment in terms of rates of domestic investment should not really be far off the mark after all.

Cited ratios of net foreign lending and borrowing to output are compiled from data on such lending and borrowing and the GNP in current prices. See United Nations, *Yearbook of National Account Statistics, 1959* (New York 1960), and corresponding volumes for 1961 and 1957; and United States Department of Commerce, *The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929–1965* [hereafter cited as *National Income, 1929–1965*] (Washington 1966), 74-75.

I refer below in the text to investment in a more or less inclusive sense in COMECON countries other than the USSR. Data on net foreign lending by those countries are incomplete and obscure. All probably are, like the USSR, net lenders on a very limited

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Data on investment for COMECON countries other than the USSR are very incomplete. They point almost unmistakably, however, to the fact that investment generally, compared to fixed investment, must usually be at least as large in those countries as in the USSR. It may often be even larger.[11]

My data on investment shares for any country reflect values of investment goods and output generally in the country in question. What of the well-known limitations of the government-controlled prices of COMECON countries? Might not aberrations in such prices distort COMECON compared with OECD shares of investment in national income? To the statistical purist, prices everywhere have their limitations for purposes of national income accounting, but they are no doubt especially dubious in COMECON countries. Revaluation of investment goods and output generally in those countries, in terms of a "factor cost" standard, however, should have corrected for the more serious of the resulting distortions, and my data may be read accordingly.[12]

I have been referring to gross investment. Even in a summary inquiry we must consider that what counts for growth of output per worker is not so much gross but net investment, or gross investment less depreciation. Furthermore, depreciation varies with the size of the accumulated capital stock rather than with the volume of current gross investment. As a share of output, therefore, net investment always falls below gross investment by an amount that depends not on gross investment but on the "capital-output ratio," that is, the ratio of the capital stock to output. Depending on that ratio, too, the same rate of net investment may represent a relatively large or small addition to, and so a high or low rate of growth of, the capital stock itself. Investment contributes, finally, to growth by determining that tempo. Given

---

scale. Comparative investment there and in OECD countries should be viewed accordingly.

[11] See particularly the data on investment rates in the USSR, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in Abram Bergson, *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928* (Cambridge, Mass. 1961), 235ff; Abraham Becker, *Soviet National Income, 1958–64* (Berkeley 1969), 94ff, 526-29; Alton (fn. 4), 59.

[12] This presupposes that each country's output ideally should be measured in terms of its own "scarcity values." That is indeed the case for an inquiry such as this, but it is illuminating that a further revaluation of output in terms of U.S. dollar prices would most likely raise the Soviet investment rate relative to that of Italy, though not to that of the USA. We may judge this from the fact that in 1955 a ruble of factor cost was worth, relative to a dollar, 94 per cent as much in respect of investment goods as in respect of output generally. The corresponding ratio for the Italian lira was 72 per cent. See Abram Bergson, "The Comparative National Income of the USSR and USA," Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, *International Comparison of Prices and Incomes* (forthcoming). On the valuation problem posed by pricing distortions in COMECON countries, see Bergson (fn. 11).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the rate of gross investment, then, the lower the capital-output ratio, the higher the rates of net investment and of growth of the capital stock, and vice versa.

The comparative data on gross investment must be seen in that perspective. Figures on capital output ratios are difficult to come by, but those for COMECON countries cannot usually be especially high by OECD standards. That might perhaps be surmised from the rather low COMECON productivity levels, though information on how, in general, capital-output ratios vary with the productivity level is also surprisingly incomplete.[13] COMECON capital stocks, however, do in fact grow notably rapidly, and that is as might be expected if their capital-output ratios are not very high. Stocks of reproducible capital, exclusive of housing in the USSR and the West, for example, grew at these average rates during 1950–62:[14]

	Per cent
USSR	9.3
Italy	3.5
United Kingdom	3.4
West Germany	6.4
France	4.2
Northwest Europe	4.5
United States	3.6

In Czechoslovakia, gross fixed capital, exclusive of housing, reportedly grew during 1950–62 at an annual rate of 5.3 per cent. Gross fixed productive assets reportedly grew in Bulgaria during 1952–58 by 8.8 per cent annually, and net fixed productive assets in Hungary during 1950–59 by 8.3 per cent.[15]

[13] There can be no question about the capital stock per worker. That coefficient is, almost as much as output per worker, a hallmark of a country's economic development. According to every indication, capital per worker also tends to vary with output per worker as between countries. Evidence regarding the capital stock per unit of output, however, is meager and somewhat conflicting. At least that seems so for reproducible capital, which is of concern here.

[14] Reproducible capital here also omits net foreign assets, and in the case of OECD countries, stocks in "general government" are also omitted. For fixed capital, reference is to an average of two index numbers, one representing gross and the other net assets. While housing was proverbially neglected in the USSR under Stalin, the stock increased at an impressive rate during 1950–62. With the inclusion of housing, Soviet reproducible capital still grew during that period at a rate of 8.9 per cent yearly. See Abram Bergson, *Planning and Productivity under Soviet Socialism* (New York 1968), 81-82, 92-95, and the sources cited there.

[15] Inclusive of housing, the Czech stock of gross fixed capital grew during 1950–62 by 4.8 per cent yearly. See Gregor Lazarcik, *Czechoslovak Gross National Product by Sector of Origin and by Final Use, 1937 and 1948–65*, Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, OP-26, 1969, 71-73; United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1961*, Part II (Geneva 1964), p. 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All this, however, is not very surprising. Indeed, what may be surprising is that, in accumulating capital, COMECON has not outpaced the West by an even larger margin than that shown. In particular, how can we explain that, without authoritarian socialism and centralist planning, a number of OECD countries were able more or less to match many COMECON investment rates? The moral must be in part that capabilities of Western countries for generating investment are greater than is often supposed. But two of the OECD countries whose investment rates were especially high are Germany and Japan. In accumulating capital, both countries have, of course, been much favored by having to devote only very limited output to defense. Under authoritarian socialism and centralist planning, moreover, it has been possible not only to achieve notably high investment rates but to achieve them even at an early stage, with striking speed. That was the case in the USSR in the thirties, and it must have been so also in the two other COMECON countries studied where socialism came to prevail before development had proceeded very far: Bulgaria and Rumania. Without authoritarian socialism and centralist planning, the West probably has not been able to match that feat very often.[16]

Sources of Growth More Generally

Our concern, however, is to explain, not so much comparative investment rates, as comparative tempos of growth of output per worker. From that standpoint, the chief finding is already fairly evident, but becomes more so if we relate rates of investment to corresponding rates of increase of output per worker. In that way, we may determine for each period and country how costly it was, in terms of capital, to achieve a one per cent increase in output per worker. Costs of productivity increases, as so reckoned, apparently tend to be higher among COMECON than among OECD countries generally (Table V; Chart 3), but of more interest here is the comparative performance of COMECON and OECD countries with lower productivity. Here the COMECON cost disadvantage is marked. Productivity increases have almost always been distinctly more costly for COMECON than for OECD countries.

That is also the result if, as before, we compare Hungary and Czechoslovakia with Austria. East Germany, however, apparently enjoys a slight cost advantage over West Germany. Interestingly, Japan now ceases to be a special case. High as its investment rate is, it is not at all

[16] Compare Simon Kuznets, "A Comparative Appraisal," in Abram Bergson and Simon Kuznets, eds., *Economic Trends in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963), 357.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE V

RATIO OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT AND GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TO RATE OF GROWTH OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER EMPLOYED WORKER, 1950–67 AND 1955–67, COMECON AND OECD COUNTRIES[a] (PER CENT)

	Ratio, gross fixed investment share to rate of growth of GNP per employed worker		*Ratio, gross domestic investment share to rate of growth of GNP per employed worker*	
	1950–67 (1)	*1955–67* (2)	*1950–67* (3)	*1955–67* (4)
COMECON				
Bulgaria	5.5[b]	5.5[b]	n.a.[c]	n.a.
Rumania	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Hungary	6.3	6.1	n.a.	n.a.
Poland	9.3	8.8	n.a.	n.a.
USSR	5.7	6.5	6.6	7.4
East Germany	n.a.	5.6	n.a.	n.a.
Czechoslovakia	7.9	7.2	n.a.	n.a.
All	6.9	6.6	n.a.	n.a.
OECD				
Turkey	n.a.	3.7[d]	n.a.	n.a.
Greece	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.7
Portugal	n.a.	3.4	n.a.	3.5
Japan	n.a.	3.8	n.a.	4.3
Ireland	4.9	5.3	5.1	5.6
Italy	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.8
Austria	4.4	5.0	n.a.	n.a.
United Kingdom	7.4	7.1	7.8	7.6
Denmark	6.6	5.8	7.1	6.2
West Germany	5.2	6.0	5.6	6.4
France	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7
Switzerland	n.a.	7.9[d]	n.a.	8.4[d]
Belgium	n.a.	6.2	n.a.	6.2
Norway	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.6
Netherlands	6.3	7.1	6.8	7.7
Sweden	7.1	6.9	7.5	7.3
Canada	11.5	13.6	12.1	14.3
United States	7.2	7.9	7.7	8.3
All	6.2	6.1	6.7	6.7
All lower productivity countries[e]	n.a.	4.2	n.a.	n.a.

[a] Except as noted, investment shares relate to 1950–66 and 1955–66.
[b] Investment shares for 1950–65 and 1955–65.
[c] n.a. = not available.
[d] Investment shares for 1958–66.
[e] Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Japan, Ireland, Italy, Austria.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHART 3

RATIO OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT SHARE IN GNP TO RATE OF GROWTH OF GNP PER WORKER, 1955–67; AND REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER WORKER, COMECON AND OECD*



*Not shown, Canada (87; 13.6)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inordinate relative to its even more dramatic rate of increase in output per worker.

I have been referring to costs in terms of gross fixed capital investment. The COMECON cost disadvantage probably is the greater when the calculation is in terms of all net investment and capital stock growth.[17]

If productivity increases have been relatively costly in capital for COMECON, may we also conclude that other sources of such increases have been less potent there? What, particularly, of technological progress? Has that been less rapid in COMECON than in OECD countries?

In trying to answer, we must consider that one country may require more capital than another to assure the same increase in productivity even though technological progress is fully as rapid in the one case as in the other. That might be so, particularly, if the labor force is increasing more rapidly in one country than in the other, for more capital is then required simply to provide additional workers with as much plant and equipment as was available to those previously employed. Without the inordinate increase in labor, the same increase in the capital stock should have permitted productivity to rise more rapidly. In fact, employment increases at diverse tempos among both COMECON and OECD countries, but, as I have implied, tends to grow more rapidly among the former. The gap between the two groups at this point is small, however, and could hardly be very consequential, as these data indicate:

	Ratio of gross fixed investment to rate of increase of GNP per worker (Table V)		*Ratio of gross fixed investment to rate of increase in GNP per worker, adjusted*	
	1950–67	*1955–67*	*1950–67*	*1955–67*
COMECON all	6.9	6.6	6.7	6.6
OECD, all	6.2	6.1	6.3	6.1
OECD, lower productivity countries	n.a.	4.2	n.a.	4.4

[17] As the more specialized reader will be aware, the coefficient that has been computed is similar to the "incremental capital-output ratio" (ICOR) familiar in economic growth analysis, though not quite the same thing. For the ICOR, one compares the increment of capital with the increment in output that is associated with it. For the coefficient computed here—perhaps it should be called the "incremental capital-productivity ratio" (ICPR)—one also compares the increment of capital with that of output, but after the latter is reduced by an amount proportional to the increase in employment. Neither the ICOR nor the ICPR represents the marginal cost of production in terms of capital inputs, as that is understood in economic theory, for the increment of output considered in both cases results not only from the increase in capital but also from technological progress. For the ICOR, it also results from the increase

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Average ratios in the two columns on the right are obtained after adjusting hypothetically, for inordinate employment changes, the rates of increase in output per worker for different countries. The adjustment is rather arbitrary, but the results should not be far off the mark.[18]

Reference has been to *physical* capital, but one country may also have to invest more of such capital than another to assure the same productivity increase because it chooses to invest less in *human* capital, and so is able to improve the quality of labor less rapidly. More physical capital might be required on that account, without technological progress being any the less. The higher COMECON requirements for physical capital, however, can hardly be explained in that way. If we may judge from somewhat dated information (Table VI), COMECON educational outlays tend to be fully comparable to those of OECD. Hence, COMECON requirements for physical capital should have been no greater than those of OECD at this point.

TABLE VI

OUTLAYS ON EDUCATION AS A SHARE OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, COMECON AND OECD COUNTRIES, 1950 AND 1955[a] (PER CENT)

	1950	*1955*
COMECON		
Hungary	n.a.[b]	2.0
Poland	n.a.	2.2
USSR	n.a.	5.0
Czechoslovakia	n.a.	2.9
OECD		
Italy	3.2	n.a.
United Kingdom	2.5	n.a.
Denmark	2.0	n.a.
West Germany	2.1	n.a.
France	2.2	n.a.
Belgium	2.6	n.a.
Norway	2.4	n.a.
Netherlands	2.1	n.a.
United States	2.4	2.8

[a] For sources, see supplement.
[b] n.a. = not available.

in employment. For the ICPR, the output increment is in effect discounted for the latter, though crudely, in a proportional way.

The ICPR has been computed previously in Simon Kuznets, "Long-Term Trends in Capital Formation Proportions," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, IX (July 1961), Part II, 27ff.

[18] See the appended technical note.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Requirements for capital of any sort to achieve any given productivity increase depend also on a country's natural endowment. The less favorable that endowment is, the greater the capital requirements. Again, technological progress need not be any the less for that. Among both COMECON and OECD countries, natural endowments must have varied widely. That countries in one group could have been favored systematically over those in another on that account seems doubtful, though not impossible.[19]

In short, comparative technological progress is not easy to gauge from the data. Very possibly such progress tended to be less rapid among COMECON than among OECD countries. Here too, therefore, there is no evidence of socialist superiority. In fact, capitalism now seems more clearly than before to be the superior system.

Conclusions

We have sought to appraise socialism summarily as a vehicle for economic development. From that standpoint, the familiar claim as to the

[19] May not COMECON capital requirements also be inordinately large because the COMECON countries have concentrated especially on investment projects in "capital-intensive" industries—that is, in industries where capital-output ratios tend, for technological reasons, to be high? Is that not likely to be particularly so for the investment goods whose production the COMECON countries have been so concerned to expand? In other words, might not COMECON investment rates be high, at least in part, simply because they are high, and here too, therefore, without technological progress being any the slower?

Such queries are familiar, but, as already explained, for the economy as a whole, capital-output ratios do not appear by any means to have been notably high in COMECON countries. Even so, the volume of new investment evidently does turn out to be inordinately large there, relative to the increment of output per worker, if not of output, with which it is associated. But COMECON preferences and technology still seem improperly viewed in the way the questions posed suggest: as an additional, consequential cause of that relation.

What is in question essentially, I believe, is whether, because of the nature of their preferences and the technological constraints on factor proportions, COMECON countries had to undertake investment projects that were not only capital-intensive, but relatively unprofitable. While the technologies open to a country at any time are not very susceptible to generalization, presumably there is, in the expansion of one or another industry, usually a decided latitude to determine factor proportions in the light of relative "factor scarcities" in the economy in general. It should be possible, therefore, to extract from any project a rate of return comparable to that earned on capital in the economy generally. Through resort to foreign trade, it is also possible to assure the same result in determining the comparative stress on different industries.

COMECON countries admittedly have hesitated to conduct foreign trade on such principles, and there is much evidence that, even apart from that, they have tended to overcapitalize some economic branches at the expense of undercapitalizing others. The resultant sacrifice of efficiency, however, is properly seen here as a factor in, rather than apart from, COMECON performance regarding technological progress.

As to comparative capital intensities in different industries, that is a matter on which data are at hand only for the United States. Interestingly, the facts there are probably other than suggested. According to a study in progress, by Peter Petri, American capital-output ratios tend to be somewhat higher for consumption than for investment goods. At least that is so for fixed capital in 1958, the year investigated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

superiority of that system over capitalism appears to have little basis. Under socialism, admittedly, it is almost always possible to attain notably high rates of capital investment, rates that are only infrequently matched under capitalism. Such rates probably are often achieved quickly even at fairly early stages of development. Capital investment, however, is costly to consumers, and under socialism the returns on the extra costs are by no means clear. In the cardinal sphere of productivity growth, socialism's performance is no better than capitalism's. Higher investment rates often may well have been negated by inferior technological progress.

I have considered socialism particularly in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and thus have also been inquiring into the efficacy of the much-discussed Soviet model of economic development. That model certainly works, but not, I think, as well as is often assumed.

Among capitalist countries, I have referred to those of the OECD in Western Europe and elsewhere. A number of these countries there are at stages of development similar to those of the USSR and Eastern European socialist countries. That greatly facilitates comparative appraisal of performance. Such appraisal probably is also aided since the OECD countries often are culturally not very different from those of COMECON. Cultural factors frequently affect economic development quite apart from the nature of the social system. But there are, of course, capitalist countries other than those of the OECD. Comparison of the European COMECON experience with that of such countries no doubt could further illuminate the relative performances of the two systems. The findings must be viewed accordingly.

But the reader may have wished to demur long ago at the direction of this inquiry. Have I not expressed, throughout, Western values inappropriate to the appraisal of the comparative performances of socialism and capitalism? Most important, is not productivity growth an illegitimate yardstick to apply in that context? After all, has not the overriding concern in the USSR and socialist Eastern Europe simply been expansion of production, and have not costs of any sort really been immaterial?

As the inquiry has underlined, under Soviet and Eastern European socialism, growth of output has been a cardinal imperative. That goal, however, always dictated a concern for productivity as well, and, if only on that account, also for residual supplies available to consumers. For some time such concerns have been gaining in force. The change in priorities has long been manifest, and is by now familiar. Lately it has been evident especially in the planning reforms I referred to at the outset. Such reforms have diverse aims, but a cardinal one clearly is to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assure, for the future, growth that is less costly to consumers than that of the past; less costly, that is, in labor and also in consumer-sacrificing capital investments.

Regarding values relating to development, then, the European COMECON countries, perhaps have, for some time, not differed from the West quite so much as is often supposed. They differ still less now. Appraisal of performance from the COMECON standpoint would formerly have had to diverge from that of the West, but the divergence should no longer be so marked.

But although socialist and Western standpoints are of interest, that of less advanced countries not yet definitely committed to either system is more so. Those concerned with economic policy in those countries presumably will usually wish to know what the alternative systems offer in terms of the extent and costs of productivity increase. At any rate, it has seemed to be in order to gauge comparative performance on that supposition.

I have focused throughout on growth of productivity. Although I have referred also to the corresponding level, I have treated it more or less as a datum. Even in the appraisal of performance regarding economic development, must we not consider that the social system could also affect the level of productivity, and in ways not always reflected in tempos of growth during any interval? Particularly, may not superior performance by one standard be consistent with, and even purchased at the expense of, inferior performance by the other? It may indeed, but the Soviet model was designed above all to assure growth. If it has not distinguished itself from that standpoint, we might wonder whether it could have done so from the standpoint of level. By all accounts, doubts on that score are in fact much in order.[20]

But if socialism has not performed outstandingly well in respect of economic development, could that not have been due in part to its greater concern for equity of income distribution? And is not equity itself a redeeming feature? Does not socialism also compare more favorably with capitalism according to still other yardsticks that might be applied? What, particularly, of the pervasive environmental pollution in the West? Must we not set that against any material achievements under capitalism?

If equity of income distribution turns at all on the degree of equality, greater equity probably has often been achieved under socialism than under capitalism, and at the expense of incentives and hence of economic performance generally. That is somewhat difficult to judge,

[20] See, for example, Bergson (fn. 14).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though, if only because socialist governments have tended to be rather secretive about income inequality. As for pollution, no one needs to be told that that is a consequential offset to the material achievements under capitalism. But, as is rarely considered, pollution is a problem not only under capitalism. As the daily newspaper often reminds us, it is pervasive under socialism as well.

If we extend the appraisal of the two systems in such ways, however, must we not extend it still further? What, especially, of the authoritarianism that has permitted socialist countries, through control over capital formation, to achieve much of the success they have achieved in economic development? With due allowance for familiar political vicissitudes under capitalism, must not capitalism be seen as usually the more appealing system at this point?

But all this only underlines what was already evident: the comparative merit of the two systems is an issue with many sides, of which comparative performance in economic development is but one. Appraisal of such merit should be facilitated, however, if it is understood that, in respect of economic development, it may well be capitalism rather than socialism that is the more advantageous system.

Technical Note[21]

Regression relations. In Table N–1 are set forth selected data concerning various regression relations alluded to in the text. Rows I A-C all pertain to such relations of the form

$$\text{(i)} \qquad Y = aX + k,$$

where, for any country, X is the index of its GNP per worker in 1960 as a percentage of that of the USA, and Y is the corresponding rate of growth of GNP per worker during 1950–67. Reference is only to OECD countries. I consider in I A all such countries; in I B, all such countries exclusive of Canada and the USA; and in I C, all such countries exclusive of Canada, the USA, and Japan.

Rows II A-C pertain to regression relations of the form

$$\text{(ii)} \qquad Y = aX + bS + k,$$

where X and Y are as before, and S is a dummy variable standing for the presence or absence of socialism. Reference, therefore, is now to both COMECON and OECD countries. I consider in II A all OECD

[21] I am indebted to Robert Allen for assistance in carrying out the calculations of regression relations presented here; and to Professor Earl R. Brubaker for helpful advice on the derivation of formula (vii) below.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE N-1 SELECTED DATA ON VARIOUS REGRESSIONS

		Text table	*No. of observations*	r^2*	*a*	*b*	*k*
I	A	II	18	.46	−.041 (3.690)**	n.a.***	5.914 (10.03)
	B	II	16	.34	−.047 (2.713)	n.a.	6.115 (7.931)
	C	II	15	.36	−.035 (2.693)	n.a.	5.436 (9.089)
II	A	II	24	.43	−.043 (4.011)	−.800 (1.462)	5.986 (10.60)
	B	II	22	.34	−.049 (3.130)	−.872 (1.511)	6.222 (8.766)
	C	II	21	.33	−.039 (2.990)	−.514 (1.076)	5.600 (9.308)
III	A	II	18	.45	−.045 (3.623)	n.a.	6.077 (9.394)
	B	II	16	.31	−.047 (2.502)	n.a.	6.187 (7.294)
	C	II	15	.35	−.033 (2.664)	n.a.	5.352 (9.381)
IV	A	II	25	.44	−.046 (4.096)	−.722 (1.329)	6.144 (10.35)
	B	II	23	.31	−.050 (3.031)	−.764 (1.337)	6.292 (8.462)
	C	II	22	.34	−.038 (3.048)	−.345 (.808)	5.536 (9.742)
V	A	V	18	.63	.084 (5.175)	n.a.	2.170 (2.558)
	B	V	16	.64	.076 (5.008)	n.a.	2.411 (3.572)
	C	V	15	.62	.073 (4.594)	n.a.	2.551 (3.502)
VI	A	V	24	.57	.081 (5.226)	1.979 (2.579)	2.314 (2.846)
	B	V	22	.55	.070 (4.398)	1.957 (3.478)	2.638 (3.675)
	C	V	21	.52	.067 (4.058)	1.897 (3.211)	2.788 (3.635)
VII	A	n.a.	18	.60	.064 (4.908)	n.a.	3.085 (4.477)
	B	n.a.	16	.62	.077 (4.736)	n.a.	2.597 (3.573)
	C	n.a.	15	.59	.074 (4.334)	n.a.	2.791 (3.591)
VIII	A	n.a.	24	.57	.063 (5.194)	1.626 (2.704)	3.164 (4.968)
	B	n.a.	22	.57	.072 (4.803)	1.727 (3.243)	2.784 (4.098)
	C	n.a.	21	.54	.069 (4.434)	1.624 (2.964)	2.980 (4.148)

* r = coefficient of correlation.
** Parenthetic figures are t values. Each has the sign of the constant to which it refers.
*** n.a. = not applicable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries; in II B all such countries other than Canada and the USA; and in II C all such countries other than Canada, the USA, and Japan.

Rows III A-C and IV A-C show the results obtained by repeating calculations considered in I A-C and II A-C, but with reference to the period 1955–67.

Rows V A-C pertain to regression relations of the form of (i), but on the understanding that Y now stands for a country's ICPR, that is, the ratio of the share of its GNP invested in fixed capital to the rate of growth of its GNP per worker. Reference is to the ICPR for 1955–67, and to OECD countries; the three variants relate, as before, to all such countries, all such countries other than Canada and the USA, and all such countries other than Canada, the USA, and Japan. Rows VI A-C pertain to regression relations of the form of (ii), but on the understanding that Y is as in V A-C. Reference is again to the ICPR for 1955–67. Whereas the calculations relate to both COMECON and OECD countries, reference for the latter is again to the three variants just indicated.

In rows VII A-C and VIII A-C, I show the results obtained by repeating the calculations considered in V A-C and VI A-C, except that for each country reference is to an adjusted ICPR as explained below.

Adjustment of ICPR. For any country, an adjusted ICPR is obtained as the ratio of the share of its GNP invested in fixed capital to an adjusted rate of growth of GNP per employed worker. Essentially, the latter is a hypothetical rate of growth that is intended to represent what the rate of growth of GNP per worker would have been if technological progress and the growth of the capital stock had proceeded as they do in fact, but employment had grown, not at the actual rate, but at a rate of 1.0 per cent annually, or about the average rate of growth of employment among all the countries studied, during the period 1955–67.

I assume that for any country output is given by the well-known sort of formula,

$$Y(t) = A(t)\,F[K(t),\ L(t)], \tag{iii}$$

where $A(t)$ represents the level of "factor productivity" at time t, as determined by technological progress: $Y(t)$, $K(t)$, and $L(t)$ represent output, the capital stock, and employment at time t; F is a linear homogeneous function. According to familiar reasoning,

$$\dot{Y} = \dot{A} + \alpha\dot{K} + (1-\alpha)\dot{L}, \tag{iv}$$

where $\dot{Y}$, $\dot{K}$, and $\dot{L}$ represent relative rates of growth of the correspond-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing variables, α represents capital's, and $(1 - \alpha)$ labor's "share" in output. But,

$$(v) \qquad (\dot{Y/L}) = \dot{Y} - \dot{L},$$

where $(\dot{Y/L})$ represents the relative rate of growth of output per worker. Hence

$$(vi) \qquad (\dot{Y/L}) = \dot{A} + \alpha\dot{K} - \alpha\dot{L},$$

Also

$$(viii) \qquad (\dot{Y/L})_a = (\dot{Y/L}) + \alpha(\dot{L} - .01),$$

where it is now understood that $(\dot{Y/L})$ is the actual, and $(\dot{Y/L})_a$ the adjusted, rate of increase in output per worker.

In applying (vii), I assume rather arbitrarily that α is .3 for Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland, and that it is .4 for all other OECD countries, and also for all COMECON countries. Note that reference is to the share of capital gross of depreciation.

Strictly speaking, formula (vii) should be applied only to variations over a very short interval of time. Where, as here, reference is to variations over a protracted period, the adjusted rate of growth of output per worker for the entire period should ideally be calculated by applying (vii) to successive short intervals, the adjusted rate of growth of output per worker for the entire period then being obtained as an average of corresponding adjusted rates for the successive short intervals. At least, that should be done in so far as the "elasticity of substitution" differs from unity and factor shares vary. With the data available, such a refinement is precluded, but it hardly could affect our results very consequentially in any case.

SUPPLEMENT:

Sources and Methods for Text Tables

Table I

For the USSR, see Bergson, *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928* (fn. 11); for other COMECON countries, Alton, *Eastern Europe* (fn. 4), p. 47, and Ernst, *New Directions* (fn. 4), Part IV, p. 882. For OECD countries, other than Belgium and the USA, see Kuznets, *Postwar Economic Growth* (fn. 5), pp. 90-93. For Belgium, see Ernst, *New Directions* (fn. 4), Part IV, p. 882; for the USA, *National Income, 1929–1965* (fn. 10), p. 156.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II

Col. (1). The calculations were made in several steps. The first, and chief, involved compilation for each country of an index number of per capita GNP, with that of the United States taken as 100. Reference in all cases is to 1955. For the USSR, the index number in question is the geometric mean of alternative indices, in adjusted rubles and dollars, of the per capita GNP of the USSR relative to that of the USA in 1955, as given in Bergson, "The Comparative National Income of the USSR and USA" (fn. 12).

For other COMECON countries, I take, as a point of departure, data on per capita GNP in Ernst, *New Directions* (fn. 4), Part IV, p. 877. Although these data relate to 1964 and nominally are in 1963 dollar prices, Ernst apparently obtained them by extrapolating from corresponding data for 1955 in 1955 dollar prices. The latter data were obtained, in turn, by linking indices for Eastern European countries (with West Germany as 100) to the 1955 per capita GNP of West Germany. The West German 1955 per capita GNP is in dollar prices, but apparently was calculated by reference to the geometric mean of alternative indices, in Deutschmark and dollars, of West German per capita GNP relative to that of the USA in 1955, as given in Milton Gilbert and Associates, *Comparative National Products and Price Levels*, Paris, n.d.

I reverse Ernst's extrapolation by reference to data in Ernst, *New Directions* (fn. 4), Part IV, pp. 880, 882; Paul F. Myers, "Demographic Trends in Eastern Europe," *Eastern Europe* (fn. 4); and *National Income, 1929–1965* (fn. 10), pp. 158-159. Index numbers of per capita GNP in 1955 in 1955 dollars, with the United States as 100, are then obtained by reference to the figure for per capita GNP in 1955, $2310, in current dollars, given in Milton Gilbert and Associates, above, p. 85.

Among OECD countries, index numbers of per capita GNP in 1955, with the United States as 100, are given in *ibid.*, p. 30, for Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark, West Germany, France, Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands. The indices in all cases are geometric means of alternative measures in national and dollar prices. For Japan, Greece, and Turkey, reference is to comparative data on per capita gross domestic product in 1965, compiled by aggregating output in dollar prices, in Angus Maddison, *Economic Progress and Policy in Developing Countries* (London 1970), p. 295. By use of indices of per capita GNP compiled from data in OECD and other sources cited under column *(2)*, below, I extrapolate to 1955 the Maddison data for the three countries in question, and for the United States and Italy. The resulting measures for the three countries, with the United States as 100, are reduced somewhat in the light of the excess of the corresponding measure for Italy over that given by Gilbert and Associates.

For other OECD countries, I take as a point of departure comparative data on per capita GNP for 1960 in Wilfred Beckerman, *International Comparisons of Real Incomes* (Paris 1966), p. 42. These data, derived by the "nonmonetary indicator" method, are admittedly crude, and I have felt it in order to adapt them and sometimes, especially for Ireland and Portugal, to diverge very widely from them, in the light of other information at hand.

Given the indices thus derived of per capita GNP in 1955, corresponding

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

measures of GNP per employed worker in 1955 are obtained by reference to data on employment in 1955 explained below in reference to column *(2)*, and on population in that year in Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968g* (Moscow 1969), p. 7; Myers, *Eastern Europe* (fn. 4), pp. 125ff, and sources for the data on employment in 1955. For Rumania, employment as calculated must be inflated, so I assume that relative to population it is the same as in Bulgaria. For Turkey, employment is taken as 94.3 per cent of the labor force, as suggested by the corresponding relation in Greece.

Finally, I obtain the indices of GNP per employed worker in 1960 in column *(1)*, by applying, to the corresponding measures derived for 1955, indices of the change in GNP per employed worker from 1955 to 1960. The latter indices are compiled in essentially the same way as those explained below in reference to column *(2)*. For the USSR, the needed index of the change in real GNP from 1955 to 1960 is taken to be 136.7, as indicated in a letter of Professor Stanley Cohn to me of January 26, 1967.

Cols. (2) and (3). For both COMECON and OECD countries, reference is to indices calculated by dividing indices of GNP in constant prices by corresponding indices of employment. For COMECON countries, for the indices of GNP in constant prices (as indicated, they are of the adjusted sort) see JEC, *Soviet Economic Performance, 1966–67* (Washington 1968), p. 16; Alton, *Eastern Europe* (fn. 4), p. 46. For employment in the USSR, see United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Estimates and Projections of the Labor Force and Civilian Employment in the USSR: 1950–1975*, International Population Reports, Series P-91, No. 19 (June 1967), pp. 22, 30; and J. G. Godaire, "The Claim of the Military Establishment," JEC, *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power* (Washington 1962), p. 43.

For other COMECON countries, civilian employment is from Andrew Elias, "Magnitude and Distribution of the Labor Force in Eastern Europe," *Eastern Europe* (fn. 4), pp. 218ff. Armed forces, including paramilitary personnel, are taken to vary as follows (in millions):

	1950	*1955*	*1967*
Bulgaria	.09	.16	.17
Rumania	.22	.22	.22
Poland	.32	.36	.32
Hungary	.11	.19	.14
East Germany	n.a.	.10	.20
Czechoslovakia	.25	.25	.26

For 1967, see Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1967–68* (London 1967). For 1950 and 1955, for Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, I extrapolate from corresponding figures for 1962 in Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Communist Bloc and Western Alliances: The Military Balance, 1962–63* (London, n.d.). The extrapolation is made by reference to data on the armed forces and internal security personnel in occasional papers of The Research Project on National Income in East Cen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tral Europe at Columbia University, particularly OP-15, pp. 12, 14; OP-26, p. 29; OP-28, p. 19; OP-29, p. 52. (For the authors and full titles of these occasional papers, and others of the Columbia project cited elsewhere, see Alton, *Eastern Europe* [fn. 4], pp. 65-67.) For Rumania and East Germany, I extrapolate to 1950 and 1955 rather arbitrarily, taking account of information in various sources, including annual issues of *The Military Balance*.

For OECD countries, indices of GNP are compiled from data on such output in constant prices (usually factor cost) in OECD, *Statistics of National Accounts, 1950–61* (Paris 1964), and OECD, *National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1958–67* (Paris, n.d.). I link, for 1960, indices compiled from the two sources. For Japan, indices for years up to 1960 are compiled, for 1953–60, from data on GNP in 1960 prices in United Nations, *Yearbook of National Account Statistics, 1967* (New York 1968), and, for 1950–53, from data on national income in 1934–1936 prices in United Nations, *Statistics of National Income and Expenditure* (New York, May 1956), Series H, No. 9, p. 9. For West Germany, indices to 1960 are exclusive of, and from 1960 inclusive of, the Saar and West Berlin. For Belgium, for GNP for 1950–55, see E. F. Denison, *Why Growth Rates Differ* (Washington 1967), p. 17. For Switzerland, for 1955–60, reference is to gross domestic product.

In compiling indices of employment in OECD countries, I rely essentially on data on average civilian employment during the year and the armed forces in OECD, *Manpower Statistics, 1950–1962* (Paris 1963), and OECD, *Labor Force Statistics* (Paris 1969). For Turkey, reference is to the labor force on census dates as given in, or extrapolated from, such data in those OECD publications. For Greece, employment is estimated from incomplete data partly relating to census dates. In the OECD sources used, where the Greek armed forces are not separately recorded, I understand that they are included in civilian employment. For Portugal, indices for years to 1960 are calculated or interpolated from data on employment at census dates for the continent and Portuguese Isles, linked to an index for 1960–67 calculated from data on average employment during the year for the continent only. Armed forces other than career personnel in 1967, not covered by OECD data, are taken to be 110,000, in the light of data in Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1967–68*, above, p. 26. For employment in Japan in 1950, see OECD, *Survey: Japan* (July 1964), pp. 54-55.

Indices for Ireland are estimated from incomplete OECD data on employment at census dates; for Italy, the Netherlands, and France, employment in 1950 and 1955, and for Denmark, employment in 1950 are from Denison, *Why Growth Rates Differ*, above, pp. 46-48. For Austria, average employment in 1960 and 1967 is extrapolated to 1950 and 1955 by reference to related OECD data for 1951, 1956, and 1961. Indices for West Germany to 1960, inclusive of Saar, are linked to an index for 1960–67 inclusive of the Saar and West Berlin.

For Switzerland, employment during 1961 and 1967 is extrapolated to earlier years by reference to related OECD data for census dates. For Sweden, employment during 1961 and 1967 is extrapolated to earlier years by reference to data on population of ages 15 to 64 in the cited OECD sources.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table III

Bergson, *Planning and Productivity under Soviet Socialism* (fn. 14), pp. 53, 92ff.

Table IV

USSR. Gross domestic investment in fixed capital and gross domestic investment during 1950–66 and 1955–66 are calculated from annual data in Richard Moorsteen and Raymond P. Powell, *The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928–1962* (Homewood, Ill. 1966), pp. 360, 384, and in *Two Supplements to Richard Moorsteen and Raymond P. Powell, The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928–1962* (New Haven 1968), p. 24. As so calculated, gross domestic investment in fixed capital is in 1950 prices; I convert to 1955 prices, taking them to be 91.8 per cent of those of 1950. See Bergson, *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928* (fn. 11), pp. 46, 85. As calculated from the Moorsteen-Powell data, aggregate gross investment in fixed capital is exclusive of "capital repairs." For purposes of comparison with data on investment in fixed capital investment available for OECD countries, I rather arbitrarily assume that one-third of capital repairs is properly treated as investment, the balance being considered, like repairs generally, as expense. I take one-third of capital repairs to amount to 6.8 per cent of gross fixed investment, exclusive of such repairs. See the data for capital repairs and gross fixed investment for 1950–61 in Moorsteen and Powell, *The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928–1962,* above, pp. 386-87.

Gross domestic investment, as calculated from the Moorsteen-Powell data, is also in 1950 prices. For gross domestic investment other than in fixed capital, I convert to 1955 prices on the assumption that prices for such goods (inventories and livestock) in 1955 were 97.6 per cent of 1950. This is the GNP deflator for the years in question as determined from data in Bergson, *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928* (fn. 11), p. 149, and Nancy Nimitz, *Soviet National Income and Product, 1956–1958,* RAND RM-3112PR, June 1962, p. 16.

Gross domestic investment in fixed capital and gross domestic investment during 1950–66 and 1955–66 are compared with aggregate GNP during the same periods. Such output is calculated from the GNP in current adjusted prices in 1955, in Bergson, "The Comparative National Income of the USSR and USA" (fn. 12), and index numbers of the GNP in constant adjusted prices compiled from data in Bergson, *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928* (fn. 11), p. 303; JEC, *Soviet Economic Performance, 1966–67,* above, p. 16; and a letter of Professor Stanley Cohn to me of January 27, 1967. Output here includes one-half of capital repairs. I adjust the totals obtained in order to reduce the proportion to one-third.

Other COMECON Countries. For countries other than Bulgaria, I take as a point of departure data on the share of gross domestic fixed investment in the GNP during 1950–54, 1955–59, and 1960–63 in Ernst, *New Directions* (fn. 4), Part IV, p. 890. Reference is to gross domestic fixed investment and GNP in 1955 or 1956 adjusted prices, except for East Germany, where investment and output are valued at 1936 prices.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I also consider these further data on the share of gross domestic fixed investment in the GNP (per cent):

	1964–65	*1966*
Hungary	26.8	27.5
Poland	30.5	31.5
East Germany	26.5	25.0
Czechoslovakia	27.0	28.7

These ratios essentially are extrapolated from those of Ernst by reference to data in OP-17, p. 14, and OP-26, p. 12 (reference again is to occasional papers of the Columbia University Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, fn. 4); United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1965*, Part I (New York 1966), chap. 1, pp. 34-35; United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1968* (New York 1969), pp. 144-45, 150-51; and in Alton, *Eastern Europe* (fn. 4), pp. 46-59.

From the foregoing ratios, I calculate the share of gross domestic fixed investment in the GNP for 1950–66 and for 1955–66 by reference to data on the GNP in constant prices in Alton, *Eastern Europe* (fn. 4), p. 46. For East Germany, the GNP for 1951–54 is interpolated from Alton's data for 1950 and 1955.

As understood in these calculations, gross domestic fixed investment and GNP include all "capital repairs." As in the case of the USSR, I assume that only one-third of such repairs are properly treated as investment and national income. In adjusting the investment shares accordingly, I assume that for all countries, all capital repairs amount to 17 per cent of all gross fixed capital investment, inclusive of such repairs, during the intervals in question.

This takes into account the following data on the ratio of capital repairs to gross domestic fixed investment, inclusive of such repairs:

	Per cent
USSR, 1950–61	16.9
Hungary, 1955	28.1
Poland, 1954	14.7
1955	16.2
1956	17.3
Czechoslovakia, enterprise sector,	
1955	18.2
1956	19.5

For the Soviet ratio, see above. For ratios for other countries, see Thad Alton and others, *Hungarian National Income and Product in 1955* (New York 1963), pp. 17, 19, 229; Alton and others, *Polish National Income and Product in 1954, 1955 and 1956* (New York 1965), pp. 123, 227-29; Alton and others, *Czechoslovak National Income and Product, 1947–1948 and 1955–1956* (New York 1962), pp. 16, 210.

For Bulgaria, reference is, to begin with, to the ratio of gross domestic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fixed investment to GNP for 1950–54 in 1956 prices in Ernst, *New Directions*, Part IV, p. 890, 23.7 per cent. From this, I calculate corresponding ratios for 1950–65 and 1955–65 by reference to index numbers of the GNP in constant prices in Alton, *Eastern Europe* (fn. 4), p. 46, and these data on gross domestic fixed investment in constant prices (1956 = 100 per cent):

1950–54	402.7
1955–65	2,242.4

Reference here is to index numbers of gross domestic fixed capital investment in OP-30 (fn. 4), p. 5. Although these index numbers allow for imports of machinery, they fail to allow for exports of machinery, which became sizable in the course of time. I have adjusted the indices crudely to exclude exports in the light of comparative data on machinery imports and exports in these publications of the United Nations: *Economic Survey of Europe in 1960* (Geneva 1961), chap. 2, p. 15; *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, XI, No. 1, p. 40; XV, No. 1, p. 29; XVI, No. 1, p. 42; XVII, No. 1, p. 36.

Here again reference has been to gross domestic fixed investment and GNP inclusive of all capital repairs. I adjust the ratios obtained to exclude two-thirds of such repairs from investment and output. I again assume that capital repairs amount to 17 per cent of gross domestic investment inclusive of such repairs.

OECD. Gross domestic fixed investment, gross domestic investment, and aggregate GNP during 1950–66 and 1955–66, in 1955 prices, are calculated from data on gross domestic fixed asset formation, investment in stocks, and GNP in 1954 and 1963 prices, and national income deflators in OECD, *Statistics of National Accounts, 1950–61* and OECD, *National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1958–67*, above. For investments in stocks, prices are taken to vary with deflators for the GNP as a whole. For Turkey, investment and output are in 1958 prices. For Japan, see also OECD, *Survey: Japan* (July 1964), pp. 54-55. For West Germany, data for 1960 and later years are adjusted to exclude the Saar and West Berlin. For the United States, I adjust gross domestic fixed investment, as calculated from OECD data, upward by 5.0 per cent to allow for omitted government purchases of producers' durables. On the latter, see Simon Kuznets, *Capital in the American Economy* (Princeton 1961), pp. 475-76; *Survey of Current Business* (March 1961), p. 24.

Table VI

Outlays for education, including those of scientific institutions, in 1955, may be estimated at 61.9 billion rubles, or 6.6 per cent of the GNP of the USSR in adjusted rubles. See Bergson, "The Comparative National Income of the USSR and USA" (fn. 12), Appendix. I reduce this to 5.0 per cent in order to exclude outlays on scientific institutions. Compare Central Intelligence Agency, *A Comparison of Consumption in the USSR and the US (Supplement)*, CIA/RR ER 64-1-5 (January 1964), p. 108.

For Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, see Alton and others, *Hungarian National Income and Product in 1955*, above, pp. 229-36; Alton and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

others, *Polish National Income and Product in 1954, 1955 and 1956*, above, pp. 229, 233; Alton and others, *Czechoslovak National Income and Product, 1947–1948 and 1955–1956*, above, pp. 234, 238.

For OECD countries in 1950, see Gilbert and Associates, *Comparative National Products and Price Levels*, pp. 75, 76. For the USA in 1955, see Bergson, "The Comparative National Income of the USSR and USA" (fn. 12), Appendix.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MODERNIZATION: Ecological Problems in the USSR

By DAVID E. POWELL

> Let us not be too proud of our victories over nature. For every such victory nature takes revenge on us. True, each of these victories, the first time, has the consequences we calculate, but the second and third times, the consequences are altogether different and unforeseen and very often destroy the significance of the first ones.
>
> —*Friedrich Engels*[1]

VIRTUALLY all of the existing literature on modernization is concerned with the virtues of modernity. It focuses on the gains to be derived from modernization—industrialization, material progress, social welfare, political rationality, etc. But experience suggests that gains are usually achieved at some cost: the drive toward modernity seems invariably to produce new social and personal problems. In the USSR—perhaps the world's most developed underdeveloped country—the modernization process has been accompanied by massive social costs.

To be sure, the Soviet regime has been responsible for a number of significant achievements, and has fashioned a central authority capable of mobilizing the nation's resources toward social, political, economic, and scientific-technical change as effective as that of any country. But Soviet modernization has been achieved at a heavy cost. Traditional patterns of family life, religion, personal freedom, and community organization have been disrupted. The USSR is presently faced with a growing drinking problem, crime and juvenile delinquency, the beginnings of a drug problem, and alienation and emotional tension among substantial numbers of citizens. These difficulties have accompanied the Soviet Union's rapid social and economic change.

In an assessment of the Soviet experience, then, achievements must be weighed against failures, and gains must be balanced against perceptible costs. Perhaps this cost/benefit dualism can be seen most clearly in the realm of ecology: the ambitious Soviet effort to transform the environment, despite (or rather because of) its many successes, has at the same time resulted in much harm. Recent years have witnessed growing evidence of pollution and misuse of the land throughout the Communist world. States as different as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and the

[1] *The Dialectics of Nature*, as cited in *Literaturnaya gazeta*, December 20, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

USSR have shown signs of profound ecological damage.[2] The Soviet Union seems to have "progressed" furthest in this direction: Soviet sources admit to the full range of symptoms, from littering, an excess of pesticides, and despoliation of the land to noise, air, and water pollution of sometimes immense magnitudes.[3]

Soviet industrialization, no less than American industrialization, has given rise to vast damage to the environment. I will spell out below how the Soviets perceive this problem and what they are doing and intend to do about it. As we shall see, the USSR confronts many of the same problems as the United States does, and for many of the same reasons. A strong urge toward industrial production, a weak and divided anti-pollution lobby, and official ignorance of, or indifference toward, damage to the environment—all these facts are clearly visible both in the USSR and the United States. Industrial development has, by and large, taken priority over the care of nature; environmentalists are not heard until the damage has been done. Only now is the Soviet government beginning to heed the warnings uttered as long ago as the 1950's. And, though it is too late to save certain communities and bodies of water, it may not be too late to protect and preserve the rest.

The official response to the growing menace of pollution has been piecemeal and unsystematic. Local government agencies have experimented with a number of approaches, but, until recently, the central authorities have simply avoided the problem. In the past two years, however, the Party has begun to mobilize its resources for a broad-scale attack on pollution and polluters. The official policy of focusing attention on one area, which for many years had allowed the Party to remain indifferent to ecological damage, may now be working to the benefit of the environment. New principles of land legislation (1968), public health (1969), and water legislation (1970) suggest a concern and resolve that had long been absent.[4] Whether these measures are enforced, whether these general principles are transformed into public policy, remains to be seen.

[2] See *Lidova Democracie*, July 26, 1970; *Zycie Warszawy*, October 8, 1970; *Scientia*, March 19 and July 16, 1970.

[3] *Pravda*, July 27, August 17 and November 21, 1967, February 11, 1970; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, March 15, 1966 and August 9, 1967; *Sovetskaya Rossia*, April 12, 1970, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [hereafter cited as *CDSP*], XXII, No. 48 (December 1970), 8; *Nauchno-tekhnicheskyye obshchestva SSSR* [hereafter cited as *NTO*], No. 2 (1968), in Joint Publications Research Service [hereafter cited as JPRS], No. 45,666, 14; *Oktyabr*, No. 10 (1966), in *CDSP*, XVIII, No. 48 (December 1966), 16.

[4] *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, December 14, 1968; *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, December 20, 1969; *Izvestia*, April 28, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Scope of the Problem

Air and water pollution in the USSR represent formidable problems. Soviet industry, geared for rapid economic growth, has, over the course of half a century, dumped untold millions of tons of sewage into the nation's waters and millions of tons of particles of dirt into the air. Until very recently, the authorities have paid little heed to the environmental costs incurred. Pollution of Soviet waters has now assumed crisis proportions, and air pollution, too, represents a considerable threat to the well-being of citizens. Although the problem of clean air is not nearly so manifest as the problem of clean water, it is much more than a minor nuisance, and there is every reason to expect the situation to deteriorate further. At present, concerned citizens and officials are devoting their primary attention to the nation's rivers, lakes, and streams. Nonetheless, aware that the problem of dirty air has assumed the proportions of a national disaster in other countries, and aware that the USSR is entering the automobile era, central and local authorities are devoting increasing attention to air pollution. They are determined to deal with the situation before it gets out of hand.

Pollution in some regions of the USSR has reached formidable levels. Millions of tons of acid, petroleum products, metal, fiber, and salts are discharged each year into Soviet rivers. Only a small part of the more than seventy million cubic meters of waste water that flow into them annually has been decontaminated.[5] As a result, hundreds of major rivers are polluted, and thousands of lesser rivers and streams have suffered the same fate.[6] Industrial enterprises, power plants, mines, agricultural fields all contribute to the problem. In addition, many forests have been "timbered out"; the resulting soil erosion damages the land and adds to the dirt flowing into bodies of water.

Pollution is noticeable even to the casual tourist. Visitors to Moscow and other large urban centers can see smog and haze in the air, as well as filth in local rivers. Only a decade ago these were not present. In some parts of the country, pollutants in the atmosphere have reached appalling concentrations. Scientific studies indicate that in many major industrial cities the concentration of harmful substances in the air

[5] Perhaps one-tenth of this effluent undergoes biochemical purification (thus removing 80-95 per cent of the impurities). Another third of the waste water is subjected to less thorough purification, removing perhaps 40 per cent of the impurities, and the remaining waste water empties into other bodies of water without undergoing any decontamination whatsoever. *NTO* (fn. 3).

[6] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 14, 1969; *Pravda*, June 21, 1965 and December 15, 1969; *Izvestia*, July 9, 1968; *Sovetskaya Rossia*, November 14, 1968, in JPRS No. 47,065, 39-40, 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

greatly exceeds the norm set for people's health. The city of Mayevka, for example, the site of a steel mill, has been described as "literally covered with soot." In Siberia, "a dense cloud of smoke and dust constantly hangs over" the city of Irkutsk.[7] And, as the Soviet automobile and truck population increases, the problem is getting worse. In 1966, a *Pravda* editorial observed that "the poisonous haze of exhaust gases over cities is becoming thicker and thicker," and a year later the same newspaper charged that exhaust gases from automobiles "thoroughly pollute the atmosphere of our cities."[8] As the date approaches when Togliatti's Fiat plant begins adding dramatically to the number of cars in the Soviet Union, the problem can only get worse. And, as Soviet industry continues its rapid rate of economic growth, industrial enterprises add more and more dirt to the air. Air pollution thus threatens to become as significant a problem as water pollution.

Pollution in the USSR, like pollution elsewhere, involves two major costs: (1) to the health of citizens, and (2) to the national economy. Human physiology knows no ideological boundaries; excessive concentrations of certain gases and solids suspended in the air or dissolved in water can do serious damage to people's well-being anywhere. Soviet scientists know this as well as their counterparts in the West do. But although the Soviet authorities are familiar with the implications of pollution for public health, they seem far more concerned with its economic consequences. Following Soviet practice, we will focus our attention on these.

Pollution caused by an individual enterprise is likely to raise the costs of production of other factories located downwind or downstream from the guilty enterprise. As the air becomes filled with soot, for example, the use of electric power for artificial lighting increases. Thus, in the city of Leningrad, a sharp rise in power consumption has been attributed chiefly to dirty air. Moreover, ash carried through the air accelerates wear and tear on the friction parts of machinery with which it comes into contact. Sulphuric and sulphurous anhydrides, coming into contact with moisture in the air, help to corrode metal.[9]

Though pollution inflicts harm on virtually all sectors of the economy, its economic costs are seen most vividly in the fishing industry. Spokesmen for the fishing industry, scientists, and environmentalists have published numerous articles describing the damage done to spawning grounds or to adult fish by effluents from chemical enterprises, oil

[7] *Izvestia*, September 17, 1968; *Pravda*, April 8, 1966.
[8] *Pravda*, December 11, 1966 and November 16, 1967.
[9] *Izvestia*, August 11, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

refineries, pulp and paper mills, sugar refineries, and other polluters. Sulfates, chlorides, and suspended particles oxidize, thus using up oxygen from river water without which fish cannot live. Hundreds of rivers and other bodies of water that used to contain large fish have completely lost their importance for the fishing industry. In the USSR as a whole, the fishing industry is said to lose between 120 and 300 million rubles a year because of river pollution.[10]

Although industrial wastes exact their toll on fish gradually, there have also been instances of mass destruction of fish due to the sudden emission of large quantities of effluent. In July, 1965, one such incident occurred near Volgograd; millions of fish were poisoned by the discharge of unpurified waste water by the Kirov Chemical Plant in Volgograd. Losses were estimated at ten to twenty million rubles. The year before, the Iset River caught fire near Sverdlovsk. Many of the city's enterprises had been dumping their sewage, filled with fats and oil by-products, into the river. The concentration of combustible materials in the river grew so dense that a lighted cigarette thrown into the water one day was enough to ignite it. Countless numbers of fish perished. "Once a transparent stream abounding in fish," a Soviet citizen lamented, "the Iset lies dead for hundreds of kilometers below Sverdlovsk, turning into a collection of sewage."[11]

Pollution of fishing waters has reached such vast proportions that a procedure was adopted in 1969 whereby the Chief Administration for Fish Breeding and Protection of Fish must agree to sites where enterprises are to be constructed near commercial fishing waters. Proof that there will be adequate devices for decontamination must be submitted to the fish-protection agencies for their approval before the site-selection process can be completed.[12]

Causes of Pollution

Numerous factors are involved in any explanation of why pollution has reached such an alarming level. The explanation involves political, economic, and scientific components. As we shall see, the most important factor contributing to pollution is the ignorance, indifference, or outright hostility that Soviet officials traditionally have manifested toward efforts to curb pollution.

Some pollution is an inevitable correlative of industrial civilization.

[10] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 14, 1969; *NTO* (fn. 3). See also *Pravda*, in JPRS No. 36,384, 69.
[11] *Izvestia*, December 17, 1965; *Pravda*, April 2, 1966; *Oktyabr* (fn. 3), 15.
[12] *Pravda*, July 28, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Production involves the creation of by-products and waste; even the best-intentioned technological society has yet to devise means capable of preventing waste entirely. As industry develops, it produces a greater volume and variety of substances, and methods for extracting these new substances from waste water or the atmosphere are either unknown or difficult to carry out. Though some substances can be extracted from waste, others invariably remain. For the foreseeable future, then, some part of industrial or agricultural waste will inevitably be carried into the sea or the atmosphere.

Although some pollution is inescapable, certain aspects of the problem in the USSR are attributable to the operation of the Soviet system. We can identify four causal factors.

(1) *Technological backwardness.* Anti-pollution technology is rather backward in the USSR. Methods for utilizing waste products and purifying effluents have not been studied very carefully, in part because few people have been encouraged to study these processes. Higher educational institutions have not expressed interest in stimulating such study, and those who are already in the field are treated badly and have little incentive to combat pollution. The specialized institutes that train students for work in the petroleum industry, for example, do not prepare specialists for the water-supply and water-disposal shops of oil refineries or chemical enterprises. There simply is no opportunity available for those who would specialize in water purification. Indeed, even basic courses in conservation or ecology are rarely offered, and when they are, they are available only to certain students. As long ago as 1947, Moscow University introduced a course in conservation, and similar courses were soon set up at other institutions of higher learning. However, none of the courses is open to all students—not even to all students in technical fields. The course at Moscow University is offered only to zoologists and biogeographers; Rostov University's course is open only to botanists; and only geographers may register for the course at Perm University.[13]

The level of scientific work done in universities, specialized institutes, and technical schools is also rather low. Little time is spent devising instruments and techniques for purifying wastes. According to a 1965 decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, "The designs of installations for purifying industrial wastes are often based on methods that have not been tested even in laboratory conditions, let alone in production conditions; this lowers the effectiveness of the funds expended. Research and higher educational institutions are doing an extremely poor job of

[13] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, May 25, 1967 and January 6, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

working out and introducing progressive methods of purifying sewage water and the wastes released into the atmosphere and of rationally using and reproducing natural resources."[14] Most of the installations that are designed and put to use are inefficient; moreover, they are not given proper care and often break down. Inferior designs, poor workmanship, delays in building, and excessively low capacities all contribute to the problem. Pollution equipment is not large enough to handle the job in most enterprises, and much of the equipment is poorly managed. Repairs are carried out infrequently, and by ill-trained technicians.[15]

The same problem inhibits efforts to curb air pollution. Existing gas-purification machinery often fails to function, and the process of replacing equipment with new, improved designs is slow. Many devices are too small for the task assigned to them; others suffer from inadequate maintenance and repair. Unproved systems of gas removal and pollution control are employed, and as a result they frequently break down or operate inefficiently. Little attention is paid to the design and construction of new installations, and existing ones deteriorate rapidly.[16]

(2) *The low status of anti-pollution work.* If few students are provided with an intellectual appreciation of conservation when they are in school, fewer still develop an incentive to deal with such matters once they are at work. Water-disposal shops and personnel are considered auxiliary. Salary levels are lower than in other sections of plants, the opportunities to earn bonuses are fewer, and, even in the matter of retirement pensions, employees of water-disposal or -purification shops are subjected to discrimination. As a result, few choose a career in anti-pollution work, and the rate of turnover in this sphere of industry is very high. For example, large numbers of anti-pollution specialists at the Baikalsk Pulp Plant near Lake Baikal give up their jobs every year and move to Bratsk, where they receive higher wages at the lumber industry complex.[17] In view of the inadequate training available and the low level of financial incentives, it is understandable that anti-pollution technology has stagnated and that not many have chosen this line of work. The system provides few incentives to potential environmentalists.

[14] *Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR*, No. 44 (370), November 4, 1965, in *CDSP*, XVII, No. 46 (December 1965), 3.

[15] *Pravda*, June 21 and November 12, 1965; *Izvestia*, September 3, 1968.

[16] *Pravda*, March 24, 1969; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 28 (1966), in JPRS No. 37,534, 16.

[17] During the summer of 1967, for example, more than 100 persons (out of a total of 230-240) left their jobs at the Baikalsk purification installation. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 11, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(3) *Appropriations and incentives.* A third major factor influencing pollution hinges on the question of money. Two components are involved here: (a) the authorization for and actual levels of expenditure, and (b) the incentive system, which stimulates a drive toward production rather than toward conservation of the environment. We will deal with each of these in turn.

State agencies invariably allocate insufficient funds to industrial enterprises for anti-pollution purposes. In addition, plant managers often choose not to spend all the funds allocated to them, diverting resources to production shops instead. Economic units strive to achieve high production indices per ruble of capital invested; they often succeed by delaying construction work on purification installations. Thus, during the period 1960-1964, more than 25 per cent of the funds allocated for the construction of purification installations in all industries was not put to use. The directors of individual plants have their own priorities, and they prefer not to invest "their" funds in ways they regard as nonproductive.[18]

Production and profit, not social purposes or care of the environment, motivate both the central authorities and the managers of industrial plants. They are rewarded for economic output, not for maintaining, purifying, or enhancing the beauty of the environment. "Produce the plant product—that is the main thing," managers are said to reason. "The purification installations can wait."[19] Plants are permitted to begin operation before work is completed on their purification facilities—sometimes even before it is begun. The sluggishness with which commissions of experts (who must pass on purification installations) work is striking in comparison with the drive to begin production operations. According to B. Voltovskii, Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers' State Committee on Conservation, "It has become a common bad practice to plan the construction of decontamination installations as a second or even a third stage, after the main shops have already worked full blast for years." Moreover, he goes on, "In the construction of new industrial units, serious attention has been directed to only one aspect, the purely production aspect. Almost no calculation was made, for example, of the losses we would suffer if the industry discharged every year so much poisonous wastes into the air, or dumped so much water polluted with harmful substances, the effect it will have on the

[18] *Pravda,* February 28, 1965, December 23, 1966, June 26, 1967, and December 9, 1968; *Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR* (fn. 14), 3; *Izvestia,* April 15, 1969.

[19] *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (fn. 16), 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

health and longevity of the people, how much it will decrease the available amounts of drinking water, irrigation water, etc."[20]

There appears to be widespread indifference—even outright hostility—to the arguments of conservationists. An article in *Izvestia* several years ago told of the director of an enterprise who began "to fuss about to have himself relieved of all these unnecessary headaches, the installation of all kinds of filters and sediment traps."[21] Officials, mindful of their production assignments, devote little attention to anti-pollution measures because of their involvement in production; they consider the protection of nature minor in comparison with their "more urgent" production tasks. One critic of this order of priorities has complained: "If . . . an enterprise does not fulfill its production plan, its executives have to make a strict accounting to the party organization, the trust and the ministry. But when this same enterprise pollutes the air and releases dirty water into a river, poisoning all the life in it, it is hardly likely that anyone will demand an accounting from the guilty parties."[22] Other commentators are equally indignant. One has recalled the example of an official who, in a discussion of Russia's polluted rivers, declared that "first we have to build communism and only afterward raise fish." But protests against such attitudes have been to little avail. Official public policy is that increased output of goods compensates for damage to the environment. "Victors are not judged," as the saying goes. When the time comes to receive a bonus, no one reminds the managers of a plant about the pollution they have caused.[23]

(4) *Organizational weakness of anti-pollution forces.* No single individual or organization has been assigned overall responsibility for dealing with pollution and polluters. The two agencies with the greatest influence here, the USSR Ministry of Public Health's Sanitary Protection Service and the USSR Council of Ministers' Chief Administration for the Hydrometeorological Service, have neither the power nor the will to combat pollution effectively. Their responsibility is "the protection of the natural environment against pollution by sewage, harmful discharges into the atmosphere, and toxic chemicals,"[24] but they

[20] *Pravda Ukrainy*, August 29, 1967.
[21] *Izvestia*, April 25, 1965.
[22] *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 10, 1967.
[23] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, February 23, 1965; *Izvestia*, November 14, 1968; *Pravda*, June 26, 1967. A 1965 conference of conservationists and fishing industry representatives adopted a resolution requesting the Ministry of the Fishing Industry "to prohibit the awarding of bonuses to officials of enterprises that have failed to take steps to eliminate and prevent the pollution of fishing waters." *Literaturnaya gazeta*, March 1, 1966.
[24] *Ekonomika selskogo khozyaistva*, No. 2 (1970), in *CDSP*, XXII, No. 19 (June 1970), 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

share this responsibility with a dozen other state, Party, and public bodies. The problem is not simply one of variety; there are overlapping jurisdictions and rivalries, with no single agency competent to coordinate the efforts of all. "With such a large number of 'masters,'" two scientists have noted, "it is rather difficult to speak of the integrated utilization of water resources. Various kinds of lack of coordination are frequently encountered. . . ."[25]

A third agency, the All-Union Gas Purification and Dust Removal Association, attached to the Ministry of the Petroleum-Refining and Petrochemical Industry, is the major source of research and design work in the field of air pollution. But its powers are limited. The Association has always been attached to a single ministry, and thus it lacks a broad perspective. Many industries cause air pollution, but the Association is concerned only with "its own" problems; it refuses to assist in solving pollution problems in other branches of the economy. The Association has been described as "a second-class appendage of a branch ministry," which cannot and will not adopt a national perspective. Its resources are modest, and its point of view is restricted. Indeed, the Association has only one plant, which cannot possibly fulfill industry's needs for gas-purification equipment.[26]

The fact that there is no single center to coordinate research and development efforts in the area of air pollution involves considerable costs. Construction and testing of experimental installations proceed at a lethargic pace, and previously approved methods for trapping harmful fumes and dust are introduced even more slowly. As a result, "primitivism, amateurishness, and the crudest design errors" occur, and the pace of scientific progress is extremely slow.[27] Moreover, because of the confusing and uncoordinated bureaucratic picture, managers of individual plants tend to see matters from a limited point of view, and individual plants and ministries continue to pour pollutants into Soviet rivers and lakes.

What Is To Be Done?

Given the nature and magnitude of the problem, what remedies are available to those who wish to combat pollution? Some see the problem as purely technical; their response is to call for more and better purification installations, the design of electric vehicles, etc. Others see it as an expression of the wrong attitudes; they suggest a propaganda campaign

[25] *Izvestia*, January 20, 1968.
[26] *Pravda*, March 24, 1969. See also *Izvestia*, December 29, 1968.
[27] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, August 9, 1967. See also *Pravda*, February 12, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to persuade citizens of the merits of conservation and the evils of pollution. One of the traditional approaches has involved the establishment of "health-protection belts" between factories and residential areas, which protect urban residents from the harmful effects of industrial wastes.[28] The major thrust of the official response to pollution, however, involves two elements: (a) the use of legal sanctions, and (b) the use of financial incentives. Both approaches seek to persuade polluters and potential polluters that marring the environment is bad business.

The most widespread response has been to reprimand and/or to fine polluters. In addition to serving to punish the guilty, this approach is designed to deter others from further pollution. Until very recently, however, the maximum fine was set so low that the system failed to exert any influence whatsoever on the industrial community. Errant managers usually escaped with a reprimand and/or a nominal fine.[29] With such lax controls, industrial executives simply ignore the instructions of sanitation inspectors. Instead, they follow the lead of local Party and Soviet officials, who are more concerned about industrial output than they are about the purity of the air and water. In the words of an *Izvestia* editorial, "The harm wrought by all this [polluting of rivers] is enormous, but the local Soviets and the various inspection teams vested with considerable powers in the struggle against the destroyers of nature display timidity and excessive delicacy 'in the showdowns.' Indulgence and protection from consequences cover up the affliction."[30] The system of fines has not acted as a brake on pollution. Many enterprises pay millions of rubles in pollution fines but continue to pour filth into the nation's waters and air. In fact, the system of fines is said to have been turned into an insidious device. The funds are turned over to the local Soviets, which use the money to pave streets, build clubhouses, and lay water mains. "This becomes a peculiar kind of redistribution of state funds," it turns out. "The local Soviets begin to regard pollution indulgently, if not favorably."[31] To provide local government authorities with a vested interest in pollution is a very inadequate way of protecting the environment.

In the past few years—interestingly enough, since the fall of Nikita Khrushchev—the Soviets have resorted to a much stronger weapon,

[28] *Pravda*, June 21, 1965; *Pravda Ukrainy*, August 29, 1967; *Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR* (fn. 14), 4; *Oktyabr* (fn. 3), 16.

[29] See, e.g., *Literaturnaya gazeta*, July 12, 1962 and December 20, 1967; *Pravda*, June 26, 1967.

[30] *Izvestia*, November 14, 1968.

[31] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, April 27, 1960.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

i.e., criminal law. After the mass destruction of fish near Volgograd in July, 1965, was traced to poisoning by unpurified waste water discharged by the Kirov Chemical Plant in Volgograd, the legal authorities moved against the plant's director, chief engineer, assistant chief engineer, shop chiefs, and chief of the plant's purification installations. All were charged with "an attitude of criminal negligence toward the performance of their duties, leading to the pollution of the river with waste water." Similar episodes elsewhere have brought criminal punishment, and it appears that resort to criminal sanctions will be one of the principal weapons in the Brezhnev-Kosygin struggle against pollution.[32]

The new Principles of Public Health and Draft Principles of Water Legislation prohibit the putting into operation of industrial facilities unless they are provided with anti-pollution devices.[33] Moreover, most of the union republics have adopted conservation laws. Typically, they prohibit "any action leading to the pollution of water resources or the air," or industrial activity that "adversely affects the health and sanitary conditions of the population's everyday life." Penalties include the closing down of enterprises whose pollution endangers people's health, and deprivation of freedom for up to three years for the guilty officials. The government's position was further strengthened in the spring of 1970, when the new Article 223 was added to the RSFSR Criminal Code. According to this law, pollution of bodies of water or the air that is harmful to human beings is punishable by corrective labor for up to one year or by a fine of up to 300 rubles. Pollution that causes "substantial harm" to the health of human beings or agricultural production, or that results in the mass destruction of fish, is punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to five years.[34] Though it is too early to say what effect these new laws will have, experience with conservation legislation in general suggests cause for considerable skepticism. Managers may continue to ignore the law's clear mandate unless prosecution officials take the offensive. Experience indicates that fines are likely to be fairly light, and the possibility of criminal punishment or the closing down of an enterprise is remote.

Because of this, some Soviet commentators have begun to argue that only by appealing to the economic self-interest of plant managers can

[32] *Izvestia*, December 17, 1965 and January 22, 1967; *Pravda*, June 20, 1968; *Sovetskaya Rossia*, February 15, 1970, in *CDSP*, XXII, No. 17 (May 1970), 20.

[33] See fn. 4.

[34] *Izvestia*, April 1, 1959; *Meditsinskaya gazeta*, November 11, 1969, in *CDSP*, XXI, No. 48 (December 1969), 14; *Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR*, No. 22 (608), May 28, 1970, in JPRS No. 50,956, 76.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the battle be won. This approach has been pursued along two lines: (a) demanding a charge for the use of water, and (b) persuading managers to extract valuable by-products from wastes emitted by their plants.

In Soviet industry, water is a free good: enterprises use it free of charge. No one has a material interest in economizing on its use, and, as a consequence, industrial plants make no effort to reduce the volume of water they pollute. If, however, they were charged for polluting it, they would have an incentive to purify and re-use it. At present, there is no reason—except the moral one, which is not enough—to be concerned about purification. Although the technical means for saving water exist, the incentive system does not stimulate water conservation. It has been suggested, therefore, that economic responsibility for dirtying water be borne by the guilty enterprise. In Czechoslovakia, a plant must deduct assets from its own budget for each cubic meter of water it contaminates. Managers quickly learn that when the overall sum of these deductions is large enough, it will be more profitable to construct purification installations than to pay these sums.[35] The system involves a kind of tax or fine—but one that, at least in Czechoslovakia, promotes environmentalism. Although the suggestion promises much, it has yet to win the endorsement of top Soviet officials.

The second approach has been tested, though not on a very broad scale. The logic is simple. Industrial sewage contains valuable substances whose discharge into water sources represents a considerable economic loss. Petroleum refineries typically lose up to 3 per cent of their total output in this way; artificial fiber plants lose up to 4 per cent of certain products, and cellulose-paper combines lose up to 8 per cent of wood fiber. Great quantities of acids, alkalis, dyes, and oils are lost, even though these substances can be easily separated from the waste waters. Phenols, too, which even in miniscule concentrations give water a medicinal taste, can easily be extracted from sewage. Furfuraldehyde and methyl alcohol (which serve as the raw material for the production of plastic) can also be obtained from sewage water, and waste liquid from soda plants can be converted into fertilizer. Efforts to save some of these valuable substances have proven successful. In Irkutsk, for example, organic substances are extracted from the sewage of a number of plants and are used to obtain fodder yeast. A cable plant in Perm, which for a long time dumped etching solutions into the Kama River, built a simple recovery installation and now produces copper foil from the former wastes. Oil, too, can be saved. Special oil traps for multi-

[35] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, July 12, 1967; *Izvestia*, September 24, 1966, January 20, May 15, and November 14, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

staged sewage purification have decreased the oil content in sewage waters at certain plants by up to 80 per cent and organic pollution by up to 95 per cent.[36]

But although there are successes, there still is much room for improvement. Despite the fact that the USSR organized a broad campaign during the mid-sixties to save ferrous metals, tremendous amounts of these substances were simply washed away with waste water. Cadmium, for example, was simply dumped into the water, although by adding a small amount of alkali to the sewage waters, the cadmium could be made to settle and could then be recovered. Soviet enterprises sustain an annual loss of dozens of tons of lead, copper, nickel, chromium, cobalt, zinc, and other metals in sewage waters, although modern technology is capable of extracting these metals from waste water with the help of ion-exchange resins. This loss of metals has led at least one water-conservation authority to call for the elimination of the so-called "discard norms," maximum possible amounts of matter in waste water, for substances that can be completely extracted from sewage.[37] The idea is still new, and the outlook for adopting such a measure is far from bright.

Central and local authorities have recently adopted a more vigorous stance with respect to two of the most significant sources of pollution, the lumber industry and the automobile. Activity here would seem to indicate that Brezhnev and Kosygin are serious about preserving or restoring the natural environment.

The lumber industry's practice of sending "log floats" downstream to pulp mills for processing results in considerable river pollution. Whole logs, bark, sawdust, shavings, and other wood scrap sink to the bottoms of rivers. An *Izvestia* correspondent, investigating the result of log-floating on the Volga, described the picture as "an ugly one." "Sunken trunks stuck out of the water like artillery for many kilometers along the shore. You see shapeless giant heaps of logs. Waves wash off logs, and chips . . . float with the current. . . ."[38] The bottoms of many rivers "are lined with a thick layer of logs." Perhaps five to ten per cent of floated timber goes to the bottom. These "drowned logs," as they are called, consume the oxygen dissolved in the water and form an anaerobic, or dead, zone. Deposits of wood and rotten bark remain on the river bottoms, and food sources for fish are damaged or ruined. As the wood scraps dissolve in the water, they absorb the oxygen the

[36] *NTO* (fn. 3), 13; *Izvestia*, September 24, 1966; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, April 27, 1960; *Pravda*, November 12, 1965.

[37] *Izvestia*, September 24, 1966.

[38] *Izvestia*, July 27, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fish need, and give off acids, phenol, and other poisonous substances. As a result, some rivers have lost their value as spawning grounds and are no longer useful to the fishing industry.[39]

The authorities have begun to remedy this situation. In some areas, government agencies have prohibited the loose floating of logs down rivers used for fishing. The lumber industry in these areas now must ask permission every time it wishes to float logs. The Draft Principles of Water Legislation have added further controls, banning the loose floating of timber on navigable waterways and certain other bodies of water.[40]

To minimize the harm done by motor vehicles, the Soviets have adopted a number of tactics, the most important of which is to limit the number of privately owned vehicles. Other steps have been taken as well. Moscow claims to be the only capital in the world in which the use of ethylated gasoline is banned. (Ethylated gasoline pollutes the air with lead compounds, which are among the most highly dangerous products of exhaust.) Moreover, Soviet scientists have begun to develop and produce neutralizers that render exhaust virtually harmless. An automobile engine that emits virtually no pollutive exhaust gases (special chambers at the head of each cylinder insure the complete combustion of the gasoline) has passed state tests and is currently being tested on vehicles in Central Asia.[41]

More imaginative steps have been taken in several cities in the Ukraine and elsewhere. Municipal authorities in Kharkov, for example, have switched to electrically powered vehicles for public transportation. The city's central districts are served by trolley-buses, and the outlying districts are served by streetcars. Kiev, Riga, and a number of smaller cities are planting greenery, which absorbs carbon dioxide while giving out oxygen. By replacing noxious fumes with oxygen, they help to combat air pollution.[42] This is a promising approach to the problem that probably will be emulated by other Soviet cities.

Conclusion

Where man lives and works, it would seem, filth appears. Man everywhere threatens to upset natural ecological balances. No state, regardless of its social, political, or economic system, has been able to escape

[39] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, November 15, 1967; *Sovetskaya Rossia*, February 15, 1970.
[40] *Pravda*, August 31, 1969; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, March 1, 1966; *Izvestia*, April 28, 1970.
[41] *Nedelya*, No. 9 (February 23-March 1, 1970); *Izvestia*, February 15, 1967 and May 1, 1970.
[42] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, August 9, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the consequences of man's callous treatment of the environment. We might have expected the Soviet Union to be preeminently suited to preserve and enhance nature's gifts. It is less advanced than the West and thus can profit from our mistakes. The Soviet political elite claims to be guided by the lofty ideals of socialist humanism. The Communist Party, the "leading core" of all organizations, is capable of enforcing its will on any problem facing the country. The State owns the land and the means of production. The regime is committed to a rational course of modernization. In view of these facts, we might have expected the USSR to be safe from the depredations of "robber-baron" industrialists and other despoilers of nature. We might also have expected the Party to create an environment of genuine beauty, which would serve man's aesthetic, social, and economic needs.

However, as the Soviet experience shows, centralized decision-making and the capacity to mobilize the energies of the entire nation have not always led to socially desirable ends. Socialist industrialists, no less than their capitalist counterparts, have shown themselves capable of despoliation on a massive scale. Indeed, centrally determined priorities, allocations, rewards, and punishments have long meant an excessive fixation on production, at the expense of all else. Recent efforts to introduce reforms in the economic system illustrate only one dimension of the problem of overcentralization. Production for production's sake has led not only to economic distortions, but to social and ecological blunders as well.

In the political realm, the absence of autonomous groups in the community—the very essence of pluralist systems—has meant that over the years no one "represented" the environmentalists. The political elite, virtually unanimous in its desire to industrialize rapidly, and insulated from the masses, effectively denied a hearing to those more concerned with the beauty of nature. This monopoly of public opinion prevented others—with a different conception of the public good—from presenting their views. The lack of access to decision-makers experienced by conservationists, when added to the politicians' focus on rapid industrialization, meant that there was no one to lobby for nature. Only when the social and economic costs of pollution and misuse of land had assumed menacing proportions did the Party respond.

At present, the Soviet leadership, like its counterparts in the West, is faced with a pollution problem of considerable proportions. Decades of indifference to the environment have exacted their toll, and the authorities must now deal with matters that their predecessors simply ignored. They have given little indication of a desire to meet the prob-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lem head on; until recently, they resorted to makeshift measures that were uncoordinated, superficial, and quite inadequate. Recent legislation in the fields of land use, water use, and public health suggest more concern and better organization and may indicate the beginning of a broadly based, comprehensive policy of pollution control.

To cope with the problem, however, will require the expenditure of massive sums of money. More important, it will require a fundamental re-ordering of priorities, from the almost pathological fixation on production to a more balanced attitude, showing as much concern for ecology as for production indices. Communism in the USSR and elsewhere has been basically oriented toward *transforming*, not preserving, nature. Now this transformation must proceed in a more balanced manner. As a Soviet conservation official has argued: "Man transforms nature. This relationship to nature should always be one of mutual benefit. That is the main thing. In other words, in using nature, protect it; in protecting nature, use it—sensibly."[43] It may well be that the policy-makers have now turned their full attention to ecology, interpreting their modernizing mission somewhat more broadly. If this is so, their monopoly of power should enable them to mobilize the nation's resources effectively and deal with the problem. If Soviet socialism is to manifest the profound humanism its leaders claim for it, steps will have to be taken very soon, for the social costs of modernization thus far have been substantial. Whether or not the regime takes the necessary steps remains to be seen.

[43] *Pravda*, December 15, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE POLITICS OF INERTIA:

Paradoxes of European Defense Cooperation

By MICHAEL J. BRENNER*

AT a time when proposals for a European strategic force centering on Anglo-French nuclear cooperation are once again the subject of serious official discussions, it would seem appropriate to raise a number of more general issues about the making of defense policy in Western Europe today.

The durable and at times frustratingly repetitious debate of European defense problems seemingly could benefit from a theoretical inquiry as to what constitutes the international role of minor nuclear powers, as well as from a closer examination of the processes of national decision-making and the ingredients of public policy that bear on questions of weapons development, military expenditure, and strategic doctrine. Using the postulated Anglo-French project as our point of analytical departure, I shall make a tentative attempt to formulate a number of propositions concerning the purposes of nations possessing rudimentary nuclear forces, the manner in which conventional conceptions of state interest have been altered by the condition of nuclear bipolarity, and the importance of domestic factors in setting limits to both national commitments and international programs.

In section I, I categorize the reasons for the deployment of nuclear weapons by medium-sized powers. I briefly review the nuclear policies of Great Britain and France to establish the motivational basis of their present forces, and discuss the recent policy changes that have raised the question of their amalgamation. In section II, I consider which of the previously catalogued purposes might be served by a joint force, and outline the requisites in force levels, research support, expenditure, and organizational integration, for their reasonable pursuit. In section III, I assess the prospects for Anglo-French cooperation, with special reference to the institutional framework of policy-making.

* An earlier version of this article was presented as a panel paper at the American Political Science Association Convention in Los Angeles, in September 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I. Present Forces and Recent Policy Changes

The ends of an independent nuclear policy in Europe hypothetically are five in number:

(1) to reinforce the deterrent capability of the NATO forces dominated by the United States;
(2) to provide for one's own security independent of the alliance structure (whether out of doubt as to the credibility of the American strategic commitment or for fear of being entangled in hostilities in circumstances not of one's choosing);
(3) to serve as a symbol of independent status in the pursuit of national political objectives;
(4) to affirm national sovereignty and to satisfy national *amour-propre*;
(5) to keep open options to protect oneself against a series of unspecified contingencies.

With this checklist of possible motives in mind, let us briefly survey the British and French nuclear policies.

Looking back on the postwar history of British defense policy, Richard Rosecrance notes with some puzzlement, "In one sense Britain did not need national strategic weapons, in another she could not abide them; yet they were built and carefully sustained."[1] The initial decisions that launched Britain on the nuclear course were predicated on the unquestioned belief that she was a major world power with global responsibilities. It followed logically that her forces should be endowed with the most advanced weaponry available; anything less would not be commensurate with her great-power status.[2] Her strategic thinking during the first decade of the postwar period asserted a British capability to provide for her national defense, independent of the United States

[1] This summary of British defense postures and attitudes is derived from a number of excellent critical accounts of that period. Richard Rosecrance, *Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch* (New York 1968), 291; Michael Howard, "The Classical Strategists" in *Problems of Strategy, Part I, Adelphi Paper No. 54* (London 1969); Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton 1959), 147-72.

[2] Thinking along those lines was made all the easier by the rudimentary conceptual apparatus of official strategists who, at first, did not recognize the changes in military doctrine dictated by the introduction of weapons of mass destruction; e.g., the distinction between a strategy of deterrence and a strategy of victory; the elaborate communication systems, and command structures, as well as invulnerable forces necessary for credible second-strike capability; and the enormous casualties that hostilities would produce. See Howard (fn. 1), 22-23. Brodie points out the ambiguous, if not contradictory, assessments of nuclear weapons and the effect of a nuclear attack on a nation's ability to continue resistance; Brodie (fn. 1), 157. He notes Air Marshal John Slessor's book, *Strategy for the West*, published in 1954, which manages to include widely divergent judgments as to the dislocation to be expected in a nuclear war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

if necessary. The specific circumstances under which such self-reliance would be tested were never made clear, though. Possible divergence of British strategic needs or basic political interests from American ones was abstractly contemplated as a hypothetical occurrence in an international system where the autonomy of political entities offered no assurance of permanent alliance. It was reasoning built on first principles: if Britain is sovereign, she has distinct national interests and must endow herself with the means to defend them. But the movement away from independence was inexorable, impelled as it was by the decline of Britain's world responsibilities and the mounting costs of ever more sophisticated weapons technology. The Suez fiasco did, for a short period, produce bold statements and some less bold action (in all events abortive), designed to shore up her military autonomy. Even those measures, though, were intended "to accompany a new political solidarity and interdependence" with the United States, rather than to support a renewed thrust toward strategic independence.[3] As with her foreign policy in general, Britain's defense policy in the 1950's was committed to the maintenance of options which she never seriously thought of taking up. The subordination of British arms and, by implication, strategy to the United States was given final confirmation by the Nassau accords that made the British force dependent on American weapons technology.

Today, Britain's nuclear forces retain some strategic rationale as an appendage to the United States' forces within the Alliance structure [motive (1) in our scheme]; they now figure in discussions of a European defense force that might serve as a guarantee of the continent's security at some future date when the American presence in Europe is sharply reduced, and/or a genuine political federation comes into being. However, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the primary explanation for Britain's continued possession of nuclear arms lies in the realm of residual nationalism. *Raison d'état* has always dictated that arms make the state. The natural impulse of nations is to control the forces upon which their security depends. In Britain's case, the initial commitment to the acquisition of nuclear weapons was made before the drastic impact of nuclear arms on conventional notions of state interest and on the military viability of the national unit had been clearly established. Early decisions thus were made in a traditional diplomatic and military frame of reference.

Once it had become set on the nuclear path, the nationalist impulse

[3] Rosecrance (fn. 1), 247. See also L. W. Martin, "British Defence Policy: The Long Recessional," *Adelphi Paper No. 61* (London 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was reinforced by all the formidable forces of inertia that normally sustain policies and programs of this magnitude. What is established has a presumptive claim to virtue; officials, both elective and permanent, who have had a part in formulating a policy retain a personal interest in its perpetuation and extension; the strong inherent conservatism of government bureaucracies resists major policy alternatives that would abort their organizational missions; private groups that derive material advantages from existing arrangements assert whatever influence is at their disposal to sustain them; and public attitudes are conditioned to believe in the program's desirability. In no other area of public policy is the array of forces behind the status quo stronger than in that of defense.

Three main points can be made about the British defense effort: first, that today the existence of British nuclear arms represents the outcome of a process of policy-formation that is not distinguished by its systematic rigor and consistency; second, that whatever the arguments made at different times by officials to explain the strategic and political purposes of the nuclear force (and whatever might have been the theoretical validity of these arguments), they are now maintained for reasons of alliance support and somewhat tarnished *amour-propre* with a powerful underpinning of inertial forces; and third, that the same concatenation of elements that maintains the national nuclear program can also be a significant impediment to the restructuring that would be required for any meaningful attempt at giving a European, or Anglo-French, identity to existing nuclear weapons. The latter two points suggest that, in assessing the prospects for their assuming a new role, we shall be obliged to consider not only the strategic and political purposes of such an initiative, but the very real organizational and institutional obstacles to a thoroughgoing defense cooperation as well.

France's commitment to a program of nuclear-weapons development was made nearly a decade into the atomic age.[4] In 1954, Prime Minister Mendes-France's Cabinet took the first step in that direction by funding a study-program to evaluate the feasibility, and desirability, of developing a French nuclear bomb (and, interestingly enough, also to consider the building of a nuclear-powered submarine).[5] Firmer decisions were made the following year when the French development program

[4] Two excellent studies of this period are available: Lawrence Scheinman, *Atomic Energy Policy In France Under the Fourth Republic* (Princeton 1965) and Bertrand Goldschmidt, *The Atomic Adventure* (New York 1964).

[5] See Christopher Layton, *European Advanced Technology* (London 1969), 104.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was launched and construction was begun on a uranium-enrichment plant. Coming at the time and under the circumstances it did, the French decision cannot be explained offhandedly as an act of political instinct asserting the national will to survive (as the British actions in 1944–46 might be). By 1954 the period of nuclear innocence for the world had passed. The French were aware of the enormous costs entailed in nuclear development, the technical complexities of weapons engineering, and the uncertain diplomatic advantages to be derived from the possession of nuclear arms. Yet it was a series of shaky Fourth Republic governments, beset by financial problems, perpetual parliamentary crises, and the acute pains of decolonization, that sustained the program through its early years. In view of the relatively high degree of conscious calculation in choosing the nuclear option at that comparatively late date, we might have anticipated a clear estimation of the strategic and foreign policy objectives toward which it would be directed. Did successive French Cabinets (and/or the Quai d'Orsay and/or the French General Staff) perceive a threat to French security which was not met by the NATO alliance but could be relieved through recourse to an independent weapons program? Did they have, in fact, distinct political goals—in Europe—that were deemed contrary to those pursued by France's Atlantic allies and that could be achieved more readily if France were endowed with weapons of mass destruction?

Knowledgeable and admirably insightful accounts of those early years available to us offer little evidence to support the hypothesis that it was security anxieties or specific political grievances that motivated the French nuclear programs [(2) and (3) in our listing].[6] Rather, there was a mix of less specific, if not intangible, concerns that again points to the strength of an enduring national orientation even in the face of a radical change in the international environment.

Aron suggests that there was a "triple function" for the evolving *force de frappe*: "to prevent the two extra-European states from having a monopoly of atomic technology; to take out insurance against the unforeseeable future and against the long-term trend in United States policy; and lastly, to acquire the prestige that attaches to membership in the atomic club along with the ability to influence American strategy."[7] [The latter two are similar to items (5) and (4) in our categorization.] If the long-term trend to which Aron refers means the reduction

[6] Although lacking a concrete political referent, we should bear in mind the strong strain in French thinking—by no means limited to the Gaullists—which, since 1946, has been reluctant to make an unqualified commitment to a U.S.-led alliance, and was tempted to retain some semblance of neutrality vis-à-vis the two Cold War protagonists.

[7] Raymond Aron, *The Great Debate* (New York 1964), 261.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the United States' physical presence on the continent and the weakening of the American commitment to Europe's defense, then we might add as a consideration the desire to reinforce the deterrent credibility of Alliance forces.

The first-mentioned "purpose," the avoidance of an American-Soviet nuclear monopoly, can be taken as just another way of saying that a state is not sovereign, and a nation is not genuinely independent, unless it can provide the means to its own defense—France's exclusion from the nuclear club being seen as constituting a sin against political nature as well as being potentially disadvantageous to French political interests. What is striking about the initial period of French nuclear policy, though, is that it reflected a general disposition, largely independent of concrete strategic and political considerations. Apparently, the decisions to build a nuclear force represented a conditioned national impulse, as in the United Kingdom, to exercise at least a modicum of responsibility, through military preparation, for guaranteeing its security and independence. The logic of *raison d'état* was reinforced in the case of nuclear arms by a powerful desire to acquire, for whatever national ends, the revolutionary new technology that had become the symbol of scientific and economic achievement as well as of international status.

At a later date, de Gaulle gave substance to latent fears of military dependence, and therefore of potential vulnerability, by calling attention to the duopolistic element in the bipolar international system, and by evoking the fear that the United States and the USSR might act in collusion, to the political detriment of France (and Europe)—if not necessarily to the detriment of world peace. Upon acceding to power, de Gaulle incorporated the emerging *force de frappe*, the *Force Nucléaire Stratégique*, into a broad policy that sought to secure diplomatic independence and a semblance of strategic self-reliance for France. Unlike the British in *this* respect, the General not only found a subordinate position to the Americans intolerable on principle, but also believed that France had political interests in Europe that contradicted those of the United States. He saw in the integrated NATO structure the mechanism of domination through which the United States imposed her political will and thwarted the divergent aspirations of her allies. For de Gaulle nuclear weapons became the tools that would enable him to follow a distinct national foreign policy.[8]

[8] The best surveys of Gaullist foreign policy are in Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy under the Fifth Republic* (Boston 1967); and John Newhouse, *de Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons* (New York 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With the perspective we now have on Gaullist policy, it appears that de Gaulle probably never perceived the actual circumstances in which his *force de frappe* might be brought into use nor envisaged a situation in which it alone would have to bear the burden of deterrence in a confrontation with one of the superpowers. It was rather, the supreme political instrument with which to create a fluid diplomatic constellation in Europe that would be favorable to the stratagems of a moderately sized but critically placed power like France. His independent defense posture was meant to serve as striking evidence of France's model rejection of "the logic of blocs," and to point to the appropriateness of her leadership in Europe once the edifice of Cold War alliances had been dismantled.[9] The significant qualifications in France's quest for strategic autonomy that have been made in the past two years, reopening the question of Anglo-French cooperation in weapons technology and defense planning, reflect the unsettling effect of Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia on Gaullist expectations of an accentuated French role in a modified European system.[10] By undermining the political design of which the *force de frappe* was an integral part, "*l'affaire tchéque*" reduced the force's political credibility. Under the circumstances, that was more damaging than any reassessment of its strategic credibility.

If we compare British and French nuclear policy as to motivation and purpose, two conclusions stand out. First, in both nations the traditional nationalist basis of arms-policy and the rationale for its retention has been strong. Even as military independence becomes more and more difficult to sustain, states that are sovereign in theory tend to respond to an untamed political environment by acquiring weapons of defense. Providing security for the territory within its jurisdiction has been the international *raison d'être* of the modern nation-state. Yet

[9] A corollary, if less publicized, purpose of her nuclear forces was to exercise an implicit veto over German actions in the event that Germany should seek to take advantage of the new, more fluid, situation to pursue goals deemed antithetical to French national interest. De Gaulle's concern with keeping Germany divided, and West Germany amenable to French political direction, has been one of the hallmarks of Gaullist policy. Michel Debré, now Minister of Defense in the Pompidou Government, has been the most forthright in arguing the need to maintain the Germans in a subordinate position. His German "fixation," as some would describe it, has led him to question any proposal for European defense cooperation, for fear that Germany would contrive to get a finger on the nuclear trigger. On the eve of the second-round 1969 Presidential election, Debré, speaking at Strasbourg, engaged in a diatribe against Poher's proposals for building European institutions, asserting that they would open the way to a nuclear role for West Germany.

[10] I discuss the particulars and implications of this shift in French defense policy in M. J. Brenner, "France's New Defense Strategy and the NATO Puzzle," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXV (November 1969), 4-7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neither the inability of the nation to assure the impermeability of its territorial shell (to borrow Herz's image) nor the guarantee of security through alliance has impressed its logic on the political consciousness of British or French leaders to the point where they would deny themselves the military attributes of nationhood. Furthermore, uncertainty as to the permanence of the existing system of alliances is sufficiently strong to introduce a powerful indeterminacy factor into the defense calculations of the United States' European allies, and to reinforce their disposition to maintain at least the capacity for creating reliable security forces in the unpredictable future.

Second, whereas Britain on the whole has been content to accept present security arrangements and political settlements (or, perhaps more accurately in the case of Germany, a political non-settlement), France, unhappy with both a condition of military dependence and the bipolar domination of Europe's political affairs, has sought to resolve the existing ambiguities by encouraging polycentric tendencies and by working toward a multipolar system in which the nation once again is a viable actor. In such a system, alliances of the *traditional* sort would not be excluded, but alliance hegemony would be unnecessary and avoidable. Whether the inhibiting effects of nuclear arms and the political inflexibility of European diplomacy allow for such an evolution is a question that will figure in the future assessments of British and French policy-makers and will bear directly on the nuclear relationship between Britain and France.[11]

[11] There would appear to be two outstanding features of the international situation in Europe today that help to explain the paradoxical position of our nuclear allies. One is the dominance of the two superpowers whose global relationship of mutual deterrence, coupled with a physical commitment on the continent of Europe, is the foundation for the European security system that has successfully maintained the peace since World War II (and is so perceived by all the parties involved). Two, the United States and the USSR accept the status quo in the area for reasons of military expediency *and* because of their essential satisfaction with the present constellation of political forces; i.e., marginal changes in the military balance are unlikely to lead to great-power aggressiveness, and, in turn, they will both be equally resistant to third-party initiatives. The result is what has properly been termed a "stalemate system." The conservative influence of nuclear weapons on international politics is most evident in Europe where the stakes are highest, the boundaries between the two camps most clearly drawn, and the military commitments firmest. As allies of the United States and beneficiaries of the protection she provides, Britain and France enjoy both security and at least a semblance of diplomatic independence. It is the strain between strategic dependence as dictated by nuclear arms and the disposition to exercise the normal prerogatives of independence that is the source of the policy dilemmas they face. The ambiguity and paradox inherent in this situation is expressed in our allies' uncertain policy toward the strategic arms that normally are the concomitant of a national foreign policy. As Aron has noted, "integration reaffirms the unity of coalition, but at the same time it also affirms the loss of military independence on the part of the states sovereign in theory." Aron (fn. 7), 245.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II. Anglo-French Defense Cooperation: Incentives and Options

A number of recent developments have underscored the interdependence of French and British military planning and have raised in unprecedented terms the issue of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation. The most significant among them have been the striking revision of Gaullist strategic doctrine so that it now parallels NATO's; France's expressions of interest in coordinating programs in selected areas of weapons technology; and the coming to power in Britain of a Conservative Prime Minister who has spoken favorably of a common European defense effort.

The political climate is thus conducive to the elaboration of a new defense scheme and lends an air of plausibility to proposals for European defense initiatives. No matter how favorable the general situation, however, it remains to be determined what exactly will motivate Britain and France to combine their military establishments, either as part of a broader pattern of European cooperation or limited to the two powers themselves.[12] In reviewing the national nuclear policies of the U.K. and France, I suggested five types of reasons that might explain the purposes lying behind the decision of a moderate power to build and/or maintain a nuclear force. Extrapolating from that analysis, let us see which of the goals presently sought independently might be achieved through a coordinated effort, and which of the goals that are difficult to attain in the national framework might be reached cooperatively.

Today, the strategic purposes of British and French nuclear arms are analogous. Having departed from the Gaullist policy of independence, France's military doctrine once again acknowledges the practical necessity for some coordinated planning with the Western allies. Neither

[12] Britain's strategic forces comprise 75 V-bombers and 4 missile-firing submarines of the Polaris type (which could be refitted with the more advanced Poseidon missile). Her annual defense expenditure of $5.5 billion is approximately 7 per cent of her GNP. Of that amount, which does not include $700 million for weapons research and development, a relatively small sum goes to the maintenance and support of strategic arms. France's nuclear force consists of 62 Mirage II bombers, to which will be added 18 Sol-Sol Ballistique Stratégique (SSBS) intermediate range missiles by 1971, and 4 missile-firing submarines (of her own design and construction)—the first of which will be operational in 1971, after considerable delays. The French military budget, the exact allocations of which are obscured in official figures, constitutes about six per cent of her GNP. Including development and research funds, it amounts to approximately $4.2 billion. A large portion of that, between 25 and 50 per cent, is allocated to her nuclear forces. (The exact percentage of defense funds absorbed by the F.N.S. varies according to whether one includes the cost of research and of support forces.)

The latest official statement of French defense expenditures is contained in a survey by Contrôleur Général Heidt, "Le Budget de la Défense Nationale pour 1970" *Revue de Défense Nationale*, XXVI (January 1970). The British figures came from *Statement on the Defense Estimates, 1969* (London: H.M.S.O., Comd. 3927).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France nor Britain considers herself able to provide completely for her security. In effect, French *strategic* doctrine now rationalizes her *force de dissuasion*, and the tactical weapons under development, as being an essential supplement to the Atlantic Alliance, a parasol beneath the U.S. nuclear umbrella that assures France of a range of independent action within the broader strategy, and a voice that will be heard on all matters of military planning. Britain's compliant acceptance of a subsidiary role, her forces serving as an appendage to the United States forces, seems more a matter of passive acquiescence. However, the dominant strategic purpose of *both* national forces is the reinforcement of the Alliance's deterrent and operational capability. [Motivation (1) according to our categorization.]

Their estimation of the magnitude of European nuclear forces required to assure effective protection by the Alliance in turn can be expected to influence decisions (a) whether or not to increase national strategic forces; and (b) whether or not to do so as part of a joint Anglo-French effort. If one is confident that the U.S. commitment to Europe's defense will remain firm, that American troops will remain on the continent in large numbers, and that the U.S. as a global power will continue to see her own security as being closely tied to that of Europe, then the size of the European contribution to the Alliance's nuclear arsenal could remain small.[13] Under those circumstances, there would be little reason for Britain or France to augment their forces, and even less reason to move toward amalgamation of their forces, with all the organizational problems, financial commitments, and drastic revisions of nationally focused policies attendant upon such a fundamental reorientation. National nuclear forces would exist primarily to stake out a place in the deliberations on strategic and contingency planning (and, perhaps, as the French Chief of Staff, General Fourquet, has argued, to enable the smaller ally—in this case France—to protect her territorial domain as the strategy unfolds in the event of hostilities.)[14] If, on the other hand, there is fear that the United States will revert to neo-isolationism, sharply reduce her physical presence in Europe, and thereby undermine the credibility of her commitment to its defense,

[13] Two excellent assessments of future U.S. troop levels in Europe and the diplomatic consequences of their reduction are by Malcolm V. Hoag, "What New Look In Defense?," *World Politics*, XXII (October 1969), 1-28, and Alain C. Enthoven and K. W. Smith, "What Forces for NATO?," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVIII (October 1969), 80-96.

[14] This point is argued in the article that heralded the shift in French strategic doctrine, M. Fourquet, "Emploi des differents systèmes de force dans la stratégie de dissuasion," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, XXV (May 1969), 757-67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the allies' supplemental share of the joint responsibility for nuclear defense would have to increase. National forces on the scale presently found in Britain and France (in the latter's case, on the scale contemplated in two years' time) might be sufficient under the former circumstances, and the strategic motivation for nuclear cooperation limited to *ad hoc* agreements on short-term projects—in particular the development of tactical nuclear weapons. In the latter circumstance, however, existing forces would have to be considerably expanded in a manner that could entail a more thoroughgoing integration of forces, command structures, and programs for weapons development.

There is, of course, no obvious and easily discernible point at which questioning of the American commitment to Europe's defense passes from mild concern to grave anxiety, and at which the purpose of European arms shifts from a largely symbolic supporting role to a significant supplement to United States strategic forces. Too many intangibles of perception and subjective interpretation are involved. But if there were serious doubts as to the security guarantees, based on hard evidence of United States troop withdrawals and Soviet reactions to them (and if the acceptance of nuclear parity led to a doctrinal "decoupling" of U.S. strategic forces) Britain and France would probably be motivated to make more careful assessments of the strategic effectiveness of their nuclear forces. The conclusion might well be to establish, jointly, the basis for a distinctly European deterrent. The underlying aim of such a policy would remain the strengthening of the Alliance rather than the pursuit of greater strategic independence and effectiveness for its own sake.

If Britain and France were to seek a wholly independent, and credible, deterrent [(2) according to our scheme] a far more radical meaning would have to be given to nuclear cooperation. For Britain, it would represent a sharp break with the deeply entrenched postwar policy of preserving an intimate political and military association with the United States. For France, which might find such a course of action emotionally more acceptable, such a move would nevertheless entail a sober financial and political commitment. On both it would impose a diplomatic burden that neither has borne for thirty years. Presumably, the creation of a truly independent strategic force would be associated with a movement toward the political unification of Western Europe. To exercise the broader defense responsibilities that would ensue, the combined Anglo-French force would indeed have to grow to formidable proportions. (Alistair Buchan has estimated these requirements to be "a force

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of as much as 500-600 deliverable warheads—perhaps more if the superpowers were to deploy BMD systems." Costs would be approximately $5 billion above present annual expenditures.)[15]

It is difficult, though, to envisage the conditions under which Britain and France would find themselves constrained to be entirely self-sufficient in matters of defense. It is improbable that they would knowingly strive to acquire complete strategic autonomy. More reasonably, we probably should predicate our already hypothetical discussion on the assumption that any presumed Anglo-French nuclear cooperation would have as its *strategic* purpose the strengthening of European security against a potential enemy to the East in some form of continuing alliance with the United States. The level of confidence in American guarantees and the degree of the Anglo-French force's responsibility for European security would then determine the type of common effort undertaken.

In amalgamating their nuclear forces in whatever form, Britain and France conceivably might be motivated by a third order of defense consideration, that of hedging their strategic bets against unforeseen contingencies [(5)]. Without necessarily being desirous of assuming the full responsibility for Europe's defense, and without even an explicitly pessimistic estimate of a declining security commitment on the part of the United States, national leaders might still be persuaded that they could not afford to deny themselves the nuclear option. The hackneyed phrase, "to preserve options against the unpredictable future," that is so often used in government ministries to support an otherwise untenable position, does in this context have some substance to it. The imperatives imposed by the rapid pace of technological innovation compel the European nuclear powers to make the hard choice of either committing themselves to a concerted and expensive program of weapons development or relegating themselves permanently to a position of strategic irrelevance (and, at this juncture, only a collective effort makes technical or financial sense.) The game of strategic politics today does not allow for part-time players or intermittent attention to its shifting rules. Unless a power assures itself of a continuing capability in the most advanced fields of technology, it not only cannot compete on anything approximating an equal footing with the superpowers, but will have excluded itself from entering the competition at any later date.[16]

[15] Alistair Buchan, ed., *Europe's Future, Europe's Choices* (London 1969), 134-37.

[16] The technological fragility of European defense programs is analyzed in great detail in the ISS series *Defense, Technology, and the Western Alliance* (London 1967). See especially Alistair Buchan, "The Implications of a European System of Defense Technology" and John Calmann, "European Cooperation in Defense Technology."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Modern weaponry is heavily dependent on the sophisticated skills and elaborate institutional supports of computers, integrated circuits, teleguidance systems, rocketry and nuclear engineering. The critical mass of scientific knowledge, technological know-how, and organizational ability requisite for sustained development in these fields is difficult to attain and equally difficult to maintain without constant support and financial infusions from governments. Recent history suggests that support on the scale required for self-generating growth will not be forthcoming in Britain or France unless there is a much keener sense of urgency than presently exists.[17] The failure of Western Europe to keep abreast of the United States in advanced technology has already given a military dimension to the "technology gap." Without taking drastic steps to redress the balance in the near future, Britain, France, and the rest of Europe will find the gap not only widening, but are also likely to suffer a deterioration in the institutional infrastructure that sustains and exploits advanced technology. If reduced to technological "helotry," Western Europe no longer will have the option of choosing to provide for her own defense.

Among those knowledgeable in matters of weapons technology and strategic defense, there is a keen awareness that the moment of truth is rapidly approaching, and a recognition that a major technological speed-up cannot be accomplished except on a European, or at least Anglo-French, base. The harsh imperative of "now-or-never" could constitute a significant force militating in favor of some institutionalized form of Anglo-French defense cooperation. Ironically, therefore, the most nebulous of motivations for acting to safeguard at least a modicum of strategic independence may possibly turn out to be the most influential. The two strategic purposes that *reasonably* could serve to move leaders in Britain and France toward formal nuclear cooperation are: a) anxiety over the lessening of the American commitment to European security, and b) a desire not to have the strategic option forever closed to them.

Two further rationales remain to be considered: nuclear arms as a prideful symbol of sovereignty [(3)], and/or as an instrument of diplomacy in the pursuit of political ends [(4)]. Just to raise the subject of nuclear status symbols and national *amour-propre* in an analysis of the prospects for a European defense force introduces a paradox. The elements of contradiction are manifest in a situation where the

[17] The history of these projects is recounted in rich detail by Layton (fn. 5), who presents persuasive evidence in support of his argument urging more systematic cooperation on a European basis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

escape from alliance hegemony seemingly demands of the "threatened" nations a dilution of the very independence they are striving to affirm. France's success in forging the rudiments of a nuclear defense force in the face of considerable obstacles, and her effective exploitation of it in asserting at least a modicum of political independence from the United States, has been, and continues to be, the source of much national pride and sense of competence. For many years, Britain's possession of nuclear arms performed a not dissimilar function in reassuring Britain of her rank in the international pecking order, in establishing a nominal equality with her dominant partner, the United States, and in comforting her for lost glories. However, whereas in France the more recent acquisition of nuclear arms and their identification with de Gaulle's assertive nationalism still makes them a potent emotional symbol, the British strategic force today seems to retain little capacity to evoke strong feelings one way or the other—it is a fading symbol of lessening affect. In either case, it is difficult to see how the disposition to create an integrated Anglo-French force can be influenced positively by the status factor. If nationalist feelings still attach to an existing force, its identity would suffer from combination; if it does not continue to serve as a unifying symbol, then there is little likelihood or reason to try to evoke that symbolism at a European level; and if its primary purpose is symbolic, the most rudimentary forces would be sufficient.

Far more complicated issues are raised in considering the *political ends* to which a combined force could be put. There is the immediate question as to the foreign-policy gains that might be sought in Europe today. There is the second-order question as to whether the nuclear stand-off between the great powers leaves a political margin in which third powers can maneuver. And there is a third question, tangential to the first two, that asks whether the projected political goal represents a tangible gain in power and influence or an assertion of political personality that aims at what Stanley Hoffmann calls "milieu" goals.

Gaullist policy in the 1960's raised all three of these questions, and in so doing provided fertile ground in which to cultivate theories of third-power diplomacy in the nuclear age. It is hard to argue that de Gaulle sought tangible rewards in a strictly conventional sense. The goal certainly was not territorial aggrandizement or economic dominance—there is scant opportunity for acquiring either in the tightly configured Europe of today. It was influence, sought in order to determine the contours of international relations, to make the international system more accommodating to France, to create a diplomatic milieu more favorable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to intermediate powers. It was influence used to preserve French independence—not from military aggressors, but from the encroachments of supranational bodies in Brussels and from the benign yet powerful American juggernaut. It was influence asserted in order to keep Germany in her present position of diplomatic subordination. It was influence directed at deflecting the centrifugal forces of Eastern Europe along paths that would accelerate the process of alliance disintegration and give to France further increments of power. Nuclear weapons in the Gaullist scheme of things, as we noted earlier, were not intended to coerce or even to protect in any concrete sense. They existed to *inform* the world of France's political independence, and to give France the necessary military accoutrements of a plausible world power. Only in this sense were weapons of mass destruction seen as providing diplomatic leverage.

Gaullist thinking, therefore, did not contradict the belief shared by the superpowers that nuclear arms cannot be employed effectively as tools of foreign policy except to deter another power from attack. The French attempt to make political capital out of their possession derived from the belief that under the umbrella of mutual deterrence a minor nuclear power could give diplomatic meaning to nuclear arms by pursuing traditional foreign policy objectives that aimed at altering the "political" status quo without upsetting the strategic arms balance. De Gaulle saw the balance of terror as paralyzing the superpowers (assuming there was no active collusion between them, i.e., the duopolistic condition he feared) so as to create a plane of international politics at the substrategic level where secondary powers could engage in a more conventional type of political contest.

At the present point in time, Gaullist policy would appear aborted. The Eastern European policy foundered on the unexpectedly obstinate Soviet resistance to precipitate change in her domain; Federal Germany is rapidly losing her second-class status and becoming diplomatically more assertive; and France's quotient of power, i.e., her ability to influence the action of other states in a manner she deems desirable, remains well below the level she expected to attain as *primus inter pares* among the European powers. But a scorecard of French diplomatic gains and losses is not our real concern here. Rather, it is to indicate in what respects it is possible for a minor nuclear power to set diplomatic goals for itself, to use the possession of nuclear weapons, however indirectly, as a means toward the achievement of these goals, and to consider whether Britain and France might perceive them as being worthy of working together toward them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As of today, there is little evidence that either nation desires a major alteration of the existing configuration of interests and power, or considers it feasible to pursue a diplomatic campaign of Gaullist proportions. The Pompidou government has drastically scaled down French ambitions, and dispatched with the rhetoric of grandeur, while retaining selective elements of the former policy. Its foreign policy is distinguished more by its caution and short-term perspective than by its scope and elaborateness of design. Britain's aspirations, of course, have been limited for some time. Her acceptance of the status quo is more complete than France's, and whatever attraction remains for the diplomatic chessboard has been well contained by a preoccupation with domestic concerns. In the immediate future, therefore, it is unlikely that a common desire to undertake broad political ventures will constitute the *raison d'être* of a combined Anglo-French nuclear force.

In the abstract, there remains the possibility that Britain's passivity is a passing phase, and France's new conservatism a temporary condition. A view of international politics that sees divergence and competition as inherent in relations among autonomous political units would predict that the assertion of diplomatic personality by our European allies is both natural and inevitable. Stanley Hoffmann, the most prominent theoretician of inexorable polycentrism, argues with great erudition and force that the immutable law of world politics, that states will strive for control over their political environment, has not been altered by the advent of nuclear weapons.[18] The bipolar condition of the postwar system, with its effacing of third powers, is seen as a special circumstance that reflects the unique conditions that prevailed in the aftermath of World War II. The Gaullist quest for national independence and influence is not a quirk or the expression of one man's passion for power politics. Rather, Hoffmann interprets the Gaullist phenomenon as the first, and most highly visible, sign of the polycentric tendencies gathering intensity on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

For Hoffmann, the impulse of a nation to affirm a national policy and to play an individual role in international politics is independent of era or circumstance. The distinct features of each diplomatic period will vary, and determine the specific ends toward which policy is

[18] Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, The Paradoxes of United States Foreign Policy* (New York 1968). Its last section is an extensive and highly sophisticated analysis of European international politics and a provocative assessment of alternative courses of development.

An equally brilliant survey of the European situation is by Pierre Hassner, "Change and Security in Europe, Part I: The Background," *Adelphi Paper No. 45*, and "Change and Security in Europe, Part II: In Search of a System," *Adelphi Paper No. 49*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aimed; but the general disposition is universal and not specific to time and place. One manifestation of irrepressible nationalism is the instinctual desire of a state to be responsible for its own security. If a state is to have political aspirations, it requires the military capacity to signify its independence. The possession of strategic arms, in turn, is rationalized in terms of a need to avoid a condition of dependence and diplomatic impotence.

In analyzing the polycentric tendencies at work in Europe today, Hoffmann claims that the European nuclear powers will increasingly demonstrate greater diplomatic initiative not simply because the evolving international system is quite conducive to the stratagems of smaller states. Stressing the mutual paralysis of the superpowers created by the delicate balance of terror, he sees the element of power, defined in military terms, as being devalued. Hence, there is evolving "a new contest in which it is the psychological and diplomatic chessboard that counts" and in which "the *offensive* power of smaller states" is increased.[19] The apparent affinities between Hoffmann's scholarly theorizing and the rationale behind Gaullist policy are not entirely coincidental. They both reflect the French tradition of viewing international relations in terms of recurrent patterns of conflict and competition among states pursuing irreducible national interests. From Hoffmann's perspective, de Gaulle's compulsive quest for independence was what one might logically expect. If his estimation that nuclear weapons had not changed the essential nature of international relations needed confirmation, Gaullism provided it. But the end of Gaullism need not produce a critical qualification of the theory. One might still assume that beyond a concern for security, nations have a political calling, and predict that whatever the vagaries of the present, the nations of Western Europe will respond to that calling.

Whether we accept or reject Hoffmann's position, it does point to the possibility that, at some time in the future, Britain and France might be diplomatically more assertive than they are today and seek to expand their strategic forces in support of their diplomacy. The question remains whether it makes sense, though, to talk of forging cooperative links to help fulfill a disposition said to be rooted in the collective personality of a nation. Where arms are symbolic in purpose, or the expression of a nation's political personality, they do not readily lend themselves to integration.

To summarize this survey of possible motivations for a thorough-

[19] Hoffmann (fn. 18), 36-37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

going Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, there appear to be two factors that could lead in that direction: a) sharpened anxiety as to the credibility of the United States' pledge to their defense; and b) a desire to retain the option of choosing strategic independence in the event that some unforeseen contingency makes it necessary. Other considerations cannot be absolutely excluded, but, at present, seem insufficient to produce the commitment necessary for meaningful integration.

III. Prospects for Defense Cooperation

Having reviewed, in rather abstract terms, the strategic, political, and symbolic reasons that hypothetically could impel Britain and France to commit themselves to a policy of combining their defense efforts, we now turn to the preconditions that would have to be met, and the obstacles that would have to be overcome, if they were to proceed in that direction.

Financial Requirements

Strategic weapons are inordinately expensive. French expenditures on the *force de dissuasion* have been in the neighborhood of $1 billion per annum for several years, and are conditionally budgeted at somewhat less than that amount for the next five years. Outlays for strategic arms are lower in Britain, since the main costs at present are for maintenance of existing weapons systems and research rather than for development and production. Anglo-French cooperation can be viewed as a money-saving device. The overtures recently made to Britain by the French government for the creation of a technology pool were strongly motivated by mounting anxiety as to the rising costs of the *force de dissuasion*. Undeniably, France's defense burden would be lightened if she could draw on British expertise in telemetry, nuclear warhead production, etc. But such an *ad hoc* arrangement, even if the British agreed to a one-way flow of arms technology, could only be temporary in nature.

In the long run, there are two options with widely different financial implications. The first is to maintain a minimum force not much larger than the present national forces combined; the second is to build a more formidable force—as would be required if it had to bear a major deterrent responsibility. In the first instance, the British and French forces would be linked through agreements on targeting, strategic planning, crisis management, and rudimentary forms of command integration. By 1972, they would dispose of approximately 125 strike bombers, the 18 SSBS intermediate-range missiles, and 8 missile-firing subma-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rines. Assuming that it had been created to achieve relatively limited purposes, i.e., to accentuate the European element in the Atlantic Alliance, to reinforce the United States' deterrent power, and/or to strengthen the European voice in intra-Alliance and pan-European discussions, a force of that magnitude would be sufficient (but probably inadequate to assure the capability of existing forces while "keeping options open for the future"). The costs of maintaining it would not be onerous. A gradual expansion or modernization of the submarine component, additions to the SSBS's, or refinement of the strike bombers probably would not entail allocations greater, in proportion to GNP, than those being made now.[20] Of course, with the development and deployment of new, technologically more advanced systems by the superpowers during this period, the Anglo-French force would lose part of whatever strategic credibility it started out with. But independent credibility would not have been the aim of a minimum force.

If, however, the alternative course is taken—that of seeking to acquire a nuclear force that does have strategic credibility and would enable Britain and France in concert, or as part of a European entity, to discharge major security responsibilities now *or in the future*—then the financial considerations would be of a different scale. We have already noted Alistair Buchan's estimate of the cost of a nuclear force comprising 500-600 deliverable warheads—the minimum one could seriously consider as having a strategic effect. His figure is $5 billion. Even if spread over five years, it would still increase defense budgets by about 12 per cent. If the expenditures were to be shared by seven members of a European Defense Community, the annual increase would be 5 per cent.[21] By Buchan's admission, these estimates are conservative. They do not take into account the expense that would be entailed in the development of MIRV warheads and penetration aids if the superpowers deployed BMD systems on a large scale; nor do they include the cost of a European BMD system.

It is exceedingly difficult to imagine either the British or French governments or, for that matter, a federal European government, willing

[20] Indeed, one can envisage the circumstances in which the U.S. might be a source of new weapons technology (at least for the British component of the force). Were the level of satisfaction (or discontent, depending on one's perspective) with existing Alliance arrangements to remain static, the latent desire of the U.K. and France to play some nuclear role, combined with a lack of any clear perception as to its strategic purposes, conceivably could be satisfied by the adoption of American arms. Any such agreement would, of course, itself be striking evidence of their unreadiness to undertake the construction of a European force with broader strategic purposes, and would establish further their dependence on American weapons technology.

[21] Buchan (fn. 15), 135.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to make defense expenditures of that magnitude. Admittedly, if such a program were to become the subject of sober consideration, rather significant changes in the outlook, and probably the political organization, of Western Europe would be required. But short of urgent and manifest crisis, the welfare-oriented citizens of Western Europe are likely to show little disposition to accept the shift in priorities that vast defense expenditures would demand. As Buchan properly notes in the preface to his study, "all the Western European countries are developing mass consumption economies which set limits on the amount of resources governments can direct from the private to the public sector, except for purposes that provide a direct return to the individual, such as welfare."[22]

TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

Modern weapons are not only expensive, they also require an enormous and varied technological capability. Scientific research and technological innovation today are handmaidens of armaments as they have never been before. The sophistication of weapons systems and the swift pace of changes in weapons technology impose a unique burden on any power which seeks to provide for its own defense. It must create, maintain, and assure the development of a wide range of institutions devoted to the several tasks that, carefully joined, are the ingredients of a successful arms program. As of today, Britain and France are acutely aware of their technological insufficiencies and share thinly-disguised fears that they will soon reach the point of no return as regards defense technology in particular and advanced technology in general.

Since World War II, Great Britain has consistently devoted large sums to defense R & D, not without some success.[23] Indeed, in most areas, she has kept abreast of the great powers at the level of scientific discovery, and often in technological innovation as well. In some cases, she has outstripped them. (Her overall R & D budget of $2.3 billion is far and away the largest in Europe.) Her failures have been at the level of development and industrial exploitation. The list of weapons projects begun and then aborted at some more or less advanced stage reads like a roll call of modern arms: Blue Streak, Skybolt, Mach-2 interceptor, variable geometry aircraft, and so forth. After each well-publicized cancellation, the voices of concern are raised, and normally

[22] *Ibid.*, 3.

[23] Layton (fn. 5), is a rich source of information on British defense technology. See also the *Second Report, The Select Committee on Science and Technology: Defense Research* (London, H.M.S.O., 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a study commission is formed to determine what has gone wrong. Their conclusions can be readily anticipated: Britain's defense commitments and arms requirements are defined with insufficient rigor; costs had been underestimated; delays attributable to the uncertainty of government policy, inefficient management, financial troubles, etc., hamper development; firms and sales are too small to support R & D on a sufficiently large scale; the national market is not large enough to make development profitable, and so on. The conclusions are correct: Britain is gradually threatened by technological atrophy as levels of skill stagnate and organizational capacity declines.

France, under de Gaulle, was more self-conscious about her technological needs and more calculating in the steps taken to meet them. Despite these efforts and the carefully controlled expenditure of about $1.2 billion on R & D ($700 million on military projects, and most of that directed toward the *force de dissuasion*), France finds herself in the same perilous position as Britain.[24] Although she has had some notable accomplishments to her credit, the Pierrelatte plant for producing enriched uranium being outstanding among them, France nevertheless has suffered a series of technological shortfalls, most strikingly in defense fields, as delays in the deployment of the SSBS's and her polaris-type submarines testify. Her renewed interest in a technology pool with the United Kingdom partly reflects these failures.

An Anglo-French decision to combine strategic forces, and to make them strategically viable, necessarily would entail a major program of technological cooperation. The past record of *ad hoc* arrangements, self-contained projects, and abortive ventures clearly establishes the inadequacy of the cooperative methods employed in previous bilateral efforts. These have been bedevilled by an array of problems. Some of the problems—such as disagreements over the mission, and therefore design, of a weapons system—would be greatly attentuated in the framework of a general accord on defense purposes and strategy. Most of them are likely to be more difficult to overcome.

First, the element of national pride so evident in matters of defense and foreign policy is not absent from the domain of science and technology, where it has acquired a life of its own. Each nation has shown a marked reluctance to divulge its knowledge, to integrate research terms, or to fuse the managerial structures of defense-related industries.

[24] These figures are taken from Layton (fn. 5), Appendix, Tables 10 & 11. The best survey and analysis of the French government's efforts in science and technology are in Robert Gilpin, *France In the Age of the Scientific State* (Princeton 1968). See also F. Rohrbach, *La Recherche Atomique en France, Le Programme Militaire* (Paris: Ministère des Armées, Document 17/5B, 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Each seems to be moved by the adage of Cyrano de Bergerac who wished "ne pas bien haut peut-être, mais tout seul."[25] Statements of this attitude have often been made by officials on both sides of the Channel. Thus, French Minister of Industry Ortoli has said, "Care must be taken not to develop European cooperation in depth too quickly."[26] He is backed by General Fourquet, who has stated the French military's reluctance to see more than expediential, short-term cooperation: "Each program ought be studied with regard to its own virtues, since cooperation is not a magic formula. At the start, the preliminary conditions must be met, in its execution great care should be taken, then real benefit can be gained from the operation. An international program badly launched involves far worse consequences than a bad national program which can be corrected more easily and more effectively."[27] Similar attitudes prevail in the United Kingdom, where a feeling of technological superiority serves, like the French feelings of inferiority, to strengthen opposition to institutional integration. In its report, the Select Committee in Science and Technology notes that the dominant administrative attitude is to limit cooperation to those selected projects that promise tangible gain; in fact, "there was no question of cooperation being done for any kind of political reason, but purely in order to save money."[28]

These attitudes are reinforced by the conservatism of the organizations, public and private, that would have their institutional identities threatened by a genuine integration of technological effort. With the best of intentions there would be difficulties in bringing together firms, laboratories, or government agencies that have different structures and work procedures. And where an institutional existence is at stake, the best of intentions are likely to be lacking. We know that bureaucratic organizations pursue ends of self-aggrandizement and self-preservation as well as substantive policy goals. We know of their unsympathetic attitudes to procedural change and redefinition of organizational mission. The very considerable restructuring attendant upon a major effort at creating a common technological capability will of necessity affect work habits, challenge authority, and raise questions of status, power, and control. In other words, it would threaten to bring about the type of general upheaval that bureaucratic institutions resist instinctively.

[25] Taken from Pierre Audorn, "Le plan calcul; une nouvelle politique" in *Revue de Défense Nationale*, XXV (August-September 1969), 1339-50.

[26] Quoted in *ibid.*, 1349.

[27] M. Fourquet, "La politique d'armament à long-terme" in *Revue de Défense Nationale*, XXIII (May 1967), 7.

[28] *Second Report* (fn. 23), XIX.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the case of government agencies, the resistance would constitute a factor influencing the decision to proceed with a full-blown policy of technological cooperation. If and when the commitment to cooperation is made, institutional opposition, latent or overt, could reduce the chances of success and could gravely damage the program for weapons development upon which an Anglo-French strategic force depends.

GOVERNMENTAL POLICY-FORMATION

Throughout this paper we have been referring to decisions that have been made, or will be made, by governments. Britain, or France, has committed herself to this or that course of action; Britain, or France, will choose among these alternatives; Britain, or France, views problem 'X' in such or such a manner. In so designating them, we are implicitly attributing to national governments a unitary character. As is still the custom in the study of international relations, the nation is conveniently treated as a monolith and given a fictitious personality. Whereas no reputable scholar would discuss domestic policy with disregard for the parties, factions, bureaucratic forces, and associational groups, the foreign policy analyst for the most part still employs a conceptual apparatus that sees national governments as unitary actors.

There are of course good reasons for this. From the perspective of international politics, the nation appears as a solidaristic, undifferentiated entity. Its officials represent the common interest of the collectivity in relations with other states; at its core, this is an unchanging security need. Moreover, the international system is normally seen as constituting a state of political nature in which the imperatives of survival impose a definite pattern of behavior on its members. International relations, it is asserted, have a logic of their own that all states must obey, setting limits on how far any government can deviate from the obvious without undermining its interests and threatening its security. The disposition to emphasize the unitary quality of nations reflects this belief that the major determinants of policy are external to the political system; and it is reinforced by the conviction that responsibility for foreign policy is normally concentrated in the hands of a few leaders and is not open to the interplay of elements that characterizes domestic policy-making.

There is no refuting the assertion that international politics have their own unique compulsions and requirements for action. There remains, though, even in the most conventional times, a range of choices and options that could produce significantly different effects (e.g., an Anglo-French force with strategic capability is created or it is not),

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and that becomes the subject of intense *intragovernmental* debate and conflict. The determinants of public acts are many, the formation of policy exceedingly complex, and not reducible to the logical *Realpolitik* calculation of the "rational statesman."

The unitary model is particularly inappropriate in analyzing the type of problems considered in this paper. Nuclear cooperation does not merely concern the calculus of power, and the strategies of gain, in an orderly diplomatic framework where all the parameters of action except nation *X*'s decision are given. Rather, we are speaking of policy decisions that would encroach upon the autonomy of Britain and France, call for major modifications of many national institutions, and radically alter the constellation of forces in the world. In this instance, the boundaries of action are not given; it is their redrawing that is being contemplated. Under the circumstances, the unitary model is clearly insufficient for a full understanding of the elements that will bear on the British and French decisions.

Graham Allison has aptly made the point that the presumed national monolith is in fact a "black box covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decision-making structure," and that "large acts are the consequences of innumerable and often conflicting small actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, and political objectives."[29] Allison is calling our attention to the dissociation of powers in government that is especially pronounced in democratic systems. Government is not a machine programmed to make rational choices on the basis of systematic analysis, choosing among clearly defined alternatives. Whether Britain and France combine their nuclear forces will be determined by a series of complex transactions within each government. Involved on each side will be (a) Treasuries or Finance Ministries, concerned above all else with financial strains, balance-of-payments troubles, and the difficulties of balancing claims on the budget—of which arms procurement and weapons development would be just two; (b) Ministries of Defense, themselves composed of their component services and agencies, which have long experience, and success, in jealously preserving their domains from the encroachments of other governmental bodies—not to say foreign military establishments; (c) the Ministries of Technology (in France, the *Délégation Génerale de Recherche Scientifique et Technologique*) and asso-

[29] Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1969), 690.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ciated research establishments that will be eager to protect their programs and personnel in any joint undertakings; (d) the Executive Offices of the Prime Ministers that are the ultimate source of authority in the system, and have the final power of decision, but are far from impervious to the influence and machinations of other governmental forces, nor themselves free of conflict; (e) the Cabinets and Party caucuses that will be sensitive to criticism by the opposition and charges of fiscal irresponsibility, militarism, disregard for national interests, or merely fecklessness. The possible combinations of convergence and divergence are numerous and unpredictable in their particulars. (Personalities can also be a source of complication. One striking paradox in the French government today is that a sympathetic European, Giscard d'Estaing, heads the Finance Ministry, which for reasons of budgetary strain and institutional autonomy resists most proposals for any form of institutionalized European cooperation, while the fiercely nationalistic Michel Debré is Minister of Defense at a time when the French military would clearly like some form of British technological cooperation.)

But it is difficult to avoid the general conclusion that, taken together, cross-cutting and conflicting intragovernmental interests, positions taken in reference to organizational ends and institutional conservatism, and partisan considerations will *militate against* a major cooperative effort and lower the chances for success of any common ventures that are launched. The plural structure of power does not necessarily mean that all policy changes are resisted. It does imply the prevalence of partial perspectives and narrow outlooks. A permanent civil servant in charge of a defense research program, a Finance Minister preoccupied with domestic problems, or a military officer who heads a team responsible for assessment of weapons requirements, is not disposed to view issues of long-term military purpose comprehensively, to accommodate himself readily to resulting policy changes, or to look with favor upon incursions into his organizational domains. Yet these officials will be engaged in making the assessments of need and capability that will be incorporated into any decision on nuclear cooperation. These judgments cannot fail to reflect the existing pattern of policy. In some cases resistance will be conscious. For the most part, however, it is the logic of established structure, institutional purpose, and policy convention that works against major innovation. In the recent history of joint Anglo-French projects there is abundant documentation of the manner in which these factors impede cooperation. The prime example is that of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the variable geometry (swing-wing) aircraft. Its sad but brief history, starting in 1965, has been recounted for us by Christopher Layton.[30] Unfortunately, there is insufficient space here even to summarize the rich details of this informative episode which is a prime case of how a combination of financial pressures, nationally-focused ties between government and industry, and intragovernmental politics creates profound difficulties for joint programs even when there is a clear military need and common interest.

SHORT-TERM PAYOFFS

Of the several domestic considerations that could singly, or in combination with other factors, prevent any serious attempt at creating an Anglo-French force, the most important is the preoccupation of both governments with welfare. We have already noted the formidable costs that would have to be borne—which in all probability would be unacceptable—if the intention were to establish a strategically viable force. The financial constraints imposed by the growing burden of domestic programs, and the politically charged claims of economic associations for an increased share of society's wealth, obviously limit a government's prerogatives in the allocation of national resources. The problem thus raised for cooperative ventures involves more than the magnitude of the financial commitment. Governments have to be concerned about the time span for return on international projects. Political circumstances demand short-term payoffs. Contrary to popular belief, increased costs are associated with bilateral projects.[31] The several Anglo-French undertakings of the 1960's have clearly established this point. If there were to be a broad program of far-reaching cooperation that created integrated industrial combines and research teams that developed weapons systems jointly, as part of a policy of common strategic planning, financial savings would be forthcoming. Redundancy would be reduced, skills and resources pooled, and efficient organizations whose effectiveness would increase with the end of stop-and-start programming would be established. But in the short run, costs would rise and dislocations resulting from selective mergers would probably occur, creating financial and political problems for the party in office. Most analyses of European integration that consider the interplay of political and economic factors point to political considerations as being disruptive of economic cooperation.[32] They often have been, but it can

[30] Layton (fn. 5), 144-48.

[31] A pertinent discussion of this issue is to be found in Buchan (fn. 16), 16.

[32] See, for example, Lawrence Scheinman, "Euratom: Nuclear Integration In 'Europe,'" *International Reconciliation*, No. 563 (May 1967), 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also work the other way. The principle of "fair return" that has bedevilled multilateral projects (e.g., ELDO, ESRO) and bilateral projects alike is not exclusively, or even primarily, political in character, i.e., dictated by feelings of national exclusiveness and a desire to be technologically self-sufficient for reasons of military necessity and preferential gain. Rather, it reflects the short-term financial perspective of governments that see themselves as being strapped for funds and already overcommitted on domestic programs.[33]

Accordingly, assessments of an Anglo-French policy aimed at providing the technological wherewithal for a combined strategic force are complicated by uncertainty as to the industrial benefits derived from weapons-oriented research. Many knowledgeable analysts question the belief that there is an important spin-off effect created by the funding of R & D in military programs.[34] Not only are the applications to nonmilitary areas of production questionable; there is also the broader issue as to whether general industrial expansion, and the prosperity it creates, in fact depends on acquiring a competitive position in areas of advanced technology that are critical to military development. Doubts as to the broad financial benefits from defense cooperation, combined with concern over the short-term balance of expenditure and return, might well place a major impediment in the way of large-scale Anglo-French defense cooperation.

POLITICAL WILL

To this point, our analysis has emphasized the several difficulties that would have to be overcome if proposals for an Anglo-French strategic force were to be accepted and acted upon. It can be stated, with some justification, that our attention has focused on the ingredients of policy and the complexities of decision-making to the neglect of political leadership *per se*. The political will of a national leader is, of course, crucial in an estimate of the likelihood of any major policy choice being made. It is of particular importance where a radical break from past policy is contemplated that would disturb all sorts of vested interests and established ideas. A committed President or Prime Minister can

[33] There is no more striking example of how short-term considerations of economic practicality prevail over long-term goals than the recent action of the French government of contracting with American firms to construct nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes rather than delay expansion of power resources in anticipation of the graphite-gas reactors being developed by its own Atomic Energy Authority. (*Le Monde*, Oct. 18, 1969). In this case, the complicating factors of international cooperation were not even present.

[34] Surprisingly, only limited attention has been paid to this question. See, though, C.J.E. Harlow, *The European Armaments Base: A Survey, Part I* (London 1957), 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be the factor that, by initiating a policy change, starts a nation along a new course of action. It is not unimaginable that such a forceful assertion of executive power could occur on the issue of Anglo-French cooperation. In circumstances where (a) national leaders felt an urgent need to forge the instruments for an independent "European" defense (whether because of a precipate withdrawal of the United States' forces or for some other reason), (b) a large segment of the public shared this sense of urgency, and (c) there were in office persons with the talent for inspiring grand schemes and carrying them through to their realization, the obstacles to joint efforts that we examined could conceivably be overcome. Of course, two further conditions would have to be met: a parallel assessment of the situation in both Britain and France, and the capacity to act in both.

But how probable a prospect is this? Short of a drastic alteration in the terms of power in the world, it seems unrealistic, for several reasons, to expect that kind of initiative and assertion of political will from either national government. First, there is some question as to how salient an issue security and nuclear policy is. From reading some analyses of European defense problems one gets the impression that European governments are preoccupied with defense matters and highly anxious about their security (these assessments are normally made by those sympathetic to independent or European deterrents). One almost senses that the Defense Ministers and the military establishments (which are conveniently equated with the national government as a whole) make comprehensive, highly subtle judgments on a routine basis as to the intensity of the United States' commitment and the state of Europe's security arrangements. It is striking that even Mr. Denis Healey, who can be "accused" of this "mercury ball" approach, had three years in office before he actually offered a serious statement of his anxiety as to the credibility of the NATO strategy, given the relative preparedness of its conventional forces.[35] And whatever the results of his subsequent actions within the alliance's Nuclear Planning Group, the impact of his concern on his government colleagues was such that British policy remained largely unmoved—in any direction whatsoever.

In France, strategic arguments were for long a tool of Gaullist policy that used them to rationalize a nuclear program that was being put to

[35] Healey's preoccupation with the nuclear threshold, and its optimum deterrent point, has come at a relatively late date. Martin (fn. 3), 3, describes his attitude in 1964 thus: "The voice of the Labour Minister of Defence, Mr. Denis Healey, became one of the most eloquent suggesting that deterrence made the danger of deliberate aggression and sustained conventional operations sufficiently remote to justify reducing the scale of supplies held in readiness for war in Europe."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political purposes. Whatever the changes in the substance of policy since, there is no evidence of an acute sensitivity to minor shifts in strategic relationships. Indeed, what seems most striking about European defense policies is their lack of system and their high tolerance for ambiguity. Uncertain commitments to new weapons systems, equivocation before strategic choices, the readiness to allow momentary financial conditions to dictate defense policy—all these characteristics seem to conform to the general impression that the governments of Britain and France place greater stress on, and are more concerned about, domestic issues than security problems. If one were to ask the question, how systematically do they, as minor nuclear powers, make the connections among the four aspects of policy that bear on defense decisions —research and development programs in weapons-related technology, arms development and procurement, strategic doctrine, and foreign policy goals—the response, as supported by abundant evidence, would have to be that they do not make these connections. The disjunctures are glaring. This tolerance of inconsistency and contradiction cannot simply be explained in terms of the normal imperfections of governments and the anomalies of policy-making.

Certainly, the superpowers themselves do not always act with great orderliness and efficiency. (Our analysis of pluralist decision-making applies to them as well as to the Europeans.) And their "sloppiness" is more dangerous insofar as it can threaten the peace by destabilizing the balance of terror. But the United States and U.S.S.R. are not facing the choice of whether to provide for their own defense; they manifestly do; they are sensitive to changes in the constellation of strategic forces, and they are assured of a continued capability by the inertial forces in both countries. Britain and France, by contrast, are at the point of decision. Today, they do not provide for their own security. To tolerate evident policy disjunctures, and to demonstrate a lack of rigor in forming policy, implies a willingness to accept the condition of dependence. A disciplined approach is the first prerequisite for the type of concerted initiative that could lead to meaningful Anglo-French cooperation.

The conclusion of this disquisition is therefore negative as regards the prospect for a combined defense effort by the French and British. It is difficult to avoid the observation that innovations in strategic arrangements are seriously proposed and conscientiously reviewed, not so much because of a concern for security or the pursuit of clear political objectives, but because national nuclear forces exist and something has to be done with them. The weapons, the defense establishments to which they belong, and the military doctrines to which they are at-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tached, have a reality and a meaning of their own. Those same forces of inertia that perpetuate their existence—bureaucratic and partisan interests domestically, the durability of the nation-state internationally—make their transmutation into a joint force of formidable dimensions and world effect unlikely. Various forms of low-level cooperation are possible, and very probably will come about. These linkages, though, would be at the expense of more consequential integration, and the resultant closing of options would assure that any future nuclear role remains a minor one.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MACEDONIAN SYNDROME

An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development

By MYRON WEINER*

I

THIS study was undertaken in an effort to use data from European history to develop a model that might prove useful for describing, explaining, and predicting the patterns of political development and international behavior of some of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. My interest in exploring the experiences of several European states grew out of dissatisfaction with efforts to build development theories exclusively upon knowledge of the contemporary developing areas in which the outcomes are unknown, where the periods of time with which we can work are often too short for testing any long-term development theories, and where we are often unable to distinguish between short-term, momentary changes and long-term, persistent patterns of growth or decay.

I was particularly interested in improving our theoretical understanding of the process of national integration in multi-ethnic societies faced with conflicts among castes, religions, tribes, linguistic groups, and races. These conflicts not only affect the development of a sense of national identity—a familiar theme in almost all the contemporary literature on development—but they also have important consequences for the kind of central-local relationships that develop in a political system, for the pattern of economic development policy and educational policy, and, most important of all, for the very legitimacy of political institutions and political authority. Since the problems of ethnic conflict have been experienced by a number of European states, it seemed to me that an examination of the rich literature on these experiences might prove useful for understanding some of the contemporary problems of ethnic conflict in the developing areas.

Some historians would probably argue, however, that the political problems faced by European states as they modernized were too different from those now faced by the developing countries to make analo-

* I should like to express my appreciation to the Carnegie Corporation, the Social Science Research Council, and the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. for providing me with the support which made this study possible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gies very useful. My first step in an attempt to meet the challenge of historic uniqueness was to single out for study a group of European countries that seemed most like those of the newly independent developing countries—the states of Southeast Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For one thing, these states were all former colonies. Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, and most of Yugoslavia had previously been ruled by the Ottoman Empire, and portions of both Rumania and Yugoslavia had been part of the Hapsburg Empire. Second, as with other former colonies, they had initially borrowed political institutions from outside, and since the major powers of Europe (except France) were monarchies, the new states became monarchies; in many instances they even recruited their kings from other countries. Third, they were all economically backward states whose elites were acutely sensitive to their own underdevelopment. As in contemporary late-developing states, their elites were often torn between a desire to borrow from others and an urge to preserve their own distinctive heritage. Fourth, they were all multi-ethnic states. They contained a mélange (or, as the French would more appropriately say, a *macédoine*) of religious and linguistic groups and even, in the case of Albania, of tribes. And, finally, these newly independent states developed in the midst of great-power rivalries, as the British, Russians, Germans, French, and Italians were all cultivating their own interests in the region.

Of course, each of these states differed in some respects from contemporary developing states, and we would be hard put to find a perfect analogy between, say, Yugoslavia and Nigeria or between Bulgaria and Pakistan. The proportions of ethnic groups differ, and so do the forms and processes of government. Moreover, the Balkan states also differed from each other in many fundamental dimensions. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had politically independent peasantries, whereas Rumania had a powerful aristocracy. Yugoslavia was a fragmented ethnic state; Rumania and Greece had a single dominant ethnic majority. Given these differences both in time and in space, how then is it possible to use the experiences of these states for illuminating contemporary problems of development?

Rather than drawing analogies—the most common method for utilizing historical cases for contemporary purposes—I have instead chosen to use the data from Southeastern Europe to create a descriptive model of political development. The utility and limits of such a model can best be understood by considering the ways in which physicians use descriptive models of diseases for clinical purposes. In clinical medicine, a well-trained doctor has in his mind the names and characteristics

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a large number of diseases. The description of a disease is essentially a model that specifies the onset, symptoms, physical signs, anatomical involvement, course, and termination of the disease. These characteristics are understood as a result of the accumulation of a substantial number of case histories. A doctor familiar with a wide range of diseases, modern methods, and instruments of diagnosis has the capacity to identify the disease, predict its probable course, and recommend treatment. Even when the precise cause of the disease is not known, as in cancer, prediction and prescription are possible. Moreover, no matter how precise the model, no matter how often it has been tested against accumulated case histories, no individual case need fit the model of the disease in every detail. Patients are in different conditions and have different susceptibilities to the same ailment. Some patients, for example, are left permanently damaged by polio, and others have no noticeable aftereffects. Then, too, the doctor's predictions are statements of probabilities. Patients with measles rarely die, but it does happen, and there can be a spontaneous remission of the most "terminal" cancer case. Still, in spite of the varied ways in which patients respond to diseases, in spite of the varied forms a given disease may take, in spite of the difficulties of making fool-proof predictions, it is still invaluable to have descriptions of diseases. Without such models, we could not study the causes of the disease; we would not know what we can typically expect; and the doctor would be unable to recommend a treatment to alleviate the symptoms, affect the speed of recovery, or change the outcome.

The Balkan cases provided me with the clinical materials for a descriptive model. No one case, not even the Balkan cases themselves, will fit the model in every single respect, but I do believe that the model is close enough to reality to be useful for describing, predicting, and perhaps even explaining the probable patterns of political development of certain types of political systems.

As I studied the impact of ethnic conflicts on the political development of each of the Balkan states, I was struck with two facts of pervasive importance. The first is that the problems of ethnic conflict were particularly acute because each Balkan state contained minorities from neighboring states and in several instances had "kinsmen" living across the international border. Second, without exception, every Balkan state was engaged in a dispute with its neighbors over its boundaries, generally because the international boundary divided some ethnic group. These two facts—the transnational character of ethnic groups and the disputes over boundaries—seemed to me to be accompanied by certain characteristic patterns of development in both domestic and interna-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional affairs. I have brought together these regularities of behavior into a single model that I have chosen to call the Macedonian Syndrome, named after the region of the Balkans disputed by Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and that provided me with an almost pure case history with which to build the model. I trust, needless to say, that no one will henceforth assume that each case is precisely like that of Macedonia.

II

The model assumes that two or more political systems contiguous to one another share a common ethnic group—that is, a tribe or a linguistic, religious, or culturally identifiable and self-conscious community. In at least one of the countries, the ethnic group must be a minority. In the other it may be either a minority or the majority. In the country or countries in which the ethnic group is a minority, the group is aware of its cultural distinctiveness in relation to the majority and is also aware of its affinities with its brethren in the neighboring country. Finally, for the model to be complete, one of the two states must be irredentist, that is, it must seek to revise the international boundaries so as to incorporate the ethnic minority in the neighboring state and the territory it occupies. This, then, is the model. It assumes a minimum of three actors: an irredentist state, an anti-irredentist neighbor, and a shared ethnic group crossing the international boundary.

Three conditions for the model need to be emphasized. The first is that the ethnic group must feel itself to be a minority: it must be aware of its own independent identity in relation to others. One minimal condition for this feeling is that the two or more political systems in which the group lives have more or less defined mutually exclusive territories that the governmental structures have penetrated and controlled, or are seeking to penetrate and control. In short, it must make a difference to an ethnic group that it is divided by an international boundary, a condition not yet met in many parts of Africa.

Second, it is necessary to stress the deliberative, policy aspects of the model. One or more of the political systems must *choose* to press for boundary rectifications. Ethnic groups can cross international boundaries without any country's making irredentist demands or without the ethnic group's pressing for border revisions. The French do not claim the Walloon areas of Belgium or the French-speaking areas of Switzerland. The Dutch do not demand the Flemish region of Belgium. The Italians and Germans do not make claims upon Switzerland. I am concerned here not with why a governing elite chooses to make an irredentist claim, but rather with the consequences for the society and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

polity of the respective countries once such a claim is made. In the current fashionable jargon of political science, I am speaking here of the effects of the "output" of the political system.

Third, the irredendist demand must have high salience for the elite and for the country as a whole. Unless the demand is taken seriously—admittedly a difficult notion to operationalize, but nonetheless recognizable in all but a few marginal cases—by all the relevant actors, then, the model is not valid. An irredentist demand may not be serious if (a) the irredentist country has simply lodged minor claims upon its neighbors, as is the case of several Southeast Asian states, or (b) the irredentist state is very small and weak and the anti-irredentist state is large and powerful. One such example is Rumania's claim upon Russia for Bessarabia, an area now incorporated into the Ukraine. Though a source of irritation in the relationship between the two countries, Rumania's claim upon the Soviet Union is not in itself serious enough to affect substantially the behavior of either country.

There are two major variants of the model.

First, there is the pattern in which an ethnic group is a minority in one country, but a majority in the other. Among the historic examples of this pattern I include the Hungarians in pre-war Rumania, the Greeks in Albania and Turkey, the Albanians and Italians in Yugoslavia, and the Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland. In each of these cases, the country involved sought to "redeem"[1] its ethnic kinsmen. Thus Hungary demanded the Vojvodina region of Yugoslavia and the Transylvania region of Rumania, both with large Magyar populations. The Greeks sought possession of the Greek-speaking areas of Southern Albania and the Greek-populated region around Smyrna in Turkish Asia Minor. And Albania claimed the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia, with its Muslim Albanian population.

The second variant exists when an ethnic group is a minority in both countries disputing its possession: the Macedonians in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece; the Slovenians in Austria and Yugoslavia; and the Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and the Soviet Union.

The two variants are not so clearcut as they may at first appear, since there is often a controversy over whether the disputed ethnic group is culturally distinct from both countries or is the same ethnic group that constitutes the majority in the irredentist state. The Macedonian

[1] In Italian, the term *irredenta* was used. The Italian-speaking provinces outside the Italian peninsula were regarded as "unredeemed" or *irredenta*, and the supporters of "redemption" by union with Italy were called "irredentist," a word then applied to aspirations of other national minorities for separation from the state in which they live.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dispute provides a good example: the Yugoslavs argued that the inhabitants of the disputed area were culturally distinct, the Bulgarians that they were predominantly Bulgarians, and the Greeks that they were Slavophones, that is, Slav-speaking Greeks.

In contemporary Asia and Africa, there are several significant cases of irredentist disputes and a larger number of instances where ethnic groups straddle international boundaries, creating potential border disputes. Among the major contemporary instances of this kind of dispute are the conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Pathan or Pushtu tribes straddling the northwest frontier, the disagreement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and Somalia's demand for the Somali-occupied territories of Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland. International boundaries also divide the Armenians among Turkey, the Soviet Union, and Iran; the Azerbaijani between the Soviet Union and Iran; and the Kurds among Turkey, Iran, and Iraq; all of these have, from time to time, resulted in irredentist claims. Although the present claims of the Arab states and of the Palestinian Arabs go beyond the disputed territories, the Arab-Israeli conflict over the territories occupied by Israel during the six-day war can also be viewed as an irredentist dispute. Finally, though the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus is not, technically speaking, an irredentist issue since Cyprus is an independent state, Greece and the Greek population of Cyprus view Turkish hostility as the obstacle to union.

The model suggests that there are characteristic patterns of political development within both the irredentist and anti-irredentist states, that the states involved in irredentist disputes have a characteristic set of relations not only to one another but to other states as well, and that these various characteristics form a syndrome—that is, they are generally found together, are causally interrelated, and owe their origin to common factors. In short, we have a class or order to which a number of countries belong and whose members behave and develop in characteristic ways. The model isolates sixteen such characteristics.

III

1. The irredentist state pressing for a revision of the international boundary will generally attempt to form alliances to threaten the state containing the ethnic minority. "Natural" allies are neighboring states of the "enemy" and other states that also seek to rectify international boundaries, or are anti-status quo with respect to the international or regional balance of power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bulgaria's dispute with her Greek and Yugoslav neighbors over Macedonia provides a classic example of this proposition. Macedonia was a disputed region of the Balkans spreading over three countries. It had not been an independent state since the fourth century B.C., but had been successively under Byzantine and Turkish rule. From the very beginning of their national movement, the Bulgarians laid claim to Macedonia. The Russians, as patrons of the Bulgarians, pressed for the inclusion of Macedonia under Bulgarian rule in 1878, in the Treaty of San Stefano, but the western powers, fearful of an enlarged Bulgaria under Russian influence, intervened at the Treaty of Berlin in the same year and Macedonia remained under Turkish rule. In 1911 Bulgaria joined with two of her rivals, Greece and Serbia, in attacking Turkey and freeing Macedonia, along with other areas, from Turkish occupation. In 1912, after this first triumph, Bulgaria turned against Serbia and Greece to fight for the spoils in a war Bulgaria lost at a considerable sacrifice of life. The Bulgarian governments from 1913 onward had an uncanny instinct for engaging in losing wars and allying with the losing side. In World War I, Bulgaria sided with the Central Powers against Russia, with the expectation that a German-Austrian victory would lead to her acquisition of Macedonia. The persistence of this claim to Macedonia was a decisive factor in Bulgaria's decision to join with Austria, Hungary, and Germany in the second World War against Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and the Allies. To the very end, Bulgaria's revisionist goals dominated her foreign policy, even when it meant becoming a supporter of German efforts to occupy all of the Balkans militarily. Bulgaria had literally cut off her own nose to spite her face. Moreover, Bulgaria's alliances with Germany ran counter to deeply felt historical, religious, and cultural associations with Russia, thus demonstrating the overwhelming role that irredentist sentiments have played in the choice of allies.

There are numerous other examples of the way in which irredentist claims dictate patterns of alliance. Pre-war Albania sought an alliance with Italy because the two countries shared claims upon Yugoslavia. Pre-war Hungary allied herself with Germany in pursuit of her irredentist claims upon Rumania. More recently, the Egyptians have turned to the Soviet Union for support, the Pakistanis have joined with China against India, and Somalia has sought Soviet support in her quarrel with Ethiopia and Kenya.

2. The anti-irredentist state with the ethnic minority will respond by attempting to form defensive alliances to preserve existing borders.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Natural" allies are neighbors of its irredentist neighbor and other powers that for one reason or another wish to preserve the status quo.

During the interwar period anti-irredentist states generally sought support from Britain or France, since both these powers advocated the maintenance of the existing European balance of power. Thus, as Bulgaria's relations with Germany tightened, Yugoslavia pressed for British and French protection. However, the choice of allies for the anti-irredentist countries of the Balkans often proved to be a contentious domestic political issue. In Yugoslavia, for example, the Serbs, staunch supporters of a united Yugoslavia, were fiercely anti-German and pro-Allied, whereas the Croatians, whose separatist tendencies had been encouraged by the Germans and Italians, were in favor of a Yugoslav-German pact.

For the Rumanians, however, the choice of allies during the interwar period was somewhat simpler. Pressed by the Soviet Union on one side and by a pro-German irredentist Hungary on the other, Rumania sought support from the Allies, especially from France, with whom Rumania also had strong cultural associations.

Today, among the anti-irredentist states, India and Israel have each turned for support to the opponent of the country that has allied itself with her irredentist neighbor. India's growing ties with the Soviet Union are the result both of Pakistan's flirtation with China and of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Similarly, Israel's growing military dependence upon the United States is closely tied to Egypt's growing dependence upon the Soviet Union.

3. Neighboring states and larger, more powerful countries are often drawn into irredentist disputes, sometimes to endorse the claims of one side or the other, sometimes formally to join one of the alliances, sometimes simply to establish more trade with, provide more assistance to, or become friendlier with one state rather than the other. Few outside states are able to maintain equally cordial relations with both parties to the dispute. Outside states may enter the dispute for any one of a large number of reasons, not the least of which is that they are often invited to take sides.

There are, of course, many occasions when an external power believes it has much to gain by endorsing one side of a dispute. Thus, Italy had good reasons for endorsing Albania's claims upon Yugoslavia and Greece; the Italian government hoped that the disintegration of Yugoslavia would lead to an extension of Italy's territory to Trieste

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and establish Italy as the exclusive power on the Adriatic and a major force on the Mediterranean. Similarly, Soviet involvement in the Middle East on the side of the Arab states is a device for extending Soviet influence into the Mediterranean and controlling the oil arteries to Western Europe and the United States.

4. As the irredentist power expresses its concern for the status of the ethnic minority in the neighboring state, hope grows within the ethnic minority that it will be incorporated into the revisionist state or that, with the support of the revisionist power, it may achieve separate statehood. But whatever the ultimate aim of the ethnic minority is (and in practice it is often divided), a substantial portion becomes increasingly hostile to efforts to nationalize it into the anti-irredentist state in which it lives. As irredentist demands grow, therefore, national integration of the ethnic minority into the status quo power is impaired.

The pre-war Yugoslav case provides an almost classic example of the impact of irredentist claims on efforts to achieve national integration. Virtually every neighboring state made claims on some portion of Yugoslavia: the Bulgarians and Greeks demanded Macedonia, the Albanians demanded the Albanian districts of southern Yugoslavia, Hungary demanded Vojvodina, and Italy demanded Trieste. The host of claims upon Yugoslavia led to a feeling of uncertain loyalties on the part of virtually all ethnic groups within the state. Moreover, in the bitterly disputed area of Macedonia there arose political groups determined to undermine the Yugoslav political system and willing and able to employ assassins to achieve their ends.

There are parallels in Kashmir and India. The persistence of Pakistan's claim upon India has generally undermined India's efforts to incorporate Kashmir into India's national political system; indeed, in the past decade a number of prominent Kashmiri political leaders who were once known for their pro-Indian sentiment have resisted integration with India and advocated some kind of autonomy as a political solution.

5. There are theoretically three possible responses by the ethnic minority to irredentist claims. First, the minority can accept the existing international boundaries, strive for improving its status within the country in which it is a minority (often demanding greater autonomy or some kind of federal solution), and press for improved relations between the two countries, viewing itself as a "bridge" of possible friendship. Second, the minority can be ardently committed to union with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its kinsmen across the border by supporting the claim of the irredentist power. Or third, if the ethnic group is a minority in both countries, it may favor union in a single state of its own.

Which response is most likely to be supported by a majority of the leaders and of the masses among the ethnic minority? If the ethnic group is a minority in one state and the majority in the other, sentiment is more likely to be toward merger with the majority state. If the ethnic group is a minority in both states, sentiment is more likely to be toward independent nationhood. In either event, there is likely to be intense debate and conflict within the ethnic minority as to the character of its own identity and its affinity or lack of affinity with other ethnic communities.

The issue of identity has, for example, been intensely argued by Kashmiris and Macedonians. Kashmiris who stress their Islamic identity are likely to be pro-Pakistani, and Kashmiris who see themselves as a separate ethnic group are likely to favor an autonomous status or lean toward India. Similarly, the Macedonians were divided between those who saw themselves as a distinct "nationality" deserving their own state and those who saw themselves, politically or ethnically, as related to the Yugoslavs, the Bulgarians, or the Greeks.

6. As demands for revision of boundaries on the part of the irredentist power persist, the status quo power will become increasingly suspicious of the loyalty of its ethnic minority whose status is being disputed. There is a strong tendency to move in two directions simultaneously: to accelerate programs to "nationalize" schoolchildren, to press the minority to learn the majority language and in various ways to demand expressions of identification and loyalty by the minority toward the national government; and, second, to increase police surveillance and border patrols and in general impose more controls over the disputed minority community. The more intense the international dispute, the higher the costs of enforcing compliance upon the disputed population will rise.

There is often disagreement within the country's governing elite as to how to treat the population under dispute. One group may advocate a federalist, decentralist policy aimed at increasing the autonomy and decreasing the fears of the minority, and another group will press for a centralist and assimilationist policy and an increased reliance upon coercion against dissident elements. The more threatening the revisionist power, the more likely it is that the centralist group will win.

However, in practice, the policy most often pursued by the status quo

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government is erratic, alternating between centralist and decentralist policies. Since the central government is often divided as to which policy will be most efficacious in winning the loyalty of the minority, the course pursued is often the result of some sudden event—a mass outburst, a hostile declaration by a minority leader, or some incident between ethnic groups—rather than of any long-term deliberate policy.

In Rumania the government has alternated between a policy of permitting cultural and educational autonomy to the Hungarian minorities residing in Transylvania and its present assimilationist policy. In Yugoslavia the trend has been in the opposite direction. The pre-war Yugoslav government was dominated by a Serbian centralist group that sought to make of Yugoslavia a "greater Serbia," whereas the present government has treated both Macedonians and Albanians as distinct nationalities in Yugoslavia's multinational state and granted considerable autonomy to both Macedonia and Kosovo. It should be noted, however, that Yugoslavia found it easier to pursue a decentralist policy when irredentist demands from its neighbors subsided.

7. The revisionist power is easily aroused by steps taken by the neighboring state to assimilate, incorporate, integrate, or in any other significant (and sometimes insignificant) way to affect the status of the minority ethnic group. All acts of discrimination against the minority, acts of protest by members of the minority community, and relatively minor incidents are magnified by the press, by political parties, and by the government of the state demanding territorial revision.

There are countless examples of this proposition: the sensitivity of the Turkish government and press to the treatment of Turks in Cyprus, the reactions of Pakistanis to events in Kashmir (and to the treatment of Muslims within India), and of Egyptians, Syrians, and Iraqis to reports from Jerusalem and all Arab-populated areas occupied by Israel.

8. As the revisionist power becomes increasingly obsessed with the question of boundary rectification, this issue, rather than matters of internal development, receives the highest priority. Although on other issues there may be differences among citizens and within the governing elite, the redemption of kinsmen and the correction of territorial injustice are sentiments on which virtually all nationals can agree. The central internal political issue, therefore, becomes one of how to bring about a change in the international or military situation in order to rectify the boundaries. In foreign policy, the government searches for allies and arms; in domestic policy, it gives high priority to military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expenditures. The handful of politicians and intellectuals who advocate shifting priorities to internal development and to the establishment of cordial relations with their neighbor are generally accused of disloyalty and may even be faced with personal danger.

Though irredentist governments may view economic development as a necessary condition for increasing their military power, they have often put aside development programs in pursuit of their irredentist objectives. Gerschenkron, in his brilliant analysis of pre-World War I economic development policies in Bulgaria, concluded that a concern for foreign and military policy obstructed serious preoccupation with industrial development, so that the Bulgarian government let many opportunities pass unused. Thus, Gerschenkron reports that the premier, once a great advocate of economic development, turned his attention to preparing for a military attack upon the Turks, expressing the sentiment that he felt, in his own words, "responsible to History for the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance."[2]

The same readiness to sacrifice economic development programs for military objectives has characterized both Egypt and Pakistan, both of whom had promising development activities in the 1960's.

9. When irredentist objectives are given priority over other public policies, the internal power structure of the country is likely to develop in such a way as to favor those advocating order and unity at home and militancy abroad. Such groups generally include the military, the monarchy (if one exists), or some single leader with dictatorial tendencies. There is a strong tendency for the military to assume political power in irredentist political systems. There is a tendency for voluntary institutions and the mass media to become subservient to central authority, and a tendency on the part of the central government to resist genuinely free elections and a representative process that might change the existing power structure. Frequently, opponents of the regime will be arrested and charged with espionage and collaboration with the enemy. In short, existing governing elites, whether "radical" or "conservative," are likely to use the irredentist issue to prevent competitive politics and changes in the existing power structure.

Few irredentist regimes have been able to establish and maintain a competitive political framework. In both pre-war Hungary and Bulgaria, pro-German authoritarian governments assumed power. The one major political group in Bulgaria that opposed the irredentist policy and

[2] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962), 233.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that sought to turn the attention of the country to internal development —the Peasant Union government of Stamboliski—was overthrown in a violent upheaval by a coalition of the army and an organization of the Macedonians. Similarly, many of Greece's frequent coups were organized by military officers critical of the government's failure energetically to pursue Greece's claims on neighboring countries. The military coup of 1909 was among the first of several direct interventions by the military into Greek political life following an abortive expansionist phase; the 1967 military coup in Greece is the most recent.

Among contemporary irredentist states, some form of military rule is common: in Pakistan (where one military regime was replaced by another after the unsuccessful 1965 war), Greece, and Egypt. In the Middle East, regimes became more authoritarian after the Israeli-Arab war, and in Greece the domestic political power of the military has increased during the periods of Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus.

10. Just as the internal distribution of power and the ordering of priorities are shaped by irredentist demands, so is the political culture. In the irredentist state, the political culture of both the citizenry and the elite are molded by the desire to redeem the "repressed" minorities, to unite with one's kinsmen in order to make whole, so to speak, a national people. National loyalties become paramount. Militancy, self-sacrifice, and the readiness to die for one's country become highly valued. There is a growing hostility to all countries and foreigners who do not support the "just" demands of the nation, hostility to internal dissent because it weakens national unity, and affection for the military on which, ultimately, hopes for redemption rest. Finally, the rhetoric of public discourse becomes highly charged with emotion, so that rational discussion of alternative courses of action becomes impossible.

11. As emotional rhetoric grows, as it becomes apparent that the status quo power will not voluntarily cede the disputed territory, as frustration within the irredentist state increases, there develops a willingness within the governing elite, including the military, and within the populace as a whole, to take chances in international affairs without any careful calculations as to the probability of a successful outcome. Military skirmishes on the border are provoked. People on the border (particularly if they are a minority of the same ethnic composition as the disputed peoples) may be encouraged to make forays across the line. Commando units of volunteers may be organized. Finally, the irredentist state may launch an ill-prepared and abortive military attack

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or deliberately encourage, at a very great risk to itself, military intervention in the region on the part of a major military power.

The irredentist state is most likely to launch a military attack, even if the military is aware of its own weakness in relation to the enemy, if it has reason to believe that support of some kind will be forthcoming from one of the great powers.

At least four dramatic examples of ineffective military expansion by irredentist states come to mind. In 1912 Bulgaria attacked her Balkan neighbors in an effort to absorb Macedonia and the southern Dobruja—an unsuccessful war resulting in a considerable loss of life and property to Bulgaria. In 1922 a similar effort to expand led Greece to launch an attack upon Turkey, a move that resulted in the forcible exodus of over a million Greeks from Asia Minor. In 1965 the government of Pakistan unsuccessfully attacked India in an effort to regain Kashmir. Finally, in 1967 the Arab states threatened to liquidate Israel after their initially successful effort to deny Israel the use of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, a situation leading to Israel's preemptive strike and the six-day war.

In all four instances we can see a general tendency at work: in their desire to achieve a dramatic military victory, governing elites of an irredentist power tend to overestimate the capacity of their own military (usually by exaggerating the high morale and moral fervor in their own military and underestimating them in that of their enemy) and the willingness of its great-power allies to provide support.

12. If the irredentist government has armed its border people and exiles from the disputed territory, or allowed outsiders to provide them with arms, there is a high probability that this armed minority will turn their arms against their own government if in their judgment it fails to pursue a sufficiently aggressive expansionist policy. Most irredentist governments have been sufficiently aware of these risks to avoid permitting their most enthusiastic irredentists from becoming armed, but there are several notable exceptions.

In the 1920's the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) took control of a portion of Macedonia lying within Bulgaria, known as the Petrich Department, and assumed considerable power within the Bulgarian government. IMRO had its major support from immigrants who had fled into Bulgaria during the Balkan wars and who provided a reservoir of manpower on which IMRO could draw for its terrorist cadres. IMRO engaged in terrorist acts and assassinations in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and deliberately sought

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to keep the region in such a state of unrest that news of it would constantly appear in the world press, so that the great powers would feel forced to redraw the Balkan frontiers. IMRO played a major role in overthrowing the Peasant Union government of Prime Minister Stamboliski, who had sought a rapprochement with Yugoslavia and had attempted to curb IMRO by arresting its leaders. IMRO leaders personally executed the Prime Minister.

Throughout the 1920's and early thirties IMRO continued to engage in assassinations and terrorism within Bulgaria and to exercise great influence at the highest levels of government. In a reaction foreshadowing the behavior of the Jordanian army in 1970, in 1934 the Bulgarian military launched a coup, dismissed parliament, dissolved all political parties, censored the press, and suppressed IMRO.

In the Middle East, the policy of the Arab states to arm Palestinian Arabs has led to armed attacks by the Palestinians against Arab governments in Lebanon and Jordan when these governments sought to restrain Palestinian commandos. Should the Palestinians take control over Jordan, it is likely that an aggressive irredentist Jordan would be prepared to take military risks considered unacceptable by some of its Arab neighbors, and would seek to trigger a larger war even if it provoked Soviet and American intervention. Such a policy could lead to conflict between a Palestinian-dominated Jordan and some established Arab governments, as well as to armed conflict within those Arab countries unwilling to support the Palestinians.

13. The effects of irredentist claims on the internal political structure and on the political culture of the anti-irredentist political system depend very much on the magnitude of the threat from the revisionist state and on the degree of ethnic homogeneity in the anti-irredentist country. Since the anti-irredentist state gives no priority at all to reordering the international boundaries and is only concerned with the issue because it is raised by the irredentist state (often asserting, in fact, that no "issue" exists), its internal politics are less likely to be affected than are the politics of the irredentist state. However, when the irredentist power is particularly threatening, the anti-irredentist state will increase its military expenditures. Since its military posture is defensive and military values do not permeate the society as they do in the irredentist state, the government is somewhat less likely to fall under military rule than is its irredentist neighbor. If the anti-irredentist country is fairly homogeneous ethnically (except for the ethnic group it shares with its neighbor), the majority may draw more closely together as a result of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the external threat. If, on the other hand, the society is multi-ethnic and its integration incomplete, the persistence of an irredentist claim may lead one or more ethnic groups to feel that the political system is "tentative," and therefore to withhold their loyalty.

Integration in pre-war Yugoslavia, a formidable task in any event, was made virtually impossible by the irredentist demands of her neighbors. Yugoslavia was then, and probably still is, the most diversified European country west of the Soviet Union. There was Serbia, a monarchy with a well-developed administrative structure and political parties, independent through most of the nineteenth century; Montenegro, also an independent kingdom, a loose collection of tribes that had gradually become a bureaucratically administrative state; Croatia and Slovenia, both quasi-autonomous provinces of the Hungarian half of the Hapsburg monarchy; the province of Vojvodina, which had been an integral part of Hungary; Dalmatia, which had been part of the Hapsburg state; and Bosnia and Herzogovina, first under Ottoman rule and then under an Austro-Hungarian condominium. Each region was well-defined and commanded some identification from a majority of the population. Each had an operating legal and administrative apparatus and, in several instances, especially Croatia and Serbia, had its own functioning regional political parties prior to the creation of the new state of Yugoslavia in 1918.

The irredentist demands upon Yugoslavia from virtually every one of its neighbors, and the external support given to political-ethnic groups within Yugoslavia, left open the very question of whether there could be a Yugoslav state. Yugoslav foreign policy became dictated more by the need to prevent civil war than by considerations of external security. Thus, on the eve of a German invasion of the Balkans, the Yugoslav government, in an effort to avoid a civil war with the Croatians and hoping to keep the Germans out, signed a treaty with the Germans, a decision soon followed by both a civil war and a German occupation!

14. Among all three actors in the system—the irredentist state, the anti-irredentist state, and the disputed ethnic group—there is likely to be a great concern, almost an obsession, with the past, as each actor seeks to define or justify its identity. The exact location and extent of historic kingdoms, the special merits attributed to historic heroes, and the historic distinctive qualities of the people—their language, literature, folk songs, traditional social institutions and practices, and their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deeply revered values are all explored and publicized by the country's historians, poets, priests, politicians, schoolteachers, and journalists.

There is often a tendency for poets to be hawks and the military to be doveish, for the literary elites are inclined to want to take military risks whereas sections of the military, aware of their own limitations, may prefer to be cautious.

In Israel, for example, the country's leading writers support the "Land of Israel Movement," whose manifesto of September, 1967, advocated retention of occupied territories not only because of security considerations but on the grounds that these territories are part of an historic Jewish homeland. Similarly, among Arabs the strongest support for a policy of driving Israelis to the sea comes from newspaper editors, journalists, writers, and literary figures generally.

Since personal identity is intertwined with the identity of the community, individuals will react with extraordinary vehemence to what to an outsider would appear to be trivial historical points: whether a given work of art belonged to one cultural tradition rather than to another, the etymology of place names, and whether a particular deity, architectural form, or ancient social institution is indigenous or was borrowed from another culture. The dispute between the irredentist and anti-irredentist powers often centers on just such historic fine points. As the dispute accelerates and as tensions mount, each side sees the dispute as involving fundamental moral issues on which compromise becomes impossible.

15. Among the actors, political leaders advocating a position contrary to the majority view are likely to be considered disloyal. Indeed, a kind of Gresham's law of leadership is at work. Political leaders in the revisionist power advocating a military solution are likely to drive out those who want to end the dispute by accepting the status quo; in the status quo power, those who advocate a firm stand are likely to drive out those who wish to surrender the disputed territory; and within the contested ethnic group, those who advocate a policy aimed at unifying the divided community are likely to drive out those who are willing to accept partition.

16. Finally, there are several typical ways in which the dispute can be terminated, all involving the use of violence or coercion, or the threat of their use. One possibility is that the irredentist power triumphs militarily and takes control over the disputed territory. If this take-over

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

occurs the roles may be reversed, as the defeated state now makes its irredentist claims. The military defeat of the irredentist power does not seem to end its claims—unless, of course, the irredentist power is permanently occupied or dismembered. A second possibility is that the ethnic minority in the disputed territory is physically withdrawn from the area. This removal may be accomplished through genocide, through forced internal population transfers, or through the expulsion of the minority group by either a forced exodus or an international exchange of populations. A third possibility is that one or more outside powers militarily impose a border settlement. A settlement can be imposed only by a credible threat that any country taking military measures to change the boundaries will be militarily occupied by an external power. Since the outcome depends upon the military power of each of the parties concerned and the interests, military power, and interrelationships of external powers, it is very difficult to predict which of these methods will terminate any particular dispute. But it is clear that the least likely way in which the dispute can end is through voluntary agreement on the part of the disputing parties.

None of the pre-war Balkan disputes can be said to have been resolved by the agreement of the contesting parties. If the Balkans have ceased to be the tinderbox of Europe, it is not because the Hungarians no longer desire Transylvania from Rumania, or because Bulgaria is content to see Macedonia remain a part of Yugoslavia, or because Albania and Greece are satisfied with their existing boundaries. None of the many proposals for finding a "rational" solution to these disputes—plebiscites, a peaceful exchange of minorities, or a federation of Balkan states into a single multicultural state—ended the disputes among the Balkan states. Rather, it was only in the postwar era, when the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant power in the Balkans, willing to intervene to prevent one or another Balkan state from using force to assert its border claims—and militarily capable of such intervention—that peace was established in the region.

It seems equally unlikely that any of the contemporary irredentist disputes will be resolved simply through discussion and without the active involvement of third parties prepared to exercise their power to enforce a settlement. Although the hegemony of a single great power in a region in which disputes have in the past occurred has been a moderating force, no such condition exists in those areas in which irredentist disputes are now most virulent. Nor has the international community thus far been able to create an effective force capable of assuming the peace-keeping functions historically performed by hegemonic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

powers. So long as this void continues, the syndrome described here is likely to be operative whenever and wherever irredentist disputes arise.

IV

Since the model is only an approximation of reality, we should not expect it to incorporate and explain every significant feature and variation in the behavior of irredentist and anti-irredentist states. Both in the natural universe and in human affairs, concrete cases are invariably unique, while all scientific conceptualizations are abstractions that never fully exhaust or reflect concrete reality. Moreover, any one of the characteristics enumerated here can be explained in other ways. A given effect can have many different causes. What is distinctive about these characteristics is that they all tend to reinforce one another under specified conditions.

I have tried to construct a dynamic model. Events occur in sequences, and one event tends to lead to another. There is action and reaction, so that we can often see accelerator effects at work. Moreover, I have made an attempt to link domestic and international developments inextricably, as they ought to be in any development model. Too many theories of development assume constancy or irrelevancy as far as the international environment is concerned, and assume also that internal political development or decay occur without regard to external factors. International events are often seen as interfering with development as if political or economic development occurred in isolation. This model assumes that we are dealing with a system of states in which the actions of one actor affect the actions of another, and that external actions affect and are affected by internal political developments. One of the objects of the model is to show the logical interconnection between the internal development of states and their interactions with their neighbors and with the great powers and, perhaps even more importantly, to alert us to expect what so often appears to be (and often is) irrational and self-destructive behavior.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE USSR: "TO BE, OR NOT TO BE"

Some Reflections on the Implications of a Recent Soviet Critique of American Political Science

By ROLF H. W. THEEN

V. G. Kalenskii, *Politicheskaia nauka v SShA: kritika burzhuaznykh kontseptsii vlasti* [Political Science in the U.S.A.: A Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of Power], Moscow, Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1969, 103 pp., 0.33 Ruble.

THE emergence or reemergence of academic disciplines in the Soviet Union has frequently been signalled or accompanied by the publication of comprehensive critical studies of their "bourgeois" counterparts in the West. Thus, for example, Soviet empirical research in sociology and the subsequent tentative and limited official recognition of sociology as an academic discipline were preceded by the appearance of a number of monographs devoted to a critique of Western sociology.[1] Perhaps it is against this background and from this perspective that one must interpret the publication, in 1969, of the first major Soviet study and critique of American political science.[2]

Like the first Soviet monographs in sociology published in the early

[1] See, e.g., G. V. Osipov, *Sovremennaia burzhuaznaia sotsiologiia: kriticheskii ocherk* [Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology: A Critical Essay] (Moscow 1964); I. S. Kon, *Pozitivizm v sotsiologii: istoricheskii ocherk* [Positivism in Sociology: An Historical Essay] (Leningrad 1964); and G. M. Andreeva, *Sovremennaia burzhuaznaia empiricheskaia sotsiologiia: kriticheskii ocherk* [Contemporary Bourgeois Empirical Sociology: A Critical Essay] (Moscow 1965).

[2] Kalenskii is also the author of an earlier critical essay on "bourgeois" political science. Cf., V. G. Kalenskii, "O predmete i metode burzhuaznoi politicheskoi nauki," [On the Subject and Method of Bourgeois Political Science], *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* [hereafter cited as SGP], No. 9 (1966), 33-41. The earliest Soviet critical essay specifically devoted to political science in the West, as far as I know, is B. Shabad, "Apologiia politicheskoi sistemy kapitalizma (O tak nazyvaemoi 'politicheskoi nauke' v burzhuaznoi sotsiologii)," [Apologia of the Political System of Capitalism (On the So-Called 'Political Science' in Bourgeois Sociology)], *Kommunist*, No. 2 (1960), 87-97. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien in Cologne, Germany, for making Kalenskii's book available to me during the summer of 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1960's, Kalenskii's study attempts to acquaint the Soviet reader with the range of research and with the methodologies prevalent in the West; but it also offers a critique—mainly ideological—of American political science and, in a subtle manner, seeks to advance the cause of a new, empirically-based political science in the USSR by indirectly suggesting the potential utility and instrumental value of such a science to the Soviet political leadership. We will consider each of these objectives in turn and then examine the status of political science in the Soviet Union, both in the light of Kalenskii's critique of American political science and against the background of some recent developments in Soviet academic life.

I

Kalenskii's survey of American political science is relatively concise; it consists of a brief introduction, three long chapters, and a short conclusion. In the introduction, the author provides the reader with a rough sketch of the subject matter of "bourgeois," i.e., American—following common Soviet usage, Kalenskii uses the terms interchangeably—political science, its apologetic character, as well as its pretensions at "scientific objectivity" and "ideological neutrality" (pp. 3-5). In the first chapter, entitled "From Legal Dogmatism to the Political Reality of the Twentieth Century," Kalenskii discusses the genesis and history of American political science, giving special emphasis to the growth of the behavioral orientation after World War II. Under the heading "The Theoretical Credo of Contemporary American Political Science," he deals, in the second chapter, with the concept of power, political influence, interest-group theory, and pluralist conceptions of elite. The third chapter, entitled "The Individual, the Masses, and Politics," is devoted to an analysis of political alienation, mass society, the problem of legitimacy, political culture, political socialization and participation. With these topics as his foci, Kalenskii is remarkably successful in providing the Soviet reader with a picture of the range of American political science research in the area of democratic politics, its complexities as an academic discipline, its points of controversy, its diversity and lack of consensus. The Western reader, however, will note the complete absence of any discussion of the considerable literature on nondemocratic politics published by American political scientists. One notes the same "oversight" in Kalenskii's consideration of specific authors whose work involves such concepts as totalitarianism—a term which Kalenskii, like other Soviet authors, uses only in reference to the Fascist regimes of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hitler and Mussolini. Thus, for example, in his discussion of Almond's classification of political systems, Kalenskii omits all reference to Almond's treatment of totalitarian political systems (pp. 80 ff.). In fact, the author all but ignores the considerable American literature on Soviet politics and Communist political systems. His only reference here is to the study by Brzezinski and Huntington—a short citation used for the express purpose of proving the "anti-Communist" and "anti-Soviet" orientation of the convergence theory (p. 92). The same general observation applies to the author's treatment of the literature on international relations—he mentions Morgenthau, Kaplan, Thompson, Snyder, and Liska, but does not discuss their work (p. 86)—and, to a lesser extent, to comparative politics in general. Essentially, Kalenskii's study deals with American political science literature on American government and democratic politics.

Among the authors whose works Kalenskii discusses in some detail are Merriam, Lasswell, Macridis, Easton, Lipset, Parsons, Bentley, Truman, Herring, Schattschneider, Hunter, Mills, Dahl, Lane, Kornhauser, Almond, Verba, Matthews, and Murphy. In view of the difficulties involved in obtaining Western political science literature in the Soviet Union, Kalenskii's selection is remarkably comprehensive and up-to-date. While a more judicious balance of his survey (through greater emphasis on international relations and comparative politics) would have been desirable, as would the use of more scholarly and less propagandistic language, the author clearly succeeds in telling the Soviet reader a great deal about American political science. In the choice of language and of balance, moreover, Kalenskii may not have enjoyed the usual prerogatives of an author. As the subsequent analysis will attempt to show, politics in general and international relations and comparative politics in particular are still extremely sensitive areas of study in the Soviet Union.

II

Kalenskii is less successful in his critique of American political science. He sees American political science as a "science of power" and "political influence" (p. 21)—a science, moreover, whose development and physiognomy accurately mirror the history and sociological character of American society. Thus, for example, he explains American interest in comparative politics and international relations by reference to the abandonment of "traditional American isolationism" and the "unprecedented foreign policy expansion of American imperialism"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after World War II and "its active interference in international political life" (p. 20), as well as by the growing interest of American ruling circles in the young, developing countries (p. 25). American interest in elite theories and, subsequently, in the empirical study of politics, according to Kalenskii, was a direct consequence and outgrowth of the reaction to the rise of totalitarian Fascist regimes in Europe (pp. 9, 15-16). The increase in the power of the executive, the oligarchic tendencies in bourgeois political parties, the increased role of professional politicians and bureaucrats—all of these developments, Kalenskii asserts, stimulated interest in the study of the personalities of political leaders (pp. 56-57). Though pioneered by Merriam and Lasswell, the integration of sociology into political research that gave rise to the behavioral orientation in American political science, according to Kalenskii did not really come about until after World War II, and was largely the result of the research done by various social scientists in the United States on "psychological war" (pp. 10-11). The functional approach to the study of politics, finally, is explained by the author as the result of the concern on the part of American political scientists for the fate of the existing capitalist order (pp. 15-16). In short, Kalenskii's interpretation of the history of American political science is squarely in the sociology-of-knowledge tradition. Although there are undoubtedly elements of truth in this explanation, it is too oversimplified and doctrinaire to be very enlightening.

Another aspect of Kalenskii's conception of American political science is reflected in his argument that political science in the United States is the obedient and flexible tool of the "ruling circles" (pp. 98-99). "Bourgeois political scientists," Kalenskii writes, ". . . are not interested in genuine democratic government, . . . but only in the problem of the most effective political direction of society by representatives of various sections of the ruling class in the interest of maintaining the stability of the existing exploitative socio-political system" (p. 57). In a similar vein he explains the essence of the behavioral orientation in American political science: "The idea that the basic way of stabilizing the existing social relations lies in the organization of control over the behavior of people, that human behavior is determined in conformity with common laws the elucidation of which will provide the key to the realization of such control—this is the central idea of the 'behavioral movement' " (p. 11). Related to this image of American political science is Kalenskii's vision of "many young American scholars" suffering in the "methodological prison of behavioralism and functionalism, compelled by material considerations to pursue purely applied research on the in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struction of the government and private foundations" (p. 99). In his conclusion, Kalenskii writes: "American political science stands in the avant-garde of those branches of American social science which are most widely used by the ruling class for the purpose of substantiating and consolidating its positions. In this lies the essence of its social purpose" (p. 102). Kalenskii's description of American political science, if accurate, would add up to a very serious indictment of the discipline.

Kalenskii is obviously greatly interested in the empirical study of politics; unfortunately, his interest in the empirical method does not extend to his critique of American political science. Generally speaking, he is much less interested in evaluating the accuracy of American political science research and in examining the validity of its conclusions than he is in commenting on the underlying normative assumptions of the researcher and his willingness to accept unpleasant facts of social life. Kalenskii does take Lipset to task for his less than successful attempt to distinguish between political science and political sociology (pp. 13-14). And he criticizes Easton for repeating the error of the social anthropologists and Max Weber in applying the concepts of "political power" and "political system" to the study of primitive societies (pp. 25-26). Political power, according to Kalenskii, is an historical category which denotes the relationship between classes and states. He also criticizes the functional approach (p. 22), and in particular Easton's "universal model" of the political system, for failing to distinguish between social and political power (p. 27), and he correctly points out Almond's preference for the Anglo-American political culture (p. 85), as well as the general bias of functional analysis in the direction of stable democratic politics.

Most of Kalenskii's criticism, however, is of a different order. "The growth of the role of the bourgeois state," he writes, "its relative independence, the intensification of its intervention in ever new spheres of life in capitalist society, the growth of bureaucracy [and] technocracy, [as well as] the relatively increasing social mobility, do not in any way disprove the Marxist proposition that in contemporary bourgeois democracies there exists a political and economic ruling class—the class of the bourgeoisie, [and] that the contemporary bourgeois state is the instrument of this class" (p. 46). The trouble with American political science, according to Kalenskii, is that it does not recognize this elementary fact and that it "intentionally or unintentionally avoids analyzing the class essence" of political rule (p. 21). Thus, he criticizes Bentley for "vulgarizing the political process in capitalist countries" by picturing the state as an institution which "merely settles the interrelationship

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among groups" (p. 33), and for not admitting that economic interests determine politics (p. 34). Truman is criticized for not recognizing that groups come into being as the result of definite social interests and the fact that people belong to certain social strata and classes (p. 36). And the whole interest-group theory is dismissed as "an attempt to mask the class character of the state" (p. 33). In short, Kalenskii's critique of American political science is for the most part purely ideological in nature; it is a critique which condemns the ideological stance of American political science while accepting much of its methodology and many of its findings. As we shall see, both the nature and the timing of Kalenskii's study suggest that the critique of American political science may not have been the only (or even the primary) purpose of his book.

III

Perhaps the most interesting and significant aspect of Kalenskii's critique of American political science is the fact that its primary and almost exclusive target is the researcher rather than the research or the methodology of research. Thus, for example, Kalenskii does not criticize Dahl's analysis of concepts and theories of democratic government or his finding of a hierarchical structure of authority in American society, but rather his acknowledgment of political inequality as a basic and inevitable fact of human life (p. 47). Similarly, he does not quarrel with the findings of Murphy's study of the U.S. Senate, but chastises the author for acknowledging the results of his research without criticism, for accepting the fact of political and social inequality and attempting to explain it on the basis of a necessary "functional division of competence" (pp. 59-60).

To be sure, in very general terms, Kalenskii is critical of American political science research, especially of the functional approach, which —so he argues—produces a severely distorted conception of political reality (p. 49). He is generally critical of American models of democratic government and any attempt to apply them to the underdeveloped countries (pp. 85-86). Throughout his study he condemns American political science for its tendency to engage in abstract theorizing, its conservative bias, and its attempt to be ideologically neutral and value-free.[3] Some of his critical observations are certainly valid. How-

[3] Kalenskii cites with approval the critical essays by Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," *American Political Science Review* [hereafter cited as APSR], LIX (March 1965), 39-51, and Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *ibid.*, LX (June 1966), 285-295, as well as Meehan's argument, in *The Theory and Method of Political Analysis* (Home-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ever, even if one adds up all of the criticisms offered by Kalenskii (and especially if one discounts his purely ideological critique), American political science comes away relatively unscathed—especially in regard to its research methodology and the highly empirical work of such scholars as Lipset, Matthews, and Murphy. The clear implication of Kalenskii's study is that the kind of research done by American political scientists could be both sound and useful—if carried out in a different spirit, and from the "correct" ideological perspective. Concentrating his fire on the researcher rather than the research itself, attacking the uses to which political science research is put (or not put) in the United States rather than its basic nature and character, Kalenskii is in a position to suggest the desirability of encouraging similar research in the Soviet Union. And, indeed, by emphasizing the importance of empirical political science research to the American ruling circles, the author very clearly implies the potential utility and practical value of such research to the Soviet leadership (pp. 61-62, 102).

In his conclusion, Kalenskii explicitly states that many of the empirical findings of "bourgeois political scientists" (in Russian: *politologi*, i.e., politologists) "undoubtedly can and must be utilized by Marxist scholars studying the political organization of contemporary capitalist society" (p. 98). By implication, these findings are also relevant to the study of Socialist society.

In his introduction, Kalenskii argues that the further development of the social sciences will depend on the "process of integration and differentiation which characterizes, above all, the development of the natural sciences." He then compares the position of political science to that of management science (*nauka upravleniia*) and criminology (*kriminologiia*), two areas in social science which have recently been established in the Soviet Union, and then emphasizes their common affinity with jurisprudence and sociology (p. 4). Kalenskii leaves no doubt in the reader's mind that he is primarily interested in the methodological implications of the close relationship between political science and sociology. "The affinity [of political science] to sociology . . . manifests itself, above all, in the fact that, in contrast to jurisprudence, it approaches the analysis of the political organization of society not from the dogmatic and normative positions which have traditionally characterized bourgeois legal science, but from the sociological positions of

wood 1965), 265-69, that the political scientist must, above all, be a responsible social critic. Kalenskii does not discuss Meehan's later work, *Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study* (Homewood 1967)—although much of this study is directly relevant to his critique of American political science.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the analysis of the dynamics of the political process [and] the behavior of its participants, making maximum use of the methods of concrete sociological research [i.e., of empirical methods]" (p. 4). A careful reading of Kalenskii's book suggests that this is the approach to the study of politics which the author accepts and more or less directly advocates. As the interested and initiated Soviet reader will immediately recognize, Kalenskii's reference to dogmatic and normative positions in bourgeois jurisprudence also applies to Soviet legal science, from whose guardianship and tutelage Soviet would-be *politologi* are trying to emancipate themselves. Thus, although wrapped in the mantle of a critique of "bourgeois" political science, Kalenskii's study is, in fact, a cautious and subtle plea for the establishment of an empirically-oriented political science in the Soviet Union. In order to understand this exceedingly significant aspect of Kalenskii's study, it is necessary to turn to a discussion of the "state of the discipline" in the Soviet Union.

IV

When on a recent occasion I responded to the question of a Soviet scholar and told him that my field of study is political science (*politicheskaia nauka*), he smiled and remarked that "all science is political." Then he added: "But I understand. You are interested in questions of state and law, political economy, and in the study of—and here he switched to English—political behavior, as you call it."

The first part of his statement echoes one of the cardinal tenets of Marxism-Leninism, i.e., the idea that science and politics are inseparable; the second part, however, reflects the very interesting and significant fact that in recent years the concept of "political science" in reference to a specific academic discipline has acquired a certain currency in the Soviet Union (and, we might add, in other Communist countries as well).[4] As a matter of fact, some Western observers have already spoken of the "emergence" of political science in Communist countries.[5]

It is probably premature to speak of the existence or even the emer-

[4] When I travelled in the Soviet Union in 1961 and 1963, I did not meet a single Russian who understood the meaning of the term "political science." During 1967-68, when I spent ten months at Moscow State University as a participant in the US-Soviet academic exchange program, I found that quite a few students and a considerable number of faculty members were familiar with the term.

[5] See David E. Powell and Paul Shoup, "The Emergence of Political Science in Communist Countries," *APSR*, LXIV (June 1970), 572-88, and an earlier review of Kalenskii's book in *ibid.* (March 1970), 188-89. See also L. G. Churchward, "Toward a Soviet Political Science," *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, XII (May 1966), 66-75, and László Révész, "Political Science in Eastern Europe: Discussion and Initial Steps," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, VII (September 1967), 185-210.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gence of a political science in the Western sense in the USSR: as yet, there is no recognized discipline of political science in Russia,[6] the curriculum of Soviet secondary schools and universities does not recognize a field of study by that name, although it does include such subjects as political economy, law, and social science (*obshchestvovedenie*);[7] and, perhaps most important, political science research, as understood in the West, has never been officially sanctioned by the CPSU. The 1961 Party Program made it clear to Soviet social scientists that the purpose of the study of contemporary social and political phenomena is to disclose the inevitable advance of mankind toward communism, the change in the balance of power in favor of the Socialist countries, the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism, and so on.[8] In other words, as far as the official Program of the CPSU is concerned, the function of social science research is still reduced and limited to the confirmation of conclusions and "truths" established *a priori* by Party doctrine. Since 1961, the CPSU has reaffirmed this basic point of departure and ideological stance on numerous occasions.[9] In fact, while not reestablishing the

[6] This fact has not prevented some Soviet scholars from implying the existence of such a discipline when writing for a non-Soviet audience. Thus, for example, A. A. Zvorykin, in "The social sciences in the U.S.S.R.: achievements and trends," *International Social Science Journal*, XVI, No. 4 (1964), 588-602, includes political science in his classification of the social sciences in the USSR. He defines political science as follows: "Political science is linked up with a group of scientific disciplines concerned with political relationships in society, political institutions and organizations, and with political concepts, ideas and theories. Together, they form the political superstructure. Political science may therefore be described as the study of the political superstructure of a given society" (pp. 596-97). Elsewhere in the same article, the author suggests a much broader definition of political science when he discusses the main trends in the social sciences. (See pp. 600-601). The existence of political science as a separate field of study is also implied in Makar Goriainov and Igor Glagoliev, "Notes concerning research on peace and disarmament conducted in the U.S.S.R.," *ibid.*, XVII, No. 3 (1965), 417-19. Two other Soviet authors, writing in 1964 for a Soviet audience, proposed a classification of the social sciences which clearly did not include recognition of political science as a separate discipline; see V. Zh. Kelle and M. Ia. Koval'zon, "O klassifikatsii obshchestvennykh nauk," [On the Classification of the Social Sciences], *Voprosy filosofii* [hereafter cited as *VF*], No. 11 (1964), 15-26.

[7] Apparently there were plans to develop a political science course for secondary schools in 1961-62, but these plans never materialized. Proposals for university-level courses in political science have suffered the same fate. See *Uchitel'skaia Gazeta*. April 4, 1961, 3, and G. S. Ostroumov, "Nauchnye osnovy politiki—v tsentre vnimaniia Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk," [The Scientific Bases of Politics—At the Center of Attention of the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences], *SGP*, No. 7 (1965), 151.

[8] Cf., "Programma KPSS," in *XXII S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza. Stenograficheskii Otchet* [The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographic Report] (Moscow 1962), III, 324.

[9] See, for example, L. F. Il'ichev, *Obshchestvennye nauki i kommunizm* [The Social Sciences and Communism] (Moscow 1963); S. Kovalev, "Trebovaniia zhizni i obshchestvennye nauki," [The Demands of Life and the Social Sciences], *Pravda*, May 6, 1966,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stranglehold on the social sciences characteristic of the Stalin era, the pronouncements made in connection with the 1961 Party Program have been elevated to the status of a new dogma, according to which the purpose of the social sciences is to provide "a scientific basis for guiding the development of society" by means of "comprehensive analysis and theoretical generalization *from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism*."[10]

On the other hand, there is increasing evidence that a movement is afoot in the Soviet Union which aims at the establishment of political science as a separate and independent academic discipline and, more important, at the development of a *genuine* political science, i.e., a political science free to pose and pursue questions, not merely to confirm answers. In this respect, the efforts on the part of Soviet scholars to bring about the establishment of the new discipline of political science must be seen within the larger context of the attempt by Soviet social scientists to free themselves from the dogma and ideological straitjacket of the CPSU.

These remarkable developments within the Soviet scholarly community are among the consequences of de-Stalinization and the subsequent "thaw," to use Ilya Ehrenburg's graphic phrase. As the "cult of the personality" came under increasing public attack in the Soviet Union, and the concentric circles of the attack on Stalinism spread to ever-widening aspects of Soviet life, the social sciences, including political science, received a new lease on life.[11] It is a measure of the integrity of the Russian spirit that some Soviet scholars, fully aware that this lease may be terminated at any time, have nevertheless had the courage to investigate the conditions of the lease, i.e., to explore the

---

2-3; "O merakh po dal'neishemu razvitiiu obshchestvennykh nauk i povysheniiu ikh roli v kommunisticheskom stroitel'stve," [On Measures for the Further Development of the Social Sciences and the Elevation of Their Role in Communist Construction], *Pravda*, August 27, 1967, 1-2 [hereafter cited as "O merakh . . ."]; "Kommunisticheskaia partiinost'—vazhneishii printsip marksistsko-leninskoi filosofii," [Communist Party Spirit—The Most Important Principle of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy], *Kommunist*, No. 3 (1970), 65-79; G. Glezerman, "Istoricheskii materializm i problemy sotsial'nykh issledovanii," [Historical Materialism and the Problems of Social Research], *ibid.*, No. 4 (1970), 76-87; O. Iakhot, "O edinstve kolichestvennogo i kachestvennogo analiza sotsial'nykh protsessov," [On the Unity of Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Social Processes], *ibid.*, No. 11 (1970), 51-60, where historical materialism is described as "the methodological foundation of all the social sciences [and] of concrete sociological research . . ." (p. 51).

[10] Cf., "O merakh . . ." (fn. 9), 1; emphasis added. The *Pravda* statement, issued in the name of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized that "the greatest attention in scientific research should be given to Marxist-Leninist methodology, to the principles of a concrete historical approach to social phenomena which reflects the theory of the class and the viewpoint of the Party" (p. 2).

[11] Cf. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Post-Stalin 'Thaw' and Soviet Political Science," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, xxx (February 1964), 22-48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

limits of their new freedom. In their quest, individual scholars and groups of scholars have been encouraged by a number of official developments and by an atmosphere conducive to greater intellectual freedom and, consequently, to a higher order of scholarly research.

Beginning with the 20th Party Congress in 1956, social science has been an important topic of debate within the CPSU and within the Soviet scholarly community.[12] The ramifications of this debate go far beyond the scope of this essay; suffice it to say that one important aspect of the Soviet discussion of social science has involved the question of the function and place of empirical research. A resolution of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1962 stressed the crucial importance of "concrete sociological investigations"—the Soviet euphemism for empirical research—to the further development and success of the social sciences. At the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, social science was again an important topic of discussion. Obviously dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs in Soviet social science, the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1967 ordered sweeping changes, innovations, and improvements in the organization, research, and teaching of social science in the Soviet Union—measures which affected the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Academy of the Social Sciences, the Higher Party School, the Institute of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education, the State Committee on Science and Technology of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Central Statistical Administration.[13]

One of the interesting and potentially explosive issues in the grand debate on the future of Soviet social science is the question of the establishment and recognition of a new academic discipline, *viz.*, political science. More specifically, the question is whether a separate academic discipline should be created from elements of presently existing and recognized fields of study. Assuming that Soviet political science would have roughly the same (vague) scope as Western political science, the creation of the new discipline would involve, above all, the science of the state and law (*nauka gosudarstva i prava*) and the discipline of

[12] See, for example, A. M. Kulkin and N. I. Kondakov, eds., *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i obshchestvennye nauki.* Materialy Sessii Obshchego Sobraniia Akademii Nauk SSSR 19-20 Okt., 1962 [The Construction of Communism and the Social Sciences. Materials of the Session of the General Assembly of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Oct. 19-20, 1962] (Moscow 1962), and the numerous articles in *Pravda, Kommunist, Voprosy filosofii,* as well as other journals. See also René Ahlberg, *Die Entwicklung der empirischen Sozialforschung in der Sowjetunion.* Berichte des Osteuropa-Instituts an der Freien Universität Berlin, Heft 60 (Berlin 1964) and Wolfgang Leonhard, "Gegenwartsprobleme des sowjetischen 'wissenschaftlichen Kommunismus,'" *Osteuropa,* XVII (October-November 1967), 726-40.

[13] "O merakh . . ." (fn. 9), 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Soviet construction" (*sovetskoe stroitel'stvo*), jointly designated by the term "state science" (*gosudarstvovedenie*), as well as elements of sociology (accorded limited recognition as a discipline), political economy, diplomatic history, modern history, the history of the CPSU, the so-called "Party science," and the all-pervading "general science" of historical materialism.[14]

Although *de jure* there are at present no political scientists in the Soviet Union, it can be argued that they do already exist *de facto*. During the past decade or so, Soviet scholars in a variety of disciplines have produced research which clearly falls within the scope of political science, as this term is understood in the West.[15] Moreover, since the publication of the first Soviet public opinion poll by *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* in 1960, Soviet social scientists have not only learned a great deal about public opinion polls and survey methods,[16] but have developed considerable sophistication in the use of such techniques as factor analysis, scaling techniques, the use of computers, etc., and have begun to apply these techniques to the study of politics.

Although political science has not been accorded recognition as an academic discipline in the USSR, there does exist, paradoxically, a Soviet Association of Political Sciences (*Sovetskaia assotsiatsiia politicheskikh*

[14] Since 1938, the Soviet science of the state and law has included the following disciplines: the theory of the state and law, the history of the state and law, the history of political doctrines, state (i.e., constitutional) law, administrative law, and, since 1946, the discipline of "Soviet construction." Purged along with Pashukanis in 1937, the discipline of "Soviet construction" was reestablished in 1946. Combining elements of local government and administrative science, and concerned with the practical operation of the soviets [*sovety*], their executive apparatus, and the "mass organizations" (in Soviet terminology they are called "social organizations" [*obshchestvennye organizatsii*]), this branch of Soviet state science probably comes closest to the Western concept of political science. To further complicate the picture, in 1962 M. A. Suslov, main Party theoretician and member of the Politbureau, officially proclaimed that the political theory of communism would henceforth be designated as "scientific communism" (*nauchnyi kommunizm*), thus in effect establishing a new discipline. See *Kommunist*, No. 3 (1962), 15-46; for a discussion of the background and early history of this new discipline, see Leonhard (fn. 12), 731 ff. In 1963, compulsory courses on scientific communism were introduced at all institutions of higher education. See Klaus Meyer, "Die sowjetischen Hochschulen nach der Reform," *Osteuropa*, XIV (September 1964), 626, 630. One of the major problems involved in the recognition of political science as a separate academic discipline has been the question of its delineation from "scientific communism." See "O razrabotke problem politicheskikh nauk," [On Working Out the Problems of the Political Sciences], *Pravda*, June 13, 1965, 4 [hereafter cited as "O razrabotke . . ."].

[15] Examples of such research are discussed in Powell and Shoup (fn. 5), 577ff.

[16] For a discussion of Soviet public opinion polls, see Allen Kassof, "Moscow Discovers Public Opinion Polls," *Problems of Communism*, X (May-June 1961), 52-55; Emilia Wilder, "Opinion Polls," *Survey*, No. 48 (July 1963), 118-29; and René Ahlberg, "Theorie der öffentlichen Meinung und empirische Meinungsforschung in der UdSSR," *Osteuropa*, XIX (March 1969), 161-72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nauk) or SAPS. Established in 1960 or possibly as early as 1959,[17] this organization, until 1965, was called Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences [*Sovetskaia assotsiatsiia politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk*]. Since 1961 the SAPS has sent delegates to meetings of the International Political Science Association (IPSA).[18] Soviet affiliation with the IPSA and the increasingly active role of Soviet scholars in IPSA affairs have been interpreted by some officials of the SAPS as recognition of the great attainments of Soviet political science.[19]

The Soviet Association of Political Sciences is a rather small organization (360 members in 1966) and heavily dominated by legal scholars.[20] The available evidence suggests that, with few exceptions, its members have done little to promote the establishment of political science as an independent academic discipline.[21] On the contrary, much of the resistance to the recognition of political science seems to come from members of the SAPS, who regard political science as a potential rival and threat to their own discipline, i.e., the science of the state and law.[22]

It may well be, however, that the promotion of political science as an independent academic discipline is not one of the primary purposes of the SAPS. While there is reason to believe that the *raison d'être* of the organization has not been entirely clear to its own members,[23] the history of the Association suggests that it serves both as an ideological weapon and as an instrument of propaganda. The basic purpose of the organization, as was made clear at its first annual meeting in 1961, is

[17] The indirect evidence points to 1960 as the founding year of the SAPS. See, however, Bociurkiw (fn. 11), 29.

[18] The genesis and early activities of the SAPS are discussed in *ibid.*, 29ff.

[19] See, for example, S.Z., "Mezhdunarodnyi forum po voprosam politicheskoi nauki," [International Forum on Questions of Political Science], *SGP*, No. 1 (1968), 140.

[20] Both presidents, most of the vice-presidents, the general secretary, and all of the members of the executive committee in 1965 were jurists. The preponderance of legal scholars among the members and officials of the SAPS, it goes without saying, has influenced its orientation toward political science as a field of study and academic discipline. More specifically, the Association is dominated by the Moscow Institute of State and Law, whose approximately 150 members are automatically members of the SAPS and comprise nearly one-half of its total membership. See Ostroumov (fn. 7), 151, and Churchward (fn. 5), 73-74.

[21] E. V. Tadevosian, the first president of the SAPS, reportedly told a Western scholar that the establishment of this organization did not signify the recognition of political science as an independent academic discipline. See Gordon Skilling, "In Search of Political Science in the USSR," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXIX (November 1963), 519. See also the report of the 1965 meeting of the SAPS by E. V. Tadevosian, "Diskussiia o politicheskoi nauke," [Discussion About Political Science], *VF*, No. 10 (1965), 164-66.

[22] See Ostroumov (fn. 7), 148ff.; "O razrabotke . . ." (fn. 14); and Tadevosian (fn. 21), 165-66.

[23] See, for example, the report of the 1962 meeting of the SAPS in V. P. Shatrov, "V Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk," [In the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences], *SGP*, No. 8 (1962), 126-27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to unmask the anti-Marxist character of bourgeois political science and its "slanderous fabrications," as well as to expose the horrors of political life in capitalist society.[24] On a number of occasions, the SAPS has attempted to use both the American Political Science Association and the International Political Science Association for political and propagandistic purposes, i.e., it has functioned as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.[25]

However, although the record of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences in regard to the promotion of political science has not been impressive and the organization seems to have become inactive during the past four years,[26] some of its members have gone very far in their argument for the establishment of a genuine political science in the USSR. Significantly, their efforts have been directed at solving the basic dilemma of Soviet social science, i.e., its subservience to Party dogma. More specifically, their quest has been for a political science free to question and reexamine "universally accepted truths," "objective necessities," "regularities of development," and "definitely solved questions," i.e., those Marxist-Leninist categories which have been used to set the limits of social science inquiry in the Soviet Union. Thus, for example, R. A. Safarov, a member of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has proposed the establishment of an Institute of Public Opinion within the Academy of Sciences for the purpose of exploring fundamental questions of politics in an empirical manner. *Inter alia*, Safarov advanced the explosive suggestion that such an Institute should investigate the reaction of the public to important political questions both before and after the formulation of official policies—thus

[24] See V. Slavin, "Pervoe ezhegodnoe sobranie Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk," [The First Annual Meeting of the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences], *SGP*, No. 7 (1961), 133.

[25] Thus, for example, in 1962 the SAPS attempted to induce the APSA to protest against the "persecution" of the Communist Party in the U.S. and later turned to the IPSA with a similar request. See Shatrov (fn. 23), 127, and, by the same author, "Tret'e ezhegodnoe sobranie Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk," [The Third Annual Meeting of the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences], *SGP*, No. 7 (1963), 163.

[26] The last reported annual meeting of the SAPS took place in February of 1966. See I. T. Pomerantsev, "V Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh nauk," [In the Soviet Association of Political Sciences], *SGP*, No. 6 (1966), 135. I have been unable to find any reference to later annual meetings in the pages of *SGP* and *VF*, i.e., those journals which had previously reported on the activities of the SAPS. I have not had access to *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*. A delegation of scholars, headed by V. M. Chkhikvadze, the president of the SAPS, attended the 1967 Congress of the IPSA. See S.Z. (fn. 19), 139. In 1969 a collection of essays was published in English translation under the joint auspices of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the *Soviet Political Science Association*. Cf., V. M. Chkhikvadze, ed., *The Soviet State and Law* (Moscow 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clearly challenging the traditional Soviet practice of equating Party policy and public opinion.[27]

The most remarkable and far-reaching argument for the recognition of political science as an independent academic discipline has been made by F. M. Burlatskii, a professor of philosophy and a member of the executive committee of the SAPS. In a major article published by *Pravda*, Burlatskii explicitly and publicly called for the establishment of a genuine political science, pointing out that such a science "presupposes *the formulation of questions the answers to which are not known in advance*."[28] Although couched in a utilitarian argument, this demand, it goes without saying, ultimately poses a direct challenge to the concept of the function of the social sciences as expressed in the 1961 Party Program and the views of those in the Soviet Union who regard political science and Marxism-Leninism as synonymous. In his essay, Burlatskii also challenged the narrow legalistic frame of political research in the USSR, as well as its traditional preoccupation with the study of formal political institutions, and proposed instead the investigation of a wide range of political questions.[29]

Burlatskii's *Pravda* article provoked a lively discussion among Soviet scholars, many of whom apparently supported his position. In February of 1965, Burlatskii spoke at the annual meeting of the SAPS and developed his ideas further. He reiterated his earlier argument that "life and practice" demand the creation of a new complex political science.[30] In June 1965, *Pravda* published a follow-up article to Burlatskii's essay, containing a summary of correspondence received during the preceding five months, as well as an official editorial commentary. The article supported a broad definition of the scope of political science and again emphasized the need for such a branch of knowledge.[31]

[27] Cf., R. A. Safarov, "Vyiavlenie obshchestvennogo mneniia v gosudarstvenno-pravovoi praktike," [The Manifestation of Public Opinion in State and Legal Practice], *SGP*, No. 10 (1967), 50, 52.

[28] See F. Burlatskii, "Politika i nauka," [Politics and Science], *Pravda*, January 10, 1965, 4; emphasis added.

[29] Burlatskii suggested that the main perspectives of political science should be the study of the mechanism and dynamics of political leadership in a society. He proposed the following divisions within political science: (1) political (class) relations in Socialist and capitalist countries; (2) international relations; (3) structure and activities of the state; (4) political parties; (5) social organizations; (6) mass movements; (7) international unions and organizations; (8) forms and methods of diplomacy; (9) public opinion; and (10) methods of propaganda.

[30] Tadevosian (fn. 21), 164-65.

[31] See "O razrabotke . . ." (fn. 14). *Pravda* suggested the following divisions of political science: (1) study of the political system, questions of leadership, organization, and government in Socialist countries; (2) study of the problems of political power in capitalist countries and in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; (3) problems of contemporary international relations and theoretical problems of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Most recently, Burlatskii has published a major study devoted primarily to an examination of the "theoretical and methodological problems of political life"—a work that was more than ten years in the making and draws heavily on Western political and social science literature.[32] In this book, which was published under the auspices of the Institute of Concrete Social Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Burlatskii again argues the case for a broader scope of political research in the Soviet Union, particularly in the areas of comparative politics and international relations, and stresses the importance of the development of middle-level theoretical propositions in politics, "the elaboration of the conceptual apparatus, as well as the methods and methodology of concrete political research," especially in such areas of study as "the political systems and institutions of various countries, international organizations, international relations, and world politics."[33] In contrast to Kalenskii, who, as has been pointed out, is very critical of functional analysis and systems theory, Burlatskii clearly advocates these approaches to the study of politics—by suggesting, *inter alia*, that Lenin was a functionalist. Burlatskii writes:

> Lenin's ideological legacy is also invaluable from the standpoint of the analysis of *political systems* and *political institutions*. An attentive study of Lenin's works shows that—notwithstanding the fabrications propagated by bourgeois science—Lenin made extensive use of the principles of a functional and systems approach to the analysis of the political mechanism of society. In a number of works he developed a functional characterization of the party, the state, the trade union, the Komsomol, and other mass organizations; he investigated the influence of classes, formal and informal groups, as well as individuals, on the political process.[34]

The fact that Burlatskii's ideas have been propagated in the pages of *Pravda* and other official publications, as well as the fact that he has

---

foreign policy; (4) basic problems of the contemporary Communist, workers' and national liberation movement; and (5) study of contemporary political ideologies and theories. As this proposal makes clear, the study of politics in Communist countries is to proceed separately from the study of politics in general, and any suggestion of possible affinities between Communist and capitalist politics is to be discouraged.

[32] Cf., F. M. Burlatskii, *Lenin, Gosudarstvo, Politika* [Lenin, the State, and Politics] (Moscow 1970). Citation on p. 8. For a bibliography of Western sources, cf., pp. 516-23.

[33] *Ibid.*, 493-94. Burlatskii's emphasis on the importance of the development of middle-level theoretical propositions is particularly interesting and significant in view of the fact that the first decade of "concrete sociological research" in the Soviet Union has been characterized by the lack of such propositions. On this point, see V. A. Iadov, "Rol' metodologii v opredelenii metodov i tekhniki konkretnogo sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia," [The Role of Methodology in the Determination of the Methods and Technique of Concrete Sociological Research], *VF*, No. 10 (1966).

[34] Burlatskii (fn. 32), 494.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been allowed to disseminate them rather widely within the academic community, suggests that his position must be supported by highly-placed officials in the CPSU and in the Soviet academic hierarchy. However, it is quite clear that Burlatskii and his allies also face powerful and formidable opposition, both from doctrinaire party ideologists and from fellow scholars (who regard the proposed new discipline as ideologically questionable and academically suspect).[35] Insisting that there is only one political science and that it already exists in the USSR, i.e., equating political science with Marxism-Leninism, Burlatskii's opponents have made it difficult, if not impossible, for him to press the case for political science without appearing to challenge the authority of Marxism-Leninism and to undermine "scientific communism." By directly invoking Lenin, Burlatskii has now resorted to what, in the Soviet context of things, is the *ne plus ultra* argument. It is inconceivable that the position he has taken in his latest book will go without serious challenge, given the degree of disagreement within the Soviet academic community and the contradictory demands of the CPSU concerning Soviet social science.[36] Moreover, during the last few years, and especially since the publication of the CPSU Central Committee decree on the social sciences in 1967, numerous articles have appeared in official Party organs which suggest that the CPSU is reasserting its control over the scope, content and methodology of social science research.[37] It is difficult to interpret these developments, but, taken as a whole, they do not augur well for the future of the "master science" in the USSR.

V

The available evidence suggests that if a separate discipline of political science does develop in the Soviet Union, it will—like all the

[35] See, for example, Tadevosian (fn. 21), 165, and the kind of opposition which can be inferred from the follow-up article to Burlatskii's *Pravda* essay of January, 1965: "O razrabotke . . ." (fn. 14).

[36] The Western social scientist will gain a measure of appreciation for the plight of his Soviet colleagues when he reads the following typical exhortation published in *Pravda*: "Our social science must combine a consistent Marxist-Leninist Party spirit (*partiinost'*) with a strictly scientific approach." Cf. S. Kovalev, "Trebovaniia zhizni i obshchestvennye nauki," [The Demands of Life and the Social Sciences], *Pravda*, May 6, 1966, 3.

[37] The articles are far too numerous to list. For examples, cf., *ibid.*, 2-3; F. Konstantinov, "Leninskaia partiinost' v filosofii i sovremennost'," [The Leninist Party Spirit in Philosophy and the Present], *Kommunist*, No. 1 (1966), 84-94; V. Pashuto and others, "Printsip partiinosti v istoricheskom issledovanii i ego sovremennye kritiki," [The Principle of Party Spirit in Historical Research and Its Contemporary Critics], *ibid.*, No. 4 (1966), 72-79; P. Demichev, "Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i zadachi obshchestvennykh nauk," [The Construction of Communism and the Tasks of the Social Sciences], *ibid.*, No. 10 (1968), 14-35. See also fn. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other social sciences—grow up in the shadow of Marxism-Leninism and, consequently, experience stunted growth. Moreover, in view of its sensitive subject matter and potentially explosive applications, it will develop under the close scrutiny and supervision of the CPSU. Even Burlatskii has explicitly recognized that the Party and government organs will play a decisive role in the organization of the new discipline and its research structure.

Furthermore, if Kalenskii's critique of American political science can be taken as an indication—in addition to the viewpoint consistently propagated by Party ideologists—Soviet political science is likely to have a strong and explicit normative orientation; i.e., its ultimate *raison d'être* will be to assist the CPSU in the construction of Communist society and the building of "full communism." Both the implications of Kalenskii's critique of American political science and Burlatskii's explicit argument for the establishment of a Soviet political science suggest that, within the framework of the limitations imposed by this set of normative goals, Soviet political science will probably be highly empirical. If one adds to these considerations the CPSU's growing need for more accurate information about Soviet society, as well as about the rest of the world, one can conjecture that the current emphasis on "concrete sociological research" will continue and almost certainly become one of the characteristic features of Soviet political science. However, given the present flux and uncertainty in Soviet social science, most social scientists in the USSR, and especially the fledgling representatives of a new, controversial academic discipline, are likely to confine their research to purely descriptive studies of relatively powerless and insignificant institutions in Soviet society. Thus, Burlatskii's call for the development of middle-level theoretical propositions will probably go unheeded for some time to come. This means that Soviet political science in all probability will grow most rapidly in such areas as local government and public administration, but will not make significant inroads into political theory, comparative politics, and international relations—i.e., the traditional domains of Party ideologists. In other words, at least during the initial phase of its development, the scope of Soviet political science is likely to be relatively narrow.

Moreover, leaving political considerations aside, the evidence suggests that Soviet political scientists, like their Western counterparts, are not at all agreed on the question of the scope of the discipline and that, given the facts of Soviet academic life today, any attempt to "acquire territory" for the proposed new science is likely to meet with stiff resistance from the entrenched academic disciplines. As the preceding

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discussion has attempted to show, there are also serious disagreements about questions of methodology and approach among the advocates of a Soviet political science (e.g., Kalenskii vs. Burlatskii). Thus, the history of the Soviet debate on political science suggests that the "birth" of the "master science" in the USSR will be a difficult one. Aside from the important political considerations involved, the greatest obstacles to the full-fledged recognition of political science in the USSR will be the question of its integration into the existing pattern of academic disciplines and the present research structure of Soviet social science. A particularly difficult problem in this connection is the relationship of the proposed new discipline to "scientific communism"—a question which Burlatskii has so far been unable to solve satisfactorily in his otherwise realistic argument.[38]

The establishment of political science as a separate discipline will, above all, affect the law faculties of the universities, as well as a number of institutes in the Academy of Sciences. It stands to reason that the Moscow Institute of State and Law will play a leading role in the development of Soviet political science—a fact likely to reinforce and prolong the heavy legal orientation of Soviet political research. These circumstances may explain Burlatskii's pointed observation that the study of politics in the USSR cannot fully develop within the existing framework of Soviet academic organizations, and his insistence that, for Soviet political science to make real progress, it will take nothing less than the creation of special scientific institutes devoted to the study of politics.[39]

Viewed against the background of developments in Soviet social science during the past decade, the publication of Kalenskii's critique of American political science may be regarded as a further piece of evidence that we are, indeed, witnessing the "birth pangs" of Soviet political science, as some observers in the West have suggested. However, the "prenatal history" suggests that the birth will be attended by complications, and only time will tell whether the "baby" will be premature, stillborn, or healthy. And, unfortunately, the "parents" will have no control over the legitimacy or illegitimacy of their offspring. Perhaps the fate of the child about to be born will be what in the words of some Soviet observers it now is—that of a stepchild or alien who lacks all formal rights of citizenship.[40]

[38] On this point, cf., Tadevosian (fn. 21), 165, and Leonhard (fn. 12), 734ff.
[39] See Burlatskii (fn. 28).
[40] See the interesting reactions to Burlatskii's *Pravda* essay by E. Ambartsumov and A. Galkin (both section chiefs of the Institute of World Economics and International

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the other hand, the "pregnancy" diagnosed so confidently by some Western observers may turn out to be a condition known as pseudocyesis or false pregnancy. Certainly it is very questionable whether the development of a genuine political science (or, for that matter, *any* social science) is possible under the conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union. As long as the present insistence on *partiinost'* and on Marxism-Leninism as *the* "theoretical and methodological foundation of all social sciences" continues, the birth of a genuine political science in the USSR is a proposition *quod esset demonstrandum* and the supposed "pregnancy"—if it turns out to be real—is likely to result in a miscarriage.

Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences) and by members of the Latin American Institute of the Academy, including its director, S. Mikhailov, in "O razrabotke . . ." (fn. 14).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES AND FOREIGN POLICY MODELS

By WILLIAM WELCH AND JAN F. TRISKA*

AMERICAN academic literature on foreign policy witnessed, in the 1960's, a continuing flow of studies of the Soviet case, as indeed of other cases. It also witnessed a flow of studies of another, newer, and broader type—studies of theoretical bent concerned with the construction of general analytical models of foreign policy behavior.

The start of a new decade, it seems to us, is a good time to do what periodically needs doing—viz., review the Soviet foreign policy studies of the recent past. In the present instance, however, it seems to us more than that. It seems to us also a good time to institute a new form for such reviews by enlarging them to include an assessment of the extent to which they are benefiting from the major theoretical advances in the foreign policy field.

Accordingly, we present the review at hand in three parts: first, a section on the Soviet studies; next, a section on the more general foreign policy studies; and finally, a section on the relations between the two, in which we raise the question of the extent to which the former make use of, or might make use of, the latter.

I. Soviet Foreign Policy Studies

Reviewers of recent American studies of Soviet foreign policy are confronted with a dilemma growing out of a paradox generated by an anomaly. The anomaly is that much important work focuses on topics either narrower or broader than the subject proper: on the one hand, on selected parts of the subject such as military strategy or bloc relations; on the other, on wholes which encompass the subject, such as the Cold War or the entire Soviet system. The resultant paradox is that, of relevant literature, there is at once too much and too little for an adequate review article. Too much, for if 'relevant' be defined, as ideally it should, to include all the above-mentioned, the review would have to extend far beyond article length, studies of the narrower and broader topics referred to being numerous indeed. Too little, for if 'relevant' be restricted to works on the subject proper, the review would be inadequate,

* This essay is based in part on William Welch, *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New Haven 1970). For obvious reasons, the review article excludes from consideration Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (London and New York 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much good thought being excluded from consideration by virtue of the restriction. The dilemma is that there is no way of carrying out the procedure practically required—reducing the larger body of literature to manageable size—that does not involve the reviewer in decisions which, because of their closeness, make them objects of legitimate challenge by others.

The following Table represents the authors' best efforts to cope with the difficulty. It is a list of works culled from competent bibliographies[1] that (a) were written by academicians, (b) were published during the sixties (in original or revised edition), and (c) constitute or contain treatments at once comprehensive and lengthy. 'Comprehensive' means covering all or many aspects of policy, and covering policy toward many or all other states. 'Lengthy' means comprising the whole or a significant part of the encompassing volume. The Table is near-exhaustive; few works noted in the bibliographies relied upon and meeting the indicated tests have been excluded.[2]

In omitting works of narrower focus,[3] covering one or a few aspects of policy, or policy directed at one or a few other states, and in excluding articles[4] and shorter pieces,[5] we concede that the Table leaves out much that is of value. Granting this imperfection, one can still claim for the twenty-two constituent studies, we believe, that they make up, if not the very best, then a fair sample of the best of the recent work in the field, and that they would probably overlap appreciably with another twenty-two, independently selected. One can therefore further claim, we believe, that a review of them—their broad features, their findings, and their quality—can stand for a review of the entirety of

[1] Notably Thomas T. Hammond, ed., *Soviet Foreign Relations and World Communism* (Princeton 1965), and the bibliographic sections of *Foreign Affairs*.

[2] Among these few are: as already noted, Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York 1968); Robert D. Warth, *Soviet Russia in World Politics* (New York 1963); and a number of other volumes on the Cold War.

[3] For exemplary works of narrower focus, see Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations* (New York 1962); Jan F. Triska and Robert Slusser, *The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties* (Stanford 1962); Herbert Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*, rev. ed. (New York 1962); Raymond Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, rev. ed. (New York 1962); and Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Mass. 1964). See also bibliography in Triska and Finley (fn. 2), esp. 449-73.

[4] For exemplary articles see Alexander Dallin, ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (New York 1960); Ivo Lederer, *Russian Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1962); Philip Mosely, *The Soviet Union 1922-62: A Foreign Affairs Reader* (New York 1963).

[5] For exemplary shorter pieces, see useful prefatory comments in Alvin Rubinstein, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 2d ed. (New York 1966); and Xenia Eudin and Robert Slusser, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1928-1934*, 2 vols. (University Park, Pa. 1966); also Herbert Dinerstein's monograph, *Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Baltimore 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: SAMPLE OF LEADING AMERICAN WORKS 1960-1969

Work	*Scope*		*Findings*		
	Subject[a]	*Time Per.*[b]	*Approach*[c]	*Hardness*[d]	*Constancy*[e]
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bouscaren, Anthony T. *Soviet Foreign Policy.* New York: Fordham University Press, 1962.	PR	ABCD	HA	Ultra-Hard	High
Dallin, David J. *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin.* Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961.	PR	..CD	H	Ultra-Hard	High
Fleming, Denna F. *The Cold War and Its Origins.* 2 vols. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1961.	ex	ABCD	H	Mixed	High
Gehlen, Michael P. *The Politics of Coexistence.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967.	PR	...D	A	Mixed	Medium
Goodman, Elliot R. *The Soviet Design for a World State.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.	PR	ABCD	AH	Ultra-Hard	High
Halle, Louis J. *The Cold War as History.* New York: Harper & Row, 1967.	ex	.BCD	H	Mixed	Medium
Kennan, George F. *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1961.	ex	AB..	H	Hard	Low
Kintner, William R. and Joseph Z. Kornfeder. *The New Frontier of War.* Chicago: Regnery, 1962.	ex	ABCD	A	Ultra-Hard	High
Librach, Jan. *The Rise of the Soviet Empire,* rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1965.	PR	ABCD	HA	Ultra-Hard	High
Lukacs, John. *A New History of the Cold War.* Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966.[f]	ex	..CD	HA	Mixed	High
Mosely, Philip E. *The Kremlin and World Politics.* New York: Vintage, 1960.	PR	.BCD	C	Hard	Medium
Overstreet, Harry and Bonaro. *The War Called Peace: Khrushchev's Communism.* New York: Norton, 1961.	in	...D	A	Ultra-Hard	High
Rosser, Richard F. *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969.	PR	ABCD	HA	Hard	Medium
Schuman, Frederick L. *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect,* 2d ed. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1967.	ex	ABCD	HA	Mixed	Medium
Schwartz, Harry E. *The Red Phoenix: Russia since World War II.* New York: Praeger, 1961.	in	..CD	C	Hard	High
Shulman, Marshall D. *Beyond the Cold War.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.	ex	..CD	HA	Hard	Low

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Work	*Scope*		*Findings*		
	Subject[a]	*Time Per.*[b]	*Approach*[c]	*Hardness*[d]	*Constancy*[e]
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Shulman, Marshall D. *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.	PR	..C.	HA	Hard	Low
Strausz-Hupé, Robert, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty and Alvin J. Cottrell. *Protracted Conflict.* Harper Colophon ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.	ex	ABCD	A	Ultra-Hard	High
Tucker, Robert C. *The Soviet Political Mind.* New York: Praeger, 1963.	in	..CD	C	Hard	Low
Ulam, Adam B. *Expansion and Coexistence.* New York: Praeger, 1968.	PR	ABCD	H	Hard	High
Wesson, Robert G. *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective.* Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1969.	PR	ABCD	HA	Hard	High
Wolfe, Bertram D. *Communist Totalitarianism.* Boston: Beacon, 1961.[g]	in	.BCD	C	Ultra-Hard	High

[a] Scope of subject-matter covered: ex = focus external to USSR (usually relations between it and West); in = focus beyond foreign policy proper (usually the whole of the internal society); PR = focus centered on USSR foreign policy proper.

[b] Scope of time period covered in some depth; A = 1917-1939, or pre-World War II; B = 1939-1945, or World War II; C = 1945-1953, or Stalinist post-war; D = 1953 and on, or post-Stalinist.

[c] A = analytical and H = historical, order of listing (where both are found) indicating relative importance; C = collection (of articles or essays).

[d] Values (in descending order, Ultra-Hard, Hard, and Mixed [neither Hard nor Soft]) are explained in text.

[e] Values (in descending order, High Constancy or little changing, Medium Constancy or moderately changing, and Low Constancy or significantly changing) are explained in text.

[f] 3rd ed. (expanded) of *A History of the Cold War.* Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1961.

[g] Revised edition of *Six Keys to the Soviet System.* Boston: Beacon, 1956.

the best output in the field, and inferences based on the review be generalized to the whole of that best.

* * * * *

Examining, to begin with, the larger, more formal characteristics of the constituents of this sample—their *scope and approach*—we immediately noted the dearth of works and especially analyses that are on target, taking target to be the study of Soviet foreign policy proper from 1917 to the 1960's.

In this connection, we were struck first by the proportion of the sample (to be exact, fifty-five per cent) that is accounted for by the works of a wider scope to which we referred earlier, that discuss the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subject only within the context of larger reference (Table, Column 2). Of the twelve in this category, eight center on broader topics external to the Soviet Union: on the Cold War or relations with the West (Fleming, Halle, Kennan, Lukacs, Schuman, and Shulman's *Beyond the Cold War*), or on the behavior of international communism (Kintner and Strausz-Hupé). Four center on broader topics internal to the Soviet Union, namely Soviet society in its totality (Overstreet, Schwartz, and Wolfe) or, in Tucker's case, its political mentality and outlook. Only the residual ten focus sharply on the subject, these being Bouscaren, Dallin, Gehlen, Goodman, Librach, Mosely (with certain reservations), Rosser, Shulman's *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, Ulam, and Wesson.

Second, we were struck by the fact that few of the works deal with their subject-matter over the full span of Soviet rule (Table, Column 3). While one or two points involved in the over-all judgment are disputable, it is by and large true that twelve of the twenty-two titles (again, about fifty-five per cent) have nothing or very little to say on one or more of the four large periods into which we might provisionally divide Soviet diplomatic history: pre-1939, 1939–45, 1945–53, and post–1953. Kennan virtually ends his story in 1945, treating the postwar era in a single, very general chapter. Halle, Mosely, and Wolfe start their stories, generally speaking, in 1939. Six works concentrate almost exclusively on the postwar era (Dallin, Lukacs, Schwartz, both Shulmans, and Tucker), having little to say on earlier periods; while, of these, Shulman's *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* virtually ends its account in 1953. Two works (Gehlen and Overstreet) are concerned almost wholly with the post-Stalin times. Only the residual ten, therefore, can be said to treat all the periods named in reasonable proportion: Bouscaren, Fleming, Goodman, Kintner, Librach, Rosser, Schuman, Strausz-Hupé, Ulam, and Wesson.

Third and last, we were surprised by the sparsity of true analyses among the sample. Classified on the basis of the approach to, or mode of, handling the subject-matter, the twenty-two works fall into three categories (Table, Column 4), namely: collections of articles (four), which, on account of their character, mount no integrated attack on the subject matter; works that are primarily or wholly histories (thirteen), and which content themselves with breaking down conduct according to time, arraying events and happenings in correct chronological order and providing an explanation therefor; and works that are primarily analyses (five), which break down conduct according to its components

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(aims, methods) and then seek regularities therein. Analyses thus account for less than twenty-five per cent of the total.

The four collections, from which synthesis is missing, are Mosely, Schwartz, Tucker, and Wolfe. The thirteen histories divide almost equally between those which are purely that (Dallin, Fleming, Halle, Kennan, Ulam) and those which contain a slight amount of formally heralded analysis (Bouscaren, Librach, Lukacs, Rosser, Schuman, the two Shulmans, and Wesson). In the latter eight, the analysis commonly takes the form of two or three chapters prefacing the historical recitation. Otherwise, what analysis there is (and with Halle and Kennan, for instance, there is an appreciable amount) is confined to the interstices of a primarily chronological account. Narrative is king.

Of the five works of primarily analytic character (Gehlen, Goodman, the Overstreets, Kintner, and Strausz-Hupé) Gehlen, the Overstreets and Strausz-Hupé proceed from the strongest framework. Gehlen takes up his subject, the post-Stalin policy of peaceful coexistence, by addressing himself in turn to the basis of that policy in internal political maneuver and ideology, the various particular aspects of that policy (military, economic, political, and ideological, the latter now used to mean manipulation of words), and finally, the working out of the policy in the sphere of intra-bloc politics. The Overstreets take up their subject, Khrushchevian behavior as a whole, under the three major headings, "Design" or objectives, "Weapons" or means, and "Battlegrounds" or particular fora of action. Strausz-Hupé, finally, tackles his topic, Communist doctrine viewed as the science and practice of conflict management, by looking first at the international setting, then at Communist strategy and the larger vision of conflict, next at various particular methods or techniques, and last at implications and consequences for the world and especially for the United States. In the case of the remaining two works in this category, organization is less tight.

* * * * *

Turning from scope and approach to *findings*, from beginnings to endings, we observed that, in their conclusions on the nature of Soviet foreign policy, the constituents of the sample agree only within rather narrow limits.

The twenty-two works agree in a rough sort of way on the major events constituting the historical record of the relationship between the Soviet Union and other states—that is, on the more important of the raw data from which over-all conclusions are to be drawn. They agree rather closely on the periodization of that record, commonly treating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1921, 1934, 1939, 1941, 1945, and 1953 as major breaks, 1928, 1949, 1956, and 1962 (give or take a year or two in the case of the last three) as minor ones. There is pretty general agreement also on the propositions that in general Soviet conduct is hardly to be described as peaceable, that its aims include the spread of communism and expansion of Soviet influence, that in pursuit of these aims it is active, militant, and not too moral, that its motives are other than altruistic, and that it represents a disturbing influence in the world.

However, beyond all this lies only difference, divergence, and dissent. The works may agree on the major events of the historical record. But they disagree often and strenuously on the interpretation to be laid on them, some seeing the Nazi Pact, for instance, as the result of Soviet initiative, the outcome of a long and settled plan on Stalin's part to turn the Hitlerite threat West; others see it as a response—specifically a response to Western appeasement at Munich. The samples may agree on the grouping of these events and the summary characteristics of the periods so formed. But they disagree over further assessment and explanation, some seeing the expansionism of 1939–1941 and of 1945–1949, for instance, as defensive and motivated by fear, others as offensive and motivated by ambition. Finally, while they may agree on the nature of conduct as qualitatively conceived in its totality and over the entire stretch of time investigated, and unite in seeing it as something less than peace-loving, they disagree sharply and acridly over the degree to which it exhibits this hostility, over the precise character of its causes and magnitude of its consequences, and over the extent and significance of the changes marked therein over time.

To pinpoint these differences more precisely, and to classify the findings, we found it useful to think in terms of an over-all property of conduct called by the familiar name "hardness," and of changes therein. Policy is "hard" in the degree that it is expansion-minded as to ends; that as to means, it is expansive, militant (addicted to coercion in the general sense), militarist (addicted to violence), and immoral (addicted to dishonesty and infidelity); and that it is initiatory and driven by ambition. Policy is "soft" in the degree that it is contraction-minded as to ends; that as to means it is contractive, persuasionist, non-militarist and moral; and that it is respondatory and driven by fear. The "hardness" continuum, or psychological equivalent of the Mohs scale of hardness for minerals, we broke into five ranges of values: in descending order, Ultra-Hard, Hard, Mixed (neither Hard nor Soft), Soft, and Ultra-Soft. Changes in hardness over time we conceptualized under the headings "little changing," "moderately changing," and "significantly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changing"—or, alternately, as High, Medium, and Low constancy or invariance.

Assessed in these terms, although none of the findings of the various works fall in the Soft or Ultra-Soft categories (Table, Column 5), they are distributed fairly evenly among the top three: eight in the Ultra-Hard (Bouscaren, Dallin, Goodman, Kintner, Librach, Overstreets, Strausz-Hupé, and Wolfe), nine in the Hard (Kennan, Mosely, Rosser, Schwartz, the two Shulmans, Tucker, Ulam, and Wesson), and five in the Mixed (Fleming, Gehlen, Halle, Lukacs, and Schuman). They are less evenly distributed among the values of the constancy scale (Table, Column 6). Yet, taking the two distributions together, one marks the following correlation: while findings of high constancy and Ultra-Hardness tend to go together, findings of low constancy (high change) tend to go with Hard findings, those of medium constancy with the Mixed findings. One can therefore speak of three fairly distinct types of overall image—egotism unlimited and invariant, egotism limited and significantly changing, and egotism restricted, defensive, and moderately changing.

This diversity may be brought into relief by contrasting the findings of Wolfe, which exemplify the Ultra-Hard and Highly invariant image, with those of Schuman, exemplifying the Mixed and Moderately changing. For Wolfe, the Soviet aim is "total conquest of the world."[6] The means are: an unceasing expansiveness and a militancy that marks as enemy all other nations, especially the United States; an addiction to the military that stops just short of provoking all-out war; an immorality marked by addiction to deception and "poisoned semantics," for which peace is a maneuver rather than a principle. Conduct is relentlessly dynamic and initiatory, pressing on regardless of victories won from the other side. Born of an ideology-given lust for power, it is utterly intractable; nothing we do makes a difference; attempts to counter it by any means short of force are doomed. It has been successful to a degree few appreciate, and it confronts the Free World with "a universal, unitary, unending war to the finish." Toward other Communist states, conduct is tyrannical, exercising "ultimate control" over the billion-plus people in the Communist world.[7] It is unchanging and apparently unchangeable: its goals, at least, are unshakeable.[8]

Schuman's picture is something else again. The objective is moderately expansion-minded, "protecting and promoting the interests of

[6] Bertram Wolfe, *Communist Totalitarianism* (Boston 1961), 76, 252.
[7] *Ibid.*, 252-331.
[8] *Ibid.*, 30, 31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Muscovy," but it is emphatically not world domination.[9] As to means, conduct is only sporadically expansive, and while militant enough at times, at others it is accommodating, and it is in low degree militarist, rarely resorting to force of arms.[10] It is, moreover, highly respondatory rather than initiatory, moments of rule-expansion and resort to arms being commonly traceable to prior aggression from without. Conformably with this, it derives in high measure from a national self-interest of which fear for security is the major component.[11] While posing some threat to the peace of the world, this is not a threat of overwhelming magnitude, and for many of the world's ills, and many of its crises (such as the Cold War), the Soviets do not bear major responsibility.[12] As for invariance over the years, conduct has gradually softened in the post-Stalin period, and the pace of softening may be expected to quicken as a secular moderation generated by new-found strength and internal liberalization gradually takes hold.[13]

* * * * *

Examining, finally, the *quality* of the thought—alternately, the *adequacy* with which the findings are demonstrated—we concluded that the studies of the sample fall short of what might reasonably be expected. The gauge of adequacy we posited as reasonable is the presence of that "well-disciplined learning" which Webster's *International* gives as being implied by "scholarly"; we spelled "well-disciplined learning" out, further, as general characterization clearly formulated and well substantiated. The grounds for the generally negative conclusion are that the works in question too often fail either to characterize Soviet foreign policy cleanly and vigorously, or to base clean characterization firmly on the historical record.

Sometimes, to be sure, the conditions are met, and we gladly take note first of leading instances of such sufficiency. The propositions that Soviet conduct has varied between Right and Left modes, for instance, and moved toward the Right in the early fifties—propositions about oscillating and declining militancy (our terms)—have been reasonably clearly affirmed by Shulman (a certain obscurity about precise phasing aside), and then squarely and adequately documented.[14] That is, Shulman has given fairly distinct meanings to the terms

[9] Frederick L. Schuman, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*, 2d ed. (Baton Rouge 1967), 12, 24-25.
[10] *Ibid.*, 28-29.
[11] *Ibid.*, 15-22. [12] *Ibid.*, 25, 79-80. [13] *Ibid.*, 25.
[14] Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963), *passim*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Left" and "Right," and has shown the events of 1946–49 and 1953-and-on to accord fairly closely, respectively, therewith, and the events of 1949–1953 with something between the two.[15] Gehlen has affirmed with similar reasonable clarity and documented with similar adequacy that Soviet conduct has been very cautious in the post-Stalin period.[16] That is, Gehlen argues reasonably that riskiness is correlated with addiction to military means, values whereof range from resort to military instruments down through resort to economic means and on to resort to words only, and he then shows that Soviet actions in selected leading crises of the period fall disproportionately at the lower end of the scale. Tucker has forthrightly affirmed and to a degree documented that Soviet conduct has changed from rule-expansive and aggressive in the late-Stalin days to influence-expansive and persuasionist in the post-Stalin, though he has less clearly defined his terms, and less convincingly demonstrated the subsumption of the data thereunder.[17]

More often, however, one or more of the conditions are not met. Characterization may be latent, dual or ambiguous. For instance, the characterization found in Fleming—of policy that is little expansion-minded, not very militant, not particularly immoral, reactive, and defensive—is not characterization which the author explicitly draws for the reader from the myriad of particular moves constituting his narrative, but rather characterization which he leaves for the reader to draw for himself. On the analogy of a prize fight, Fleming gives a blow-by-blow account of beginning, middle, and end, while leaving to others the drawing of implications and the generalizing about the postures, strategy, and tactics of the two opponents. The same holds in comparable degree for others among the works that are wholly histories, like Dallin and Ulam, and only slightly less so for those that are largely histories, like Bouscaren, Librach, Lukacs, Rosser, and Wesson. Again, the characterization found in the first part of Kennan—of policy almost totally initiatory and ambition-driven, and in substantial degree militarist—is at sharp variance with the characterization in a later part —of conduct half respondatory and fear-driven, and in low degree militarist.[18]

Or substantiation may be insufficient. Sometimes the data alleged to support a generalization simply do not do so; indeed, they point in a quite different direction. Kennan, for instance, in backing up the

[15] For definitions see *ibid.*, 4-5.
[16] Michael Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence* (Bloomington 1967), 109-27.
[17] Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York 1963), chap. 8.
[18] George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston 1961); compare chaps. 13 and 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

general view of high Stalinist militancy, and the particular view that accommodation between Soviets and the West in resistance to Nazism in the thirties was out of the question because of Soviet intransigence, presents data on Western and Soviet conduct in the case of the particular crises of that time (the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, etc.) that actually support the opposite view, namely, that if cooperation did not develop at this time, it was Western appeasement rather than Soviet intransigence that was to blame.[19] Sometimes, again, the fit is managed only by virtue of reinterpreting the data to mean something other than what they appear to mean, and by doing so on unexamined and undefended principles. So Goodman, in order to maintain his thesis that a World State remains the Soviet objective despite the disappearance of explicit references thereto, asserts that "commonwealth of nations," "world economic system," and "fusion of nations" are really to be understood as oblique, Aesopic equivalents of World State.[20] So Strausz-Hupé proceeds in documenting the case for the proposition that the Soviets (or Communists, for the two are interchangeable) conduct unremitting warfare against the West—albeit indirectly through proxies. By a process of casual ascription never examined or defended, and scarcely recognized, he attributes to Soviet dictation *all* anti-Western moves that inaugurated the great crises of the postwar era, not only those formally initiated by the Soviets (e.g., Berlin) or informally sanctioned by them (e.g., Korea), but also those formally initiated by other Communist elements (e.g., the Indo-China war), and those formally initiated by nationalist but non-Communist elements (e.g., the Suez crisis of 1956, the Iraqi crisis of 1958, and so forth).[21]

* * * * *

On the whole, recent American studies of Soviet foreign policy, in our view, leave much to be desired. There is a dearth of full-span treatments centering on the topic proper, and especially of analyses. Findings are diverse, sometimes contradictory, and, with occasional exceptions only, the procedures on which these findings rest meet what we consider to be reasonable tests of adequacy only indifferently. These are the conclusions on the sample to which our survey leads.

What contribution to this record may have been made by the growing body of theory-oriented literature on foreign policy in general, and

[19] *Ibid.*, chaps. 20-21.
[20] Elliot R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York 1960), 47-49.
[21] Robert Strausz-Hupé and others, *Protracted Conflict* (New York 1963), chap. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what hope for improvement was held out by this literature, are the questions next to be raised, the topics to which the essay now turns.

II. Foreign Policy Models

Until scarcely more than a decade ago, foreign policy studies remained essentially narrative, non-empirical and largely non-conceptual. The several approaches to the study of foreign policy which may be viewed as indicative of the earlier period include country studies, diplomatic narratives, studies of state officials' behavior, memoirs and biographies of diplomats and decision-makers, and studies of the impact of environmental influences and pressures on the policy-making process—all of which constituted the major intellectual thrust. The difference between the Soviet foreign policy studies reviewed above and other literature in the foreign policy area was minimal.

Certain more recent intellectual contributions in this field, however, represent a real takeoff in a different direction. They may be characterized as attempts to achieve greater systematic treatment, objectivity, and precision, and broader and more valid generalization. The task of the reviewers here as compared with the Soviet foreign policy studies is relatively simpler, since the more theoretically attractive essays which add substantively to the advancement of knowledge are limited in number.

Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin's *Foreign Policy Decision-Making*,[22] a widely cited seminal study of influences affecting decision-making in foreign policy, introduces systematic, comparable, applicable categories within a fresh conceptual framework. And, as the imaginative case study of *The Korean Decision* by Glen Paige[23] (originally more simply presented by Snyder and Paige in the above volume) shows, the Snyder decisional model can be usefully applied to particular empirical situations.

George Modelski's *A Theory of Foreign Policy*[24] is an input-output model of a political system's behavior in foreign affairs which emphasizes the domestic-foreign policy linkage. Here the decision-makers, who have aims (interests and objectives) that influence behavior, are molded by political parties, interest groups, and agencies at home and abroad; follow some worthy principles; and employ means (resources, power inputs) which are then transformed into policy (power out-

[22] Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York 1962).
[23] Glen D. Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York 1967).
[24] George Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy* (New York 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

puts). The foreign policy process is thus subjected to systematic investigation which is rigorous, encompassing, and effective.

The study of environmental influences is advanced by the Sprouts ("Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics").[25] They define more precisely the operational influences, and separate and distinguish these from the psychological environment. Joseph Frankel (*The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making*)[26] further refines the concept of the psychological environment. In particular, he emphasizes information, image, and values as the three sets of variables that condition and mold the perceptions of the decision-makers.

The conceptual framework of James Rosenau's "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy"[27] consists of five sets of behavioral variables (idiosyncratic, role, governmental, systemic, and societal); three types of political systems (depending on the size, the state of the economy, and the state of the polity, and ranked for developed and underdeveloped economies, open and closed polities, and penetrated and non-penetrated systems); and a four-fold issue-area category (territorial, status, human resources, and non-human resources), all interconnected. By a series of hypotheses the author links types of political systems and issue-areas to the sets of behavioral variables. The framework is thought-provoking, permits data-gathering, and the hypotheses it produces can be tested.

In his review article "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?,"[28] a careful survey of the foreign policy literature and a gentle advocacy of the comparative approach to the study of foreign policy, Professor Rosenau argues that a theory of foreign policy cannot explain "why and how a national system manages to persist or why and how it collapses." Rosenau writes that "those whose aspirations for foreign theory include the capacity to explain and predict sys-

[25] Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York 1961).

[26] Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making* (London 1963).

[27] James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston 1966).

[28] James N. Rosenau, "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?," *International Studies Quarterly*, XII (September 1968); see also his *Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept in the Study of International Politics and Foreign Policy*, Center of International Studies Research Monograph No. 15 (Princeton 1963), and the excellent article by Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," *The American Political Science Review*, LXI (December 1967), 971-82.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

temic coherence and collapse are bound to be thwarted." What can a foreign policy analyst do to meet this major theoretical challenge? To understand the foreign policy of a nation, Rosenau argues, "it is not sufficient to answer the question of systemic adaptation and political process"; only by comparison of two or more foreign policies "can the theoretically oriented analyst begin to satisfy his curiosity and the policy-oriented analyst begin to accumulate the reliable knowledge on which sound recommendations and choices are made." That argument, perhaps because it is so brief, does not really seem to be as persuasive as Professor Rosenau would like to have it. These reviewers would argue that, at least to start with, a foreign policy theory at the middle-range level would permit orderly collection of data pertaining to foreign policy matters and their analytical examination, without necessary recourse to comparing and comparative analysis.

Professors Jacobson and Zimmerman, in *The Shaping of Foreign Policy*,[29] recommend that one start with the beginning—the five categories representing the major foreign policy variables along which traditional alternative explanations of foreign policy may be arranged: the systemic, the environmental, the societal, the governmental, and the idiosyncratic or psychological.[30] The two editors present seven selections from the foreign policy literature—"Soviet-American Relations: A Multiple Symmetry Model," by Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley; "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," by Harold and Margaret Sprout; "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," by Karl W. Deutsch; "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," by Gabriel A. Almond; "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," by Henry A. Kissinger; "National Images and International Systems," by Kenneth E. Boulding; and "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of the International System," by Sidney Verba—to illustrate the five explanatory approaches to foreign policy, and to articulate alternative explanations of foreign policy behavior.

These are not yet middle-range foreign policy theories, of course, but "contextually limited insights," initial though essential steps toward building such theories. The merit of this useful volume lies in

[29] Harold Karan Jacobson and William Zimmerman, eds., *The Shaping of Foreign Policy* (New York 1969).

[30] "The scheme used here is related to the one [Rosenau] developed but differs in that it includes as a separate category environmental factors (e.g., geography, level of technology, rate of scientific innovation), and it does not include role variables as a separate category (they are included instead within the governmental category)." *Ibid.*, 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND TRACTORS

ROBERT F. MILLER

The MTS and the Development of Controls in Soviet Agriculture

This intensive work not only presents a detailed account of the thirty-year history of the Machine-Tractor Station, an important Soviet agricultural institution, but also provides data and illustrations in an analysis of Soviet policy-making and policy-implementation processes. *Russian Research Center Studies, 60.* $12.50

SOVIET POLICY IN WEST AFRICA

ROBERT LEGVOLD

In this first in-depth study of Soviet relations with Black Africa, Mr. Legvold focuses on six West African countries that differ widely in their approach to foreign aid and domestic matters—Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Nigeria. He explores the intricacies of Soviet policy in Africa and follows closely its course over the ten years after the majority of that continent's colonies achieved independence. $13.00

MARXISM

ALFRED G. MEYER

The Unity of Theory and Practice
A Critical Essay
Reissued with a new Introduction

"It is rare to find a work so penetrating in its exposition and so stimulating in its criticism," commented the *Political Science Quarterly* upon publication of this book in 1954. In his introduction to this latest edition Mr. Meyer brings the study up to date and reflects the widespread changes in attitude toward Marxism. *Russian Research Center Studies, 14.* $6.00

ICON AND SWASTIKA

HARVEY FIRESIDE

The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control

During the Nazi occupation of Russian territories the Orthodox Church staged an unprecedented religious revival. Mr. Fireside shows how the Church was able to steer a neutral course between resistance and collaboration and to emerge with perhaps the greatest freedom of any social institution under the occupation. *Russian Research Center Studies, 62.* $8.00

In Canada/Saunders of Toronto, Ltd.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the editors' assertion that the five approaches represent the major advances in this field and therefore provide the alternative platforms for the next steps to follow. "Despite their distinctiveness," write Zimmerman and Jacobson, "there are certain unifying schemes common to all the theories in each of the . . . categories." Jointly, they point the road ahead.

Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein's "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior"[31] combines input-output analysis, the feedback effect, input categorization, the psychological environment, and the issue-area concept into a research design which is both researchable and productive of hypotheses.

The input category consists of a set of components: the operational environment (composed of ten foreign and domestic variables) sets the parameters of the decision-making process, "but influences the choice among policy options . . . only as it is filtered through the images of decision-makers." The filter is the "attitudinal prism" of policy-makers located within the psychological environment. The communication system represents the transmission of data concerning the operational environment to the decision-making elite and results in elite image, the decision-makers' "perceptions of their environment along with their views of the desirable (or proper) roles for their state."

The four issue-areas—military-security, political-diplomatic, economic-developmental, and cultural-status—differentiate among types of decisional subject matters which define the process within which strategic and tactical decisions are formulated, and, once formulated, implemented. The output category then describes the acts or decisions taken.

Content analysis (essentially a frequency count) was used as a test of the model's empirical utility, principally with respect to the link between elite images and policy decisions. This exercise generated several findings and hypotheses, almost exclusively along the continuum of developed/developing states' perception of decision-makers, but nicely tying in with the domestic politics/foreign policy matters.

However, the Brecher decision-making model, a unitary, rational construct, defines the decisional unit quite narrowly: as few individuals as possible—one or two—are decisive and responsible for policy output. No processes are posited—influences, pressures, conflicts, bargains, inconsistencies, compromises, contradictions, confusions, resolutions—within the foreign policy elite. As it is exceedingly small, homogeneous, and absolutely consensual, the policy-making unit exhibits no

[31] Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIII (March 1969), 75-101.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism

中共人物

Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark
(Two Volumes) $30

Virtually every fact of Chinese Communist history has been dealt with in one or another of the 433 biographies.

This is the only biographical dictionary, in any language, encompassing the period from the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 to the mid-1960's.

Most biographies contain more information than can be found in any other single source.

It can be regarded, without qualification, as *the* research tool for those students, scholars, journalists and others concerned with Contemporary Communist China. Harvard East Asian Series, 57.

HARVARD
Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

particular problems; there is no need to worry about differences in perceptions and attitudes among members of the elite, about tendencies which build up at the end or disappear, about the give-and-take which takes place among the decision-makers. Small group theory, organization theory, and decisional models such as that of bureaucratic politics are ignored because they are not needed. Second, the broad dichotomy between the psychological and the operational environment tends to make any actual measuring of success in foreign policy difficult. Since the observer himself views this dual universe through a perceptual screen of his own, he may find it hard to assign meaningful, common-denominator values to both environments. The feedback concept does not appear to be adequate for the purpose of success evaluation. Finally, the accuracy of the assumption that the decision-makers' perceptions of the various variables could be discovered via a correlative frequency of articulation—an issue much discussed within the profession—has still not been satisfactorily determined. Unarticulated images present a serious methodological problem.

Graham T. Allison's "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis"[32] is a systematic blend of three modes of analysis into three discrete sets of complex data defining the same case study, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. This triple approach to the data serves nicely as a cumulative checkpoint of each model's explanatory powers. At the same time, it permits the author to process more data more systematically within more uniform, comparative categories built into each of the respective conceptual models.

The first explanatory alternative, the rational policy model, is an explicit, systematic attempt to articulate the often unstated, implicit assumptions of analysts (Horelick and Rush, Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffman, and Shelling are examples).[33] Given an external stimulus, a set of alternative responses, a set of goals, and a rational national actor, the rational policy model explains why a certain policy was adopted (*had to be adopted*) as a national choice. The unitary actor is thus "simply a value-maximizing mechanism for getting from the strategic problem to the logical solution."

[32] Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1969), 689-718.

[33] Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago 1965), based on A. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 3rd ed. (New York 1960); Stanley Hoffmann, "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy," *Daedalus* (Fall 1962), reprinted in *The State of War* (New York 1965); Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York 1960).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ASHLEY MONTAGU says:

"It should be the bounden obligation of all who can read to read this book and to act upon its very practical recommendations. What is at stake is no less than the survival of humanity."

SENATOR HARRISON A. WILLIAMS: "I commend Mr. Falk for his unique and perceptive formulation of the clear and present dangers facing this earth, his well-reasoned solutions coupled with an action plan, and his earnest and compelling plea for personal involvement."

STEWART L. UDALL: "Bold and comprehensive . . . very valuable."

$8.95, now at your bookstore
RANDOM HOUSE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second conceptual alternative, the organizational process model, argues that the decision-making structure is a complex organizational device rather than a unitary monolithic national government, and that a policy is not a simple act but a complex output, a sum-total of decisions on many levels. It explains the "how" of the decision-making process, "the organizational routines and repertoires that produce the outputs that comprise the puzzling occurrence."

The third alternative, the bureaucratic politics model, characterizes policy neither as a rational national action nor an organizational, routine output, but as an *outcome* of essentially intra-national compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among officials—an outcome of political bargaining. The decision-making behavior is perceived here as "outcomes of intricate and subtle, simultaneous, overlapping gains among players located in positions, the hierarchical arrangement of which constitutes the government."

The three conceptual models follow almost identical structures of categories. First, each framework is briefly introduced and differentiated from the others. Then the model's analytic paradigm (which "exhibits the characteristics of the most refined version of the . . . model") spells out the organizing principles: the basic unit of analysis; the organizing concepts (actors or players, the problem, action, and goals); the dominant inference patterns; and general as well as specific propositions (deterrents and Soviet force posture). And three paradigmatic analyses precede the three respective narratives (the U.S. Blockade of Cuba, Cut One, Two, and Three) to which the respective conceptual models are then applied.

The study is thus important not only because of the insightful narrative of the Cuban missile crisis—as one colleague put it, "just skip the introductory parts and read the story"—but precisely because of the objectified triple analysis which insists on careful and sustained definition of terms and concepts. Its aim is indeed a foreign policy theory of middle range validity. Unfortunately, it does not use any of the available techniques "to measure and estimate," either for defining variables or for the analysis of the relationship. The author does point out that although "neither the concepts nor the relations among the variables are sufficiently specified to yield propositions deductively, paradigmatic analysis nevertheless has considerable promise for clarifying and codifying styles of analysis in political science." It is true, says Graham Allison, that the paradigms can be expressed "rigorously

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Future of Law in a Multicultural World

ADDA B. BOZEMAN

Examining the unique cultures of the Islamic Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Indianized Asia, and China, Mrs. Bozeman attacks the supposition that world unity can be achieved through the application of Western ideals of international law and organization. "This brilliant book should have a sobering effect on anyone who is trapped in the cage of assuming that universalized rhetoric implies universalized conduct."—*Harold D. Lasswell*

Cloth, $6.50
Paper, $2.45

The Growth of World Law

PERCY CORBETT

Professor Corbett documents specific achievements in a historic transition: from international law regulating conduct among states to world law equally applicable to individuals, corporations, international organizations, and nations. Looking at the post-1918 world, he discusses the positive gains of the UN; the growth of regional organizations; the work of the ILO; the influence of multinational business corporations. $7.50

. . . new paperback

Why Men Rebel

TED ROBERT GURR

". . . the most important book on social violence that has been published in a good number of years."—Lewis A. Coser, *New York Times Book Review* #233 $2.95

Princeton University Press

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in mathematical terms."[34] Unfortunately, "this does not solve the most difficult problem of measurement and estimation." Allison rejects what he calls "the 'new frontiersmen's appropriation of new techniques.'" And this, we think, is the study's only major weakness.

Allison is aware of the limits of his analysis. As to Model I, he points out that reasons given why a rational actor would choose an action do not necessarily constitute an explanation of that action unless the real determinants of the action are known. As to Model II, he stresses the need for modification of the organization-process model to indicate where organizational change is likely. And Model III is enormously complex. How can it be made more parsimonious, and thus more efficient?

The three models are not exclusive alternatives. While each handles only one class of variables, the three classes do not exhaust *all* the critical variables. Adequate synthesis would mean identification of all major variables as determinants of outcomes, and specification of their relationships. This, the author rightly admits, is not the case here.

* * * * *

Assessing the literature as a whole, we found problems remaining with even the best of the constructs. The theoretical frameworks tended to be simplified and country-oriented rather than complex and general. Notice, for example, the conceptual statement of Brecher on the identity of the "core" decision-makers: "The core decision-making group in any foreign policy system consists of the head of government and the foreign minister." How many decisional groups would have to be excluded from consideration on this basis? Or even worse: The foreign policy decisional group's "size and composition will vary with the issue." Will it? Not unless, to start with, we exclude all the Communist Party states. It is true, of course, that "a narrow-gauge definition of the foreign-policy elite permits more fruitful comparison." But alas, the price is too high.

Allison contributes three stimulating, systematic, generalized, empirically-based alternative models of foreign policy processes. But he "failed to gauge their analytical value" by research techniques and modern research facilities which would measure the variables and their relationship more precisely. Rigorous research techniques, often employing modern computer technology, are revolutionizing the prospects of

[34] "For example, Model I lends itself to mathematical formulation along the lines of Herbert Simon's 'Behavioral Theory of Rationality,' *Models of Man* (New York 1957)."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LUCY C. BEHRMAN

MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS AND POLITICS IN SENEGAL

The influence of traditional and religious groups on modern politics is a significant factor in the development of many countries. Focusing on the West African country of Senegal, Mrs. Behrman investigates the political roles of Muslim religious organizations there. She analyzes the historical conditions under which Muslim brotherhoods emerged as a political force and examines their contemporary function in Senegalese politics. $7.25

AUDREY C. SMOCK

IBO POLITICS

The Role of Ethnic Unions in Eastern Nigeria

The first social scientist concerned with Africa to obtain both primary records of ethnic unions and interviews from their leaders and prominent members, Mrs. Smock demonstrates that ethnicity is not a legacy of the precolonial past so much as a response to forces of change induced by colonial rule. She concludes that ethnic unions are a sign of modernization, not backwardness. $10.00

In Canada/Saunders of Toronto, Ltd.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Columbia reports on the Pearson Report

THE WIDENING GAP

Development in the 1970's

Barbara Ward, Lenore d'Anjou and J. D. Runnalls, Editors

The 1970's will see a deepening of the social and economic strain in relations between developed and developing countries. This is the conclusion drawn by the distinguished participants of this conference on International Development sponsored by Columbia University in direct response to the Pearson Report. These 37 papers not only serve as a critique but raise new questions about issues to be faced in the seventies.

Cloth, $10.00 paper, $3.95

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reliable empirical research. They can and should be used wherever convenient and useful. Moreover, while Allison's analysis is more extensive and inclusive than that of his predecessors, it is exhaustive neither in terms of the major determinants of foreign policy processes, nor in terms of their interrelationship.

Still, it is too harsh to say, as Allison does, that "the disgrace of political science is the infrequency with which propositions of originality are formulated and tested." As the above studies and models cumulatively show, the trend is fairly well set. The tendency, hopefully perceived as the new rules of the game, is to move from a single-factor explanatory analytical key to a mix, as in the Allison study; from monocausal and determinist analysis to multicausal and probabilist conceptual framework as illustrated in the Jacobson and Zimmerman volume; from separate country studies and separate theoretical formulations ("the two never meet") to symbiotic treatments, as in the several studies ranging from the Snyder and Paige essay to that of Brecher; from excessively rational explanations of foreign-policy behavior to non-unitary complex decisional explanations; and from failure to use any appropriate research techniques to a mix of relevant instrumentalities and application of sophisticated quantification- and analogue-modelling using advanced mathematical and statistical techniques.

What lies ahead, in our view, is thus not what one of our more creative students proposed doing, namely to combine the best features of the several models into one single unitary new model (input-output flow from Almond and Modelski, decision-making model from Snyder, "man-milieu" relationship from the Sprouts, the psychological environment from Frankel, issue-areas from Rosenau, and internal-external taxonomic input variables from Brecher), but instead to continue the search for mixes of relevant social science models on the one hand, and mixes of appropriate research techniques on the other hand, and to apply both rigorously to real-life foreign policy processes (on the basis of Brecher's statement that "social science models are of little value unless they are subjected to the rigorous test of empirical utility.")

In short, we think that forthcoming studies in the field of foreign policy must address themselves to, and cope with, not only the old problem of linkage between micro- and macro-level phenomena—between the decision-makers and decisional units on the one hand, and the political systems involved on the other—but must also include all the critical and relevant variables, both behavioral and institutional,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from Yale

Nullity and Revision

The Review and Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards

by W. Michael Reisman

The process of resolving international disputes by authoritative decisions and bringing such decisions and future conduct into harmony with each other is a problem of the utmost importance. Adapting the policy-oriented framework of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, the author takes up comprehensively the entire subject of international arbitration and decision.

Mr. Reisman develops a set of sequential heuristic models, which enable the international decision-maker to orient himself in the flow of pre-decision, decision, and post-decision events, and permit him to formulate the most effective decision. He then treats in depth a selective but wide range of claims lodged against the validity of a decision, at different sequences, and considers in detail the policies and the contextual investigations to which they should be subjected. Finally, Mr. Reisman presents a model of enforcement for international awards and judgments based on the availability of effective power in diverse contexts and the intricate network of authority expectations that decision-makers may activate and integrate in the enforcement process. **$25.00**

YALE **Yale University Press** New Haven and London

in Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press

THE AAPSS

Announces Publication of Monograph Number 10

DESIGN FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH: SCOPE, THEORY, METHODS & RELEVANCE

Edited by Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania

Readers wishing Complimentary Copy return form below

Monograph order form

The American Academy of Political and Social Science

3937 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104

Please send me a Complimentary Copy of Monograph #10

NAME .....

ADDRESS .....

PLEASE SEND ME ..... **additional copies, and bill me ($2.00 each)**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and their relations. They must permit measurement and operational definition. And, to increase the reliability of the results, they should both examine and test the foreign policy processes in several alternative but integrated ways.

III. Conclusion

As one looks back now at the first of the twin subjects of our essay —at Soviet foreign policy studies of the last decade or so—and considers in conclusion what has been done in the light of our second subject, the foreign policy models developed at the same time—one's immediate and overriding impression is of the utter indifference of first to second, and of the yawning gap that separates the two. It was earlier pointed out that less than twenty-five per cent of the list of works constituting our sample of Soviet foreign policy studies are analyses. To this, a few supplementary observations are here in order. Of the works on that list published in the second half of the sixties (see Table), only one (Gehlen) out of nine rates as an analysis. Work in the field, in other words, has been primarily historical, and is continuing to be so. More important, the few analyses proceed each upon its own particular framework of concepts, and these frameworks, though in certain cases quite sensible and coherent, have little in common with one another. Still more important, the authors fail to articulate their frameworks explicitly; indeed, they give little evidence of having addressed themselves systematically to the problems involved, none of them having canvassed and drawn upon the literature on models for suggestions. Whatever may be the explanation—and one suspects the tenacity of the old reasoning that because the conduct of a given state is unique, analysis thereof requires a unique conceptual framework—the hard fact is that the enterprise of examining Soviet foreign policy continues to be carried on in virtually complete independence of any theoretical implications. Consideration of recent periodical literature would modify this judgment somewhat,[35] but not much.

The second point to be made—and it has the effect of tempering the first—is that failure to consult the findings of the model-builders and theoreticians is probably not the unmitigated disaster the latter may think it to be. The question formulated earlier, what hope for im-

[35] For an article invoking models see, for instance, William A. Welsh, "A Game-Theoretic Conceptualization of the Hungarian Revolt: Toward an Inductive Theory of Games," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences* (Chicago 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Summer 1971 Volume XXV, No. 2

CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Bernard Brodie

THE FUTURE OF IDEOLOGY IN ALLIANCE SYSTEMS
Herbert S. Dinerstein

POPULATION AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Robert C. North and Nazli M. Choucri

RACE AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
George W. Shepard and Tilden J. LeMelle

THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
William D. Coplin

INTERNATIONAL FUNCTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGY
Eugene B. Skolnikoff

BOOK REVIEWS: Edward L. Morse, Harold Fruchtbaum, James Stegenga, John D. Montgomery

Subscriptions: Single current issue $2.25; single back issue $2.50; one year $4.50; two years $8.50; three years $12.50. Plus 50 cents per issue for foreign postage and handling.

School of International Affairs, Columbia University
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10027

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

A Quarterly Published by
The University of Notre Dame

The July issue will present the following articles:

Thomas P. Murphy:	The Public Interest and the Fruits of New Technology
Fredrick B. Pike:	Making the Hispanic World Safe From Democracy: Spanish Liberals and Hispanismo
Michael J. Francis and Herman Vera-Godoy:	Chile: Christian Democracy to Marxism
Steven Golin:	Culture as Social Control
Zvi Henry Rosen:	Bruno Bauer: The Radicalism of a Young Hegelian
William R. Schonfeld:	The Classical Marxist Conception of Liberal Democracy

Annual Subscription: $5.00 **Single Issue: $1.50**

Address: THE EDITORS, THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provement in Soviet studies may be held out by the models in question, is one to which the answer must be "at the present time, not a great deal." Even the most recent of the analytical models have, as we point out, significant weaknesses, and the reduction in the utility of the schemes as instruments of analysis is compounded by the relative scarcity of data in the Soviet case. While it would exaggerate matters to contend that the student of Soviet foreign policy has little to learn from the model-builders, it is nonetheless true that for the time being, perhaps, the most he can expect from them by way of help is suggestions, to start with, for more illuminating analytical categories.

But if Soviet studies cannot benefit much as yet from the new models, and if their failure to press the search in the direction of a common scheme of integrating concepts can, in some degree, thereby be excused, their general dereliction can hardly be. The final point we would make is that the need to do something along this line is absolutely imperative if the minimum of scholarly work as we define it, namely, general characterization clearly formulated and well substantiated, is to remain the criterion. As specific steps towards this goal we would suggest the following: that students of Soviet foreign policy address themselves earnestly to method not in the grandiose sense, that is, to a critique of elaborate schemata, but to method in the modest sense, that is, to a critique of detailed procedure; that they start by breaking out and centering upon one or a few of the traits of policy in terms of which description is to run (e.g., addiction to the military instrument, fidelity to promise, addiction to the initiative, and so forth); that they define and differentiate scrupulously each such trait, specifying with care the rules for application to the historical record; that they then, according to these rules, apply the terms to the data, doing so evenly, and aggregating results meticulously as occasion may demand; that in all of this, they assiduously cultivate habits of self-examination and the deliberate search for, and allowance for, possible bias. Michael Gehlen's treatment of the Soviet propensity for risk-taking, alluded to above, exemplifies the procedure and its promise. Model-builders, in carrying out an earlier suggestion to the effect that more attention be paid to the specification and measurement of variables, would, we might add, be doing substantially the same thing within the more general context. This is a mundane, common-sense type of intellectual endeavor. But a mundane, common-sense approach is precisely, we think, what is needed, if the state of affairs presently prevailing in the field—that is, the diversity of scope, of approach, and of conclusion described earlier in this essay—is to be corrected.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

JANUARY-MARCH 1971 **ISSUE NO. 45**

Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China — Maurice Meisner

The Ninth Central Committee — Donald W. Klein, Lois B. Hager

Railway Development and Economic Growth in Manchuria — Shun-hsin Chou

China's Nuclear-Missile Programme: Regional or Intercontinental? — Alice Langley Hsieh

Documents on the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution — Introduction by Harold R. Isaacs

Why Communist China Imports Wheat — Feng-hwa Mah

Recent Leadership and Political Trends in Taiwan — J. Bruce Jacobs

COMMENTS CORRESPONDENCE BOOK REVIEWS
QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial Office:
24 Fitzroy Square, London W.1

Subscription Office:
Research Publications Ltd., 11 Nelson Road, London S.E.10

Subscriptions:
£3 or U.S. $7.50 **£2 or U.S. $5 for full-time students**
Single copies: 75 new pence or U.S. $2.00

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

the quarterly journal of the World Peace Foundation providing a lively forum for scholarship on international organizations and for analysis of current literature and research methods in the field

Spring 1971 **Volume 25, Number 2**

ARTICLES

Mice that Do Not Roar: Some Aspects of International Politics in the World's Peripheries ..... Jorge I. Domínguez

The Principle of Nonintervention, the United Nations, and the International System ..... Nicholas Greenwood Onuf

Theory and Method in the Study of International Integration ..... James A. Caporaso

REVIEW ESSAYS
by Dennis Livingston and Jonathan Knight

NOTE ON THEORY AND METHOD
by Peter J. Katzenstein

COMMENTS
by Samuel A. Bleicher and Amos Perlmutter

$3.25 per copy **$18.00 for two years**
$10.00 for one year **$25.00 for three years**

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
40 Mount Vernon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108, U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In any discipline, the ideal condition is one in which case studies and theoretical writings fortify one another, the former providing a test of the usefulness of the latter, and being provided in turn with a coherent set of concepts and ideas for carrying out the tasks of description, explanation, and comparison at the lower level. In the field of foreign policy studies, we should have this condition constantly in our sights. However, at least where the study of Soviet foreign policy is concerned, achievement is probably a matter for the not-so-immediate future only. Under the circumstances, the wise strategy for advance is the modest one, of small steps, taken one at a time. There is little excitement in this, little glamour. But *natura non facit saltum*, it is well to remember. Sustained progress in human affairs too, one would add, rarely issues from Great Leaps.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Studies in

COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

An Interdisciplinary Journal

Some Articles in 1971 Issues:

On the applicability of structural-functional model: Comparative study of East European political systems by JAN F. TRISKA, M. GEORGE ZANINOVICH, LADIS K. D. KRISTOF, OTTO ULC, and PETER A. TOMA; comments by GABRIEL ALMOND, FREDERICK BARGHOORN, and CHARLES A. POWELL

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN on Soviet and Cuban concepts of revolution

R. BARRY FARRELL on East European foreign-policy leadership

JOHN N. HAZARD on Communist constitutionalism in a new form

ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI on bureaucracy and interest groups in Czechoslovakia

S. N. EISENSTADT on change in Communist systems and the comparative analysis of modern societies

Published quarterly by the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California. Editorial and business offices, VKC 301, University of Southern California, University Park, Los Angeles, California 90007.

Subscriptions: Individuals $10.00 a year, institutions $16.00 a year, foreign and domestic postage included.

JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH

A quarterly journal of scientific reports in the field of peace research

Edited by Johan Galtung

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Contents No. 1, 1971

***Istvan Kende*: 25 Years of Local Wars**

***Michael Wallace*: Power, Status and International War**

***Claus Iverson*: Freedom and Civilization**

***Lars Porsholt*: A Quantitative Conflict Model**

***William Eckhardt*: Symbiosis between Peace Research and Peace Action**

Discussion on Galtung's Concept of Violence

Book Notes

The first of its kind in Europe, the Journal of Peace Research is published under the auspices of the International Peace Research Association, Groningen, Netherlands

Subscriptions

UNIVERSITETSFORLAGET, Norwegian Universities Press
P.O. Box 307, Blindern, Oslo 3 Norway / P.O. Box 142, Boston, Mass. 02113, USA
One year, including postage: N.kr. 35.00 US $5.75

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME XXIII

Asia, southeast, *see* Solomon

Bayne, E. A., *Persian Kingship in Transion, Conversation With a Monarch Whose Office Is Traditional & Whose Goal is Modernization*, reviewed by Sepehr Zabih, III:522
behavior, political, biological bases, *see* Corning
Belorgey, Gérard, *Le Gouvernement et l'Administration de la France*, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Bergson, Abram, Development under Two Systems: Comparative Productivity Growth since 1950, IV:579
Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science, The, by Peter A. Corning, III:321
Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia, by Robert L. Solomon, I:1
Brenner, Michael J., Strategic Interdependence and the Politics of Inertia: Paradoxes of European Defense Cooperation, IV:635
Burks, Richard V., *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe*, reviewed by Andrew C. Janos, III:493

Canada, military profession, *see* Preston
Catherine, Robert, and Guy Thuiller, *Introduction à une Philosophie de l'Administration*, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Change and Continuity in Iran's Foreign Policy in Modern Times, by Sepehr Zabih, III:522
Chen, Pi-chao, The Political Economics of Population Growth: The Case of China, II:245
Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy, by David Easton and Jack Dennis, reviewed by William R. Schonfeld, III:544
China, *see* Wilson
China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System, I, Books 1 and 2, by Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., reviewed by Richard W. Wilson, II:295
China in Crisis: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives, II, by Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., reviewed by Richard W. Wilson, II:295
China, population growth, *see* Pi-chao Chen
Chinese Studies in Crisis, by Richard W. Wilson, II:295
communism, eastern Europe, *see* Janos
Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, by Paul Shoup, reviewed by Andrew C. Janos, III:493
Communist Party, Romania, *see* Jowitt
comparative economic growth, *see* Bergson
Comparative History and the Theory of Modernization, by Lester M. Salamon, I:83
Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations, by Hanna Newcombe, James Wert, and Alan Newcombe, III:452
Corning, Peter A., The Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science, III:321
Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals, by Edward Shils, ed., reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
currencies, international, *see* Strange

Dencik, Lars, ed., *Scientific Research and Politics*, reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
Dennis, Jack, and David Easton, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy*, reviewed by William R. Schonfeld, III:544
Development of Political Attitudes in Children, The, by Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, reviewed by William R. Schonfeld, III:544
Development under Two Systems: Comparative Productivity Growth since 1950, by Abram Bergson, IV:579
Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe, The, by Richard V. Burks, reviewed by Andrew C. Janos, III:493

Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans, by Paul Lendvai, reviewed by Andrew C. Janos, III:493
eastern Europe, communism, *see* Janos
Easton, David, and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy*, reviewed by William R. Schonfeld, III:544
ecology, USSR, *see* Powell
economic systems, comparative economic growth, *see* Bergson

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Elite Recruitment in Turkey: The Role of the Mülkiye, by Joseph S. Szyliowicz, III:371
Ethnicity, Communism, and Political Change in Eastern Europe, by Andrew C. Janos, III:493
ethnic politics, *see* Horowitz
Europe, eastern, communism, *see* Janos
European defense cooperation, *see* Brenner

Fejtö, François, *Les juifs et l'antisémitisme dans les pays communistes*, reviewed by Andrew C. Janos, III:493
Focus of Political Socialization Research, The: An Evaluation, by William R. Schonfeld, III:544
foreign policy, Soviet studies, *see* Welch and Triska
foreign policy models, *see* Welch and Triska
foreign policy, Iran, *see* Zabih
Foreign Policy of Iran, The, 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, by Rouhollah K. Ramazani, reviewed by Sepehr Zabih, III:522
France, bureaucracy, *see* Suleiman
free-rider problem, *see* Frohlich and Oppenheimer
French Bureaucracy and Its Students, The: Toward the Desanctification of the State, by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer, I Get By With a Little Help From My Friends, I:104

Ghana, military rule, *see* Price

Haberer, Joseph, *Politics and the Community of Science*, reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
Hess, Robert D., and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*, reviewed by William R. Schonfeld, III:544
Horowitz, Donald L., Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics, II:232

I Get By With a Little Help From My Friends, by Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, I:104
Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Re-analysis, by Jeffery M. Paige, I:24
insurgency, *see* Paige
international currencies, *see* Strange
international relations and political development, *see* Weiner
Introduction à une Philosophie de l'Administration, by Robert Catherine and Guy Thuiller, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Iran, foreign policy, *see* Zabih
Iran: The New Imperialism in Action, by Bahman Nirumand, reviewed by Sepehr Zabih, III:522

Janos, Andrew C., Ethnicity, Communism, and Political Change in Eastern Europe, III:493
Jowitt, Kenneth, The Romanian Communist Party and the World Socialist System: A Redefinition of Unity, I:38

Kahan, Jerome H., Strategies for SALT, II:171
Kalenskii, V. G., *Politicheskaia nauka v SShA: kritika burzhuaznykh kontseptsii vlasti* [Political Science in the U.S.A.: A Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of Power], reviewed by Rolf H. W. Theen, IV:684
Kessler, Marie-Christine, *Le Conseil d'Etat*, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Kolkowicz, Roman, Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives, III:431

Langton, Kenneth P., *Political Socialization*, reviewed by William R. Schonfeld, III:544
Le Conseil d'Etat, by Marie-Christine Kessler, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Le Gouvernement et l'Administration de la France, by Gérard Belorgey, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Le Personnel de Direction des Ministères, by J. Siwek-Pouydesseau, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Lendvai, Paul, *Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans*, reviewed by Andrew C. Janos, III:493
Les juifs et l'antisémitisme dans les pays communistes, by François Fejtö, reviewed by Andrew C. Janos, III:493

Macedonian Syndrome, The: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development, by Myron Weiner, IV:665
military profession, Canada, *see* Preston
military rule in new states, *see* Price
modernization theory, *see* Salamon

Newcombe, Alan, Hanna Newcombe, and James Wert, Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations, III:452

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Newcombe, Hanna, James Wert, and Alan Newcombe, Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations, III:452
Nirumand, Bahman, *Persien, Modell eines Entwicklungslandes oder Die Diktatur der Freien Welt* (English Translation, *Iran: The New Imperialism in Action*), reviewed by Sepehr Zabih, III:522

Oppenheimer, Joe A., and Norman Frohlich, I Get By With a Little Help From My Friends, I:104

Paige, Jeffery M., Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Re-analysis, I:24
Persian Kingship in Transition, Conversation With a Monarch Whose Office is Traditional & Whose Goal is Modernization, by E. A. Bayne, reviewed by Sepehr Zabih, III:522
Persien, Modell eines Entwicklunglandes oder Die Diktatur der Freien Welt, by Bahman Nirumand, reviewed by Sepehr Zabih, III:522
Piccard, Paul J., ed., *Science and Policy Issues: Lectures in Government and Science*, reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
Pi-chao Chen, The Political Economics of Population Growth: The Case of China, II:245
Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System*, I, Books 1 and 2, reviewed by Richard W. Wilson, II:295
Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*, II, reviewed by Richard W. Wilson, II:295
Ploss, Sidney I., Soviet Politics on the Eve of the 24th Party Congress, I:61
policy, public, *see* Rettig
political behavior, biological bases, *see* Corning
political development and international relations, *see* Weiner
Political Economics of Population Growth, The: The Case of China, by Pi-chao Chen, II:245
Political Science in the USSR: "To Be Or Not To Be," by Rolf H. W. Theen, IV:684
Politicheskaia nauka v SShA: kritica burzhuaznykh kontseptsii vlasti [Political Science in the U.S.A.: A Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of Power], by V. G. Kalenskii, reviewed by Rolf H. W. Theen, IV:684
political socialization, *see* Schonfeld
Political Socialization, by Kenneth P. Langton, reviewed by William R. Schonfeld, III:544
Politics and the Community of Science, by Joseph Haberer, reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
politics, ethnic, *see* Horowitz
politics, Soviet, *see* Ploss
Politics of International Currencies, The, by Susan Strange, II:215
population growth, China, *see* Pi-chao Chen
Powell, David E., The Social Costs of Modernization: Ecological Problems in the USSR, IV:618
Preston, Adrian, The Profession of Arms in Postwar Canada, 1945-1970, II:189
Price, Robert M., A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case, III:399
Profession of Arms in Postwar Canada, The, 1945-1970, by Adrian Preston, II:189
public policy, *see* Rettig

Ramazani, Rouhollah K., *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs*, reviewed by Sepehr Zabih, III:522
reference-group theory, *see* Price
Rettig, Richard A., Science, Technology, and Public Policy, II:273
Romanian Communist Party and the World Socialist System, The: A Redefinition of Unity, by Kenneth Jowitt, I:38

Salamon, Lester M., Comparative History and the Theory of Modernization, I:83
SALT, *see* Kahan
Schonfeld, William R., The Focus of Political Socialization Research: An Evaluation, III:544
Science, Technology, and Public Policy, by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
Science and Policy Issues: Lectures in Government and Science, by Paul J. Piccard, ed., reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
Scientific Research and Politics, by Lars Dencik, ed., reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Shils, Edward, ed., *Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals*, reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
Shoup, Paul, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, reviewed by Andrew C. Janos, III:493
Silvert, Kalman H., ed., *The Social Reality of Scientific Myth: Science and Social Change*, reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
Siwek-Pouydesseau, J., *Le Personnel de Direction des Ministères*, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Social Costs of Modernization, The: Ecological Problems in the USSR, by David E. Powell, IV:618
socialization, political, *see* Schonfeld
Social Reality of Scientific Myth, The: Science and Social Change, by Kalman H. Silvert, reviewed by Richard A. Rettig, II:273
Solomon, Robert L., Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia, I:1
southeast Asia, boundary concepts, *see* Solomon
Soviet critique of political science, *see* Theen
Soviet Foreign Policy Studies and Foreign Policy Models, by William Welch and Jan F. Triska, IV:704
Soviet Politics on the Eve of the 24th Party Congress, by Sidney I. Ploss, I:61
Strange, Susan, The Politics of International Currencies, II:215
Strategic Interdependence and the Politics of Inertia: Paradoxes of European Defense Cooperation, by Michael J. Brenner, IV:635
Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives, by Roman Kolkowicz, III:431
Strategies for SALT, by Jerome H. Kahan, II:171
Suleiman, Ezra N., The French Bureaucracy and Its Students: Toward the Desanctification of the State, I:121
Szyliowicz, Joseph S., Elite Recruitment in Turkey: The Role of the Mülkiye, III:371

Tang Tsou and Ping-ti Ho, eds., *China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System*, I, Books 1 and 2, reviewed by Richard W. Wilson, II:295
Tang Tsou and Ping-ti Ho, eds., *China in Crisis: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*, II, reviewed by Richard W. Wilson, II:295
technology, *see* Rettig
Theen, Rolf H. W., Political Science in the USSR: "To Be Or Not To Be," IV:684
Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States, A: Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case, by Robert M. Price, III:399
Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics, by Donald L. Horowitz, II:232
Thuiller, Guy, and Robert Catherine, *Introduction à une Philosophie de l'Administration*, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Torney, Judith V., and Robert D. Hess, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*, reviewed by William R. Schonfeld, III:544
Traité de Science Administrative, reviewed by Ezra N. Suleiman, I:121
Triska, Jan F., and William Welch, Soviet Foreign Policy Studies and Foreign Policy Models, IV:704
Turkey, elite recruitment, *see* Szyliowicz

United Nations, voting formulas, *see* Newcombe
USSR, critique of American political science, *see* Theen
USSR, ecological problems, *see* Powell
USSR, foreign policy studies, *see* Welch and Triska
USSR, strategic parity, *see* Kolkowicz

Vietnam, *see* Paige

Weiner, Myron, The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development, IV:665
Welch, William, and Jan F. Triska, Soviet Foreign Policy Studies and Foreign Policy Models, IV:704
Wert, James, Hanna Newcombe, and Alan Newcombe, Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations, III:452
Wilson, Richard W., Chinese Studies in Crisis, II:295
world socialist system, *see* Jowitt

Zabih, Sepehr, Change and Continuity in Iran's Foreign Policy in Modern Times, III:522

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXIII

October 1970—July 1971

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

KLAUS KNORR, *Chairman*

GRAHAM T. ALLISON
CYRIL E. BLACK
ROBERT A. DAHL
WILLIAM T. R. FOX
TED ROBERT GURR
MORTON A. KAPLAN
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
RAYMOND TANTER

Editors: KLAUS KNORR, CYRIL E. BLACK, HENRY BIENEN (*review articles*)
Associate Editors: FRANCINE R. FRANKEL, ROBERT G. GILPIN, EDWARD L. MORSE, ROBERT L. TIGNOR, EDWARD R. TUFTE
Executive Editor: ELSBETH G. LEWIN

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers. WORLD POLITICS does not usually accept manuscripts for which subsequent publication, even in somewhat different form, is planned.

Manuscripts should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Rates: $9.00 per year; $15.00 for two years; $20.50 for three years. Foreign postage, 50 cents additional per year. Single issue, $2.50.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *Social Sciences & Humanities Index* and the *Book Review Index*. Abstracts of its articles appear in *Historical Abstracts* and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Back issues: WORLD POLITICS is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Volumes 1-XVII are available from Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003, at $20.00 per volume. Volumes XVIII on are available from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Reprint permission: Permission to reproduce or translate material from WORLD POLITICS should be sought from the Permission Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Copyright © 1971 by Princeton University Press
"Development under Two Systems" *Copyright © 1971 by Abram Bergson*

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. July 1971. Vol. XXIII, No. 4. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS

No. 1—October 1970

Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia	*Robert L. Solomon*	1
Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Re-analysis	*Jeffery M. Paige*	24
The Romanian Communist Party and the World Socialist System: A Redefinition of Unity	*Kenneth Jowitt*	38
Soviet Politics on the Eve of the 24th Party Congress	*Sidney I. Ploss*	61
Comparative History and the Theory of Modernization	*Lester M. Salamon*	83
I Get By With a Little Help From My Friends	*Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer*	104
Review Article		
The French Bureaucracy and Its Students: Toward the Desanctification of the State	*Ezra N. Suleiman*	121

No. 2—January 1971

Strategies for SALT	*Jerome H. Kahan*	171
The Profession of Arms in Postwar Canada, 1945-1970	*Adrian Preston*	189
The Politics of International Currencies	*Susan Strange*	215
Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics	*Donald L. Horowitz*	232
The Political Economics of Population Growth: The Case of China	*Pi-chao Chen*	245
Review Articles		
Science, Technology, and Public Policy	*Richard A. Rettig*	273
Chinese Studies in Crisis	*Richard W. Wilson*	295

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

No. 3—April 1971

The Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science — *Peter A. Corning* 321

Elite Recruitment in Turkey: The Role of the Mülkiye — *Joseph S. Szyliowicz* 371

A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case — *Robert M. Price* 399

Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives — *Roman Kolkowicz* 431

Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations — *Hanna Newcombe, James Wert, and Alan Newcombe* 452

Review Articles

Ethnicity, Communism, and Political Change in Eastern Europe — *Andrew C. Janos* 493

Change and Continuity in Iran's Foreign Policy in Modern Times — *Sepehr Zabih* 522

The Focus of Political Socialization Research: An Evaluation — *William R. Schonfeld* 544

No. 4—July 1971

Development under Two Systems: Comparative Productivity Growth since 1950 — *Abram Bergson* 579

The Social Costs of Modernization: Ecological Problems in the USSR — *David E. Powell* 618

Strategic Interdependence and the Politics of Inertia: Paradoxes of European Defense Cooperation — *Michael J. Brenner* 635

The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development — *Myron Weiner* 665

Review Articles

Political Science in the USSR: "To Be Or Not To Be" — *Rolf H. W. Theen* 684

Soviet Foreign Policy Studies and Foreign Policy Models — *William Welch and Jan F. Triska* 704

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New books from the

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

edited by Leon Gordenker

*What is the present nature of the United Nations?
*What relationship does it bear to broader frameworks of world politics?
*What standards of judgment can be applied to the United Nations?
*How can we approach forecasts of the future nature, activities, and roles of the United Nations?

Six authors, all of whom have been associated with the Center, take the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations to reexamine its role and work in the world today and to anticipate its future. $7.50

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

Volume III, Conflict Management

edited by Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black

This is the third volume in a large-scale collaborative research project intended to focus the attention of international lawyers and social scientists on the near future of the international legal order. The eleven contributors to this volume come to grips with the hard realities of controlling war in our modern, interrelated world, dealing directly with the role of law in the management of conflict.

Forthcoming in August. $12.50

INDIA'S GREEN REVOLUTION

Political Costs of Economic Growth

by Francine R. Frankel

The success of the agricultural policy adopted in 1965 has given India the hope of escaping from its long-closed circle of poverty. At the same time, however, the increased rate of economic development in the Indian countryside seems to have exacerbated social tensions and accentuated disparities not only between regions but also within districts; and there is now reason to fear that it may eventually undermine the foundations of rural political stability. The author assesses the political costs of this economic growth.

Forthcoming in August. $7.50

Order from your bookstore, or from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED